Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Der Akt des Verstehens 4 - das den Intellekt bewegende Objekt: einfaches, zusammengesetztes Wort (incomplexum, complexum, 3 Elemente; Beispiel Kreis, Nacht, Licht; intellectus agens - phantasma; forma, species; Formalursache

Kurzinhalt: Since the intellect has two operations, it has likewise two objects that move it. In order that the intellect be able to speak either a simple or a compound word, it must first understand; ... Sufficient evidence itself, insofar as it can move any ...

Textausschnitt: 567a Since the intellect has two operations, it has likewise two objects that move it. In order that the intellect be able to speak either a simple or a compound word, it must first understand; but since it is a passive potency, in order to understand it must be moved to an act of understanding. Nothing is moved from potency to act unless it has something to move it; and this, as capable of moving something, is called a motive or motor, and as actually moving something is called a mover.1

567b In the case of the second intellectual operation, this is very obvious. Take, for example, the spoken judgment, 'I am reading a book.' Why do I utter this judgment? Because I have grasped sufficient evidence as being sufficient. So there are three elements here: the sufficient evidence itself, the grasp of the sufficient evidence as sufficient, and the judgment uttered on the grounds of the sufficiency of the evidence. Now, a judgment is a compound word. Grasping the sufficiency of evidence is a reflective act of understanding whence there is spoken a compound word. Sufficient evidence itself, insofar as it can move any intellect to grasp its sufficiency, is a motive, and insofar as it actually moves an intellect, it is the object moving it. (Fs)

567c But this same analysis holds in the case of the first operation of the intellect. One who first discovers the definition of something or one who learns it is not impelled by some blind spontaneity but by his mental acuity and quickness to understand. Here, for example, is the definition of a circle: 'a locus of coplanar points equidistant from a center.' Why is it so defined? Because it is obvious that a line must necessarily be perfectly round if all the radii are equal, and also that it cannot be round if any radii are unequal. But where is this obvious? Is it in grasping a nexus between abstract concepts? Certainly not, for there is only one abstract radius and only one abstract point, whereas the definition involves an infinity of radii and points. Besides, that necessary roundness which grounds and explains the definition of a circle is grasped in those equal radii themselves. Here too are three distinct elements: the equal radii represented in the imagination, the grasp of the necessary roundness in these equal radii, and the definition of a circle that proceeds from the grasp of this roundness. Now, a definition is a simple word. Grasping the necessary roundness is a direct act of understanding. The equal radii, represented in the imagination and illumined by the light of the agent intellect, as being capable of moving any intellect to understand the nature of a circle, are the motive, and as actually moving this or that particular intellect, are the object moving it. (Fs) (notabene)

569a This needs further clarification. Equal radii are easy to imagine, but the necessity of roundness cannot at all be imagined. Necessity and possibility can only be apprehended intellectually. Nevertheless, without a multiplicity of radii in a visible continuum the necessity of roundness would never be grasped; and unless we grasp this necessity, we cannot arrive at the definition of a circle, except, perhaps, like children who memorize words without understanding what they refer to. (Fs) (notabene)

569b For this reason we must distinguish between the intelligible in potency and the intelligible in act. Just as at night colors are potentially visible while in the daytime they are actually visible, so the phantasms in themselves are actually sensible but potentially intelligible. Through the illumination of the agent intellect they become actually intelligible, and then not only do we imagine equal radii but also we understand the necessity of roundness in those imagined radii.1 Upon grasping this necessity, we speak inwardly the simple word that is the definition of a circle. (Fs) (notabene)

569c We must further distinguish between the proper object of our intellect in our present state of existence, its object as the term of the first intellectual operation, and its indirect object. In seeing with our eyes or in imagining equal radii, we first and directly understand through our intellect the necessity of roundness, the form or species or quiddity or nature or formal cause2 of a circle. All of these words refer to one thing, namely, the actually intelligible as luminous in the phantasm and directly discerned by the intellect. This is the nature of the proper object of our intellect in our present state of existence in which our soul is joined to our body; and since this proper object cannot be had without a phantasm, we cannot understand anything unless our intellect turns its attention to phantasms. And then, as it now grasps the necessity of roundness in the equal radii, we form the definition of a circle and thus produce the object that is the term of this first operation. Finally, in order to know intellectually a singular thing already known by our senses and imagination, we add particular knowledge indirectly to our already acquired universal knowledge by reflecting upon the phantasm in which the species shines forth. (Fs)