Autor: Ormerod, Neil

Buch: Creation, Grace, and Redemption

Titel: Creation, Grace, and Redemption

Stichwort: Erbsünde: Mittelalter; Sünde - Gnade; Ur- Gerechtigkeit; Konkupiszenz: Augustinus (K. nach der Taufe) - Thomas (K. ungeordnet in Relation zur Ur-Gerechtigkeit)

Kurzinhalt: ... central to this speculative development was the emergence of a distinction between grace and nature, where grace is "supernatural," beyond what can be achieved by "nature" conceived of as a metaphysical principle of being.

Textausschnitt: 71c The Middle Ages witnessed the beginning of a more speculative exploration of the notion of original sin. As we shall see in a later chapter, central to this speculative development was the emergence of a distinction between grace and nature, where grace is "supernatural," beyond what can be achieved by "nature" conceived of as a metaphysical principle of being. According to this view, human nature remains substantially constant before and after the fall, for if there were a substantial change in human nature we would simply cease to be human. What differs is not human nature per se but the overall relationship of human beings to God and divine grace. Significantly, the scholastic theologians of the Middle Ages conceived of Adam and Eve as the recipients of a special grace, which they called "original justice," prior to their first sin. This grace ordered their passions to their will and their will to God. Because of this special grace Adam and Eve could do more than nature itself could achieve on its own. After the fall, however, they lost this original justice. Their passions were no longer ordered by their will, and they experienced concupiscence. This position is significantly different from that of Augustine. For Augustine, concupiscence is the disordering of the passions that arises from original sin, and at times is even equated with original sin. For Aquinas, concupiscence is the natural state to which the passions are returned when human beings are deprived of original justice. In a state of pure nature, which "historically" never existed, the desires are not disordered but unordered. The ordering of the passions is the moral task of self-constitution, through the practice of the virtues. The passions can be thought of as disordered only relative to their supernatural ordering in the state of original justice. (Fs) (notabene)

72a This speculative advance allowed Aquinas to solve a problem of Augustine's position. Augustine found it difficult to distinguish between concupiscence and original sin itself, because of his confusion between the problem of finitude and the problem of sin. [eg: der vorige Satz ab "because" ist unklar] He thus found it difficult to explain why concupiscence remained after baptism, which in faith he believed removed original sin. Aquinas, on the other hand, spoke of concupiscence as the "material" component of original sin. Its "formal" component, however, is our lack of original justice, caused by the fall of Adam (ST I-IIq. 82, a. 3). People may suffer to a greater or lesser extent from concupiscence, but in every case the formal component or meaning is the same-it is the absence of original justice (ST I-II q. 82, a. 4). Moreover, one may remove the formal component, for example, through baptism, bringing the gift of sanctifying grace; though the material component (concupiscence) remains, it no longer has the same "formal" meaning. Concupiscence is only "disordered" relative to the supernatural gift of grace; otherwise it is simply a lack of order, an order to be imposed through the growth of natural and supernatural virtues, through a process of moral maturation. (Fs) (notabene)