Autor: Ormerod, Neil

Buch: Creation, Grace, and Redemption

Titel: Creation, Grace, and Redemption

Stichwort: Erlösung - Mittelalter; Anselm, Thomas

Kurzinhalt: It is the notions of honor and satisfaction due to dishonor that are central to Anselm's argument... Aquinas is not arguing for the necessity of the incarnation, but for its fittingness. He is not trying to deduce the truths of faith...

Textausschnitt: THE BEGINNINGS OF SYSTEM IN THE MIDDLE AGES

97d The most famous attempt at a theological systematization of soteriology is that of Anselm in his work Cur Deus homo? (Why the God-man?). Anselm makes clear his rejection of any notion that the death of Jesus should be understood as a ransom paid to the devil. Such a notion is abhorrent to him:
I do not see the force of that argument, which we are wont to make use of, that God, in order to save men, was bound, as it were, to try a contest with the devil in justice, before he did in strength, so that, when the devil should put to death that being in whom there was nothing worthy of death, and who was God, he should justly lose his power over sinners; and that, if it were not so, God would have used undue force against the devil, since the devil had a rightful ownership of man, for the devil had not seized man with violence, but man had freely surrendered to him. It is true that this might well enough be said, if the devil or man belonged to any other being than God, or were in the power of any but God. But since neither the devil nor man belong to any but God, and neither can exist without the exertion of Divine power, what cause ought God to try with his own creature, or what should he do but punish his servant, who had seduced his fellow-servant to desert their common Lord and come over to himself. (Cur Deus homo? 1.7)1

98a Rather than speak of ransom Anselm introduces the new concept of his emerging soteriology, that of "satisfaction." According to Anselm, every wish of a rational creature should be subject to the will of God, conceived of as a debt or duty:

This is the debt which man and angel owe to God, and no one who pays this debt commits sin; but every one who does not pay it sins. This is justice, or uprightness of will, which makes a being just or upright in heart, that is, in will; and this is the sole and complete debt of honor which we owe to God, and which God requires of us. For it is such a will only, when it can be exercised, that does works pleasing to God; and when this will cannot be exercised, it is pleasing of itself alone, since without it no work is acceptable. He who does not render this honor which is due to God, robs God of his own and dishonors him; and this is sin. Moreover, so long as he does not restore what he has taken away, he remains in fault; and it will not suffice merely to restore what has been taken away, but, considering the contempt offered, he ought to restore more than he took away. For as one who imperils another's safety does not enough by merely restoring his safety, without making some compensation for the anguish incurred; so he who violates another's honor does not enough by merely rendering honor again, but must, according to the extent of the injury done, make restoration in some way satisfactory to the person whom he has dishonored. We must also observe that when any one pays what he has unjustly taken away, he ought to give something which could not have been demanded of him, had he not stolen what belonged to another. So then, every one who sins ought to pay back the honor of which he has robbed God; and this is the satisfaction which every sinner owes to God. (1.11; emphasis added)

99a It is the notions of honor and satisfaction due to dishonor that are central to Anselm's argument. After much discussion he comes to his basic conclusion that satisfaction can be made only by one who is both God and human:

Anselm. But this cannot be effected, except the price paid to God for the sin of man be something greater than all the universe besides God. Boso. So it appears.
Anselm. Moreover, it is necessary that he who can give God anything of his own which is more valuable than all things in the possession of God, must be greater than all else but God himself. Boso. I cannot deny it.

Anselm. Therefore none but God can make this satisfaction. Boso. So it appears.
Anselm. But none but a man ought to do this, other wise man does not make the satisfaction. Boso. Nothing seems more just.

Anselm. If it be necessary, therefore, as it appears, that the heavenly kingdom be made up of men, and this cannot be effected unless the aforesaid satisfaction be made, which none but God can make and none but man ought to make, it is necessary for the God-man to make it. (2.6)

99b To his own satisfaction then Anselm has found necessary reasons why the incarnation had to occur, given the fact of human sinfulness. This account has proven remarkably resilient through the subsequent history of Christian thought on the redemption, to such an extent that it was on the point of formal adoption at the First Vatican Council (1869-70).2

99c Modern commentators have been less sympathetic to Anslem's argument. They have identified two major concerns. First, Anselm's account depends very much on a medieval worldview in which codes of honor were central to the way of life. Codes of honor were one of a number of interlocking elements of mutual rights and obligations in medieval society. Take these elements away and the account tends to become less convincing. Anselm's account is more culturally conditioned than he thought and hence less convincing to those of a different worldview. Second, it is difficult to square Anselm's account of how God deals with human sin with the account we find operative in the mission of Jesus. As Michael Winter points out,

