Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Hervorgang (processio) - Sendung (missio); Problem: absolute Vollkommenheit - kontingente Ursache -> 3 Thesen; Lösung: konstituiert in der göttlichen Relation bei nachfolgender kontingenter Realität

Kurzinhalt: ASSERTION 17/1 - The mission of a divine person is constituted by a divine relation of origin in such a way that it still demands an appropriate external term as a consequent condition.

Textausschnitt: ASSERTION 17

The mission of a divine person is constituted by a divine relation of origin in such a way that it still demands an appropriate external term as a consequent condition.
Meaning of the assertion

455d Since it is clear from the foregoing that the Son is sent by the Father, and the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son, we now go on to ask about the ontological constitution of a mission. (Fs)

455e Since we have more fully explained elsewhere what is meant by 'ontological constitution,"1 it will suffice here to illustrate this notion by an example. Let us suppose that it is true that 'Peter is this wise man.' Then, to ask about the ontological constitution of this truth is nothing else than to ask what in reality is required and is sufficient for it to be true that Peter is this wise man. Now, the following are required and are sufficient: (1) an act of existence, for it to be true that Peter is, (2) individuating matter, for it to be true that Peter is this, (3) a human substantial form, for it to be true that Peter is this man, (4) the habit of wisdom received in his possible intellect, for it to be true that Peter is wise, and (5) a being-which, a subsistent, composed of all the above, in order to have Peter with these attributes. (Fs) (notabene)

457a We ask, therefore, what is required and is sufficient for it to be true that the Son is sent by the Father, and that the Holy Spirit is sent by the Father and the Son. (Fs)

457b We answer this question with two assertions: first, that the mission of a divine person is constituted by a divine relation of origin itself; second, that although such a mission is constituted by a relation of origin alone, nevertheless an appropriate external term is required. Therefore we are saying nothing more than what we have said previously, in a general way in assertion 15 concerning all that are truly predicated contingently of the divine persons, and in the same general way concerning those predications that attribute a cognitive, volitional, or productive contingent operation to a divine person as divine, and in a particular way when treating elsewhere the ontological constitution of Christ.'2
For the present we are not determining the nature of the appropriate term of the missions but will leave that for later questions. (Fs)

Various opinions

457c Regarding what is truly predicated contingently of one or other divine person as divine, two points are clear, namely, (1) that nothing real and intrinsic is added to a divine person as divine on account of such a truth, and (2) that such a truth has no correspondence with reality without an appropriate external term. The first is clear, because a divine person as divine is immutable; the second is also clear, because there can be no contingent truth without a contingent reality. (Fs) (notabene)

457d However, regarding the constitution of these contingent truths, there are three principal divisions among theologians. (Fs)

To the first group belong those who hold that such a contingent truth is constituted not by the unchanged divine reality but by the appropriate external term - that is to say, inasmuch as this term regards in a special way the divine person about whom a true contingent predication is made. Thus, concerning the incarnation, the followers of Scotus and Tiphanus posit a special relation in the assumed nature to the assuming Word alone. Similarly, concerning the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit, many authors hold that this gift is constituted as given by the fact that there is in sanctifying grace a special relation to the divine gift, which gift is in fact either the Holy Spirit himself or is said to be the Holy Spirit by appropriation. (Fs) (notabene)

457e Others, however, are of the opinion that each and every thing is constituted by its own proper reality and that therefore the relation alone of the term does not suffice. Hence, to this second group belong those who say that these contingent truths are constituted by some sort of union of the infinite and the finite. They hold that just as matter and form are united, or essence and existence, or potency and act, so also the infinite and the finite are united in some preeminent manner. Concerning the incarnation, this is the opinion of those who suppose some eminent actuation of the assumed human essence through the divine existence of the Word; and, in a similar way, a number of theologians since Petavius want to conceive the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit as given somehow by way of some form of our sanctification or at least of adoption.3 (Fs)

459a Still others consider that the finite is composed of intrinsic causes because it is finite, so that there is no true similitude between the constitution of the infinite and the composition of a finite being. And since these also hold that each thing is constituted by its proper reality, they have recourse to the infinite divine reality as infinite. (Fs) (notabene)
459b The opinion of the third group, which we are defending, distinguishes first of all between that which is added to the infinite, namely, nothing, and that which is constituted by the infinite, namely, what is not finite. (Fs)

459c Next, it finds an analogy, not in created things, but in divinity itself. For just as God knows that contingent things exist through his own knowledge, and not through an external term, which is nevertheless required, and just as God wills that contingent things exist through his own volition, and not through an external term, which is nevertheless required, and just as God makes contingent things exist through his own omnipotence and not through an external term, which is nevertheless required, so also the [incarnate] Son is all that he is through his own proper divine act of existence and not through an external term, which is nevertheless absolutely required,4 and the Holy Spirit is sent through that which the Holy Spirit is and not through an external term, which is nevertheless absolutely required. (Fs) (notabene)

459d According to this third opinion, then, both what is common and what is proper, and what is necessary and what is contingent, are truly predicated of divine persons as divine. All of these are constituted by the very reality of the divine person, the common by their common reality, the proper by their proper reality, the necessary without any condition, and finally the contingent with a consequent condition. But if no one can deny that common contingent truths are constituted by the divine reality, with a consequent condition - that God knows that contingent things exist by his own knowledge,5 and so on - one can hardly assign a reason why proper contingent truths are not likewise constituted by the very reality of a divine person, with a consequent condition. (Fs) (notabene)

461a We have considered the opinions of these three groups separately. Considerable clarity will be added if we compare them with one another. (Fs)

461b The greatest difference is between the first and the third. In