Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Actio (poesis, factio); Aristotelels, Thomas: motivum, mobile (kineton), movens, motum, motus (kinesis); Tätigkeit mit/ohne Bewegung im engen Sinn

Kurzinhalt: For just as one and the same reality is the act both of the motor and of the movable, so also one and the same act is that of the sounding bell and of the one who hears it, and in general of the sensible and the sentient; for otherwise every mover ...

Textausschnitt: 7 Action (poiesis, factio)


543c Let us consider now that action which is not act (energeia) but the predicament or category of action, and perhaps, speaking more generally, the exercise of efficient causality. Here one must distinguish three things: (1) Aristotle's own terminology, (2) Aristotelian terminology as modified somewhat by St Thomas, and (3) another terminology found mostly in the Scriptum super Sententias and in the Quaestio disputata de potentia. (Fs)

543d First, then, Aristotle distinguished motive or motor (kinetikon/motivum), mobile or movable (kineton/mobile), mover (kinoun/movens), moved (kinoumenon/motum), and motion (kinesis/motus). The motive or motor is active potency, the motive force; mobile or movable is passive potency; and in one and the same act the motor becomes the mover, and the mobile or movable becomes the moved. This act is the motion, which is received in the movable but produced by the mover. Aristotle proves that nothing is received per se in the motor when it becomes an actual mover, because otherwise it would follow that every mover would itself be moved, which is impossible if there is any motion at all. (Fs) (notabene)

543e Now this one same act that is produced by the mover and received in the movable has a twofold relation, one to the mover from which it proceeds and the other to the moved in which it exists. Hence arise the definitions of action and passion. Action is the act of this as proceeding from this, that is, the act of the mover as from the mover, while passion is the act of this as being in this, that is, the act of the moved as present in the moved. See In III Phys., lect. 4 and 5. (Fs) (notabene)

543f Note1 that St Thomas makes use of this Aristotelian theorem in solving a famous difficulty in trinitarian theology. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 28, a. 3, ad 1m. (Fs) (notabene)

345a Note also that St Thomas does not restrict this Aristotelian analysis to material things or to motion in the strict sense of the word. For just as one and the same reality is the act both of the motor and of the movable, so also one and the same act is that of the sounding bell and of the one who hears it, and in general of the sensible and the sentient; for otherwise every mover would itself be moved. See In III De anima, lect. 2, §§592-93. (Fs) (notabene)

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345b Second, this Aristotelian terminology is sometimes slightly modified by St Thomas. According to Aristotle, action and passion are identical with the motion itself. According to St Thomas's modification, action is the denomination of the agent from the patient or receiver, and passion is the denomination of the patient from the agent; see his commentary, In III Phys., lect. 5, ¶15, §614; see also ¶13, §612. Hence, it is possible that in creation, wherein there is no motion, there are nevertheless the relations of active and passive creation. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2m; a. 3 c. (Fs) (notabene)

345c Third, there exists also another quite different terminology according to which action is conceived 'as being from the agent,' or 'as proceeding from the agent into the other.' That there is only a verbal and not a real difference between this terminology and the Aristotelian is clear from the following passage:

That which is attributed to something as proceeding from it to something else does not enter into composition with it, as neither does action [enter into composition] with the agent ... [In the case of a relation of one thing to another,] without any change in that which is related to another, a relation can cease to be through the mere change alone of the other; as also is clear about action, that there is no movement as regards action except metaphorically and improperly; as we say that one passing from leisure to act is changed; which would not be the case if relation or action signified something remaining in the subject. (De potentia, q. 7, a. 8 c; see also ibid. a. 9, ad 7m.)
See Theological Studies 3 (1942) 377-81 [Grace and Freedom 68-73].2

345d Finally, it is true that Aristotle in working out his theory of action is speaking diretly about motion in the strict sense. Now it is also true that St Thomas wrote, 'Action as a predicament, or category, refers to something flowing from an agent and with motion.' Super I Sententiarum, d. 8, q. 4, a. 3, ad 3m. But it is also true that St Thomas applied this analysis both to cognitive acts and to the gifts of divine grace, and used it to illustrate his teaching on both creation and the Trinity. As he knew perfectly well, action takes place with motion in the strict sense and also takes place without motion in the strict sense; and concerning this latter action without motion he writes: 'This is hard to understand for those who are unable to abstract their consideration from actions that take place with motion.' Quaestiones quodlibetales, 5, a. 9 c. See also Summa theologies, 1, q. 41, a. 1, ad 2m. (Fs)

547a Concerning the question of physical premotion, since it is not pertinent here, it will suffice to refer you to what I have written in Theological Studies 3 (1942) 381-402 [Grace and Freedom 73-93].3