Quite simply, in Jesus' own dealings with sinners and in his teaching about forgiveness, compensation is never required as a prior condition for being received back into the love of God. This is true of the parables of forgiveness, the narratives of conversion or reconciliation of individuals or in the plain teaching of Christ. Satisfaction is never required as a condition of their being reconciled with God.3
100a A further difficulty lies in Anselm's methodology. His desire to find "necessary reasons" for the incarnation means that he has narrowed the experience of salvation to one particular aspect, an aspect that may have made some sense in his own culture, but of itself is a truncation of the full reality of redemption. In Aquinas, on the other hand, we find a much more adequate account, in part because he is not seeking "necessary reasons" but simply seeking to give a fuller understanding. Indeed, he rejects the possibility of finding any necessity for the incarnation, "For God with His omnipotent power could have restored human nature in many other ways" (ST III q. 1, a. 2). Aquinas is not arguing for the necessity of the incarnation, but for its fittingness. He is not trying to deduce the truths of faith; he is trying to understand them, and the proposed intelligibility is hypothetical, not necessary. He is adding not to our certainty but to our understanding, and hence the account he gives is much fuller than Anselm can even consider. Aquinas then lists ten reasons why the incarnation is necessary, but in the sense of fitting or convenient: five under the heading "for the furtherance of the good," and another five under the heading "for our withdrawal from evil":

Now this may be viewed with respect to our "furtherance in good." First, with regard to faith, which is made more certain by believing God Himself Who speaks; hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 2): "In order that man might journey more trustfully toward the truth, the Truth itself, the Son of God, having assumed human nature, established and founded faith." Secondly, with regard to hope, which is thereby greatly strengthened; hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "Nothing was so necessary for raising our hope as to show us how deeply God loved us. And what could afford us a stronger proof of this than that the Son of God should become a partner with us of human nature?" Thirdly, with regard to charity, which is greatly enkindled by this; hence Augustine says (De Catech. Rudib. iv): "What greater cause is there of the Lord's coming than to show God's love for us?" And he afterwards adds: "If we have been slow to love, at least let us hasten to love in return." Fourthly, with regard to well-doing, in which He set us an example; hence Augustine says in a sermon (xxii de Temp.): "Man who might be seen was not to be followed; but God was to be followed, Who could not be seen. And therefore God was made man, that He Who might be seen by man, and Whom man might follow, might be shown to man." Fifthly, with regard to the full participation of the Divinity, which is the true bliss of man and end of human life; and this is bestowed upon us by Christ's humanity; for Augustine says in a sermon (xiii de Temp.): "God was made man, that man might be made God."

So also was this useful for our "withdrawal from evil." First, because man is taught by it not to prefer the devil to himself, nor to honor him who is the author of sin; hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): "Since human nature is so united to God as to become one person, let not these proud spirits dare to prefer themselves to man, because they have no bodies." Secondly, because we are thereby taught how great is man's dignity, lest we should sully it with sin; hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xvi): "God has proved to us how high a place human nature holds amongst creatures, inasmuch as He appeared to men as a true man." And Pope Leo says in a sermon on the Nativity (xxi): "Learn, O Christian, thy worth; and being made a partner of the Divine nature, refuse to return by evil deeds to your former worthlessness." Thirdly, because, "in order to do away with man's presumption, the grace of God is commended in Jesus Christ, though no merits of ours went before," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17). Fourthly, because "man's pride, which is the greatest stumbling-block to our clinging to God, can be convinced and cured by humility so great," as Augustine says in the same place. Fifthly, in order to free man from the thraldom of sin, which, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 13), "ought to be done in such a way that the devil should be overcome by the justice of the man Jesus Christ," and this was done by Christ satisfying for us. Now a mere man could not have satisfied for the whole human race, and God was not bound to satisfy; hence it behooved Jesus Christ to be both God and man. (ST III q.l.a.2)

101a Aquinas is often portrayed as simply adopting the Anselmian teaching taken up in his fifth point on "withdrawal from evil," the difference being his dropping of the strict necessity of the incarnation. However, we can see from the above that he places the work of the incarnation in a much richer context than the single explanatory concept of "satisfaction." While it is part of his armory, it is not the whole thing. Moreover, his treatment of satisfaction is more nuanced and careful (more specifically in STIII q. 1, a. 2, ad 2). It is also worth noting that Aquinas makes no explicit mention of Anselm himself, but draws heavily from Augustine. (Fs)

102a The richness of Aquinas's account rivals that of von Balthasar at the beginning of this chapter; however, it has the advantage of being also very concrete. Aquinas is trying to analyze the impact of Jesus' death, conceived of as an act of love from God toward human beings, on those who recognize this divine intent in Jesus' self-offering. He is literally asking, How does the death of Jesus move us who believe in him, and so save us? Nonetheless, it still makes little direct contact with the historical narrative of Jesus' mission as the precursor to his death. In order to make this connection we might turn to the modern anthropology of Rene Girard. (Fs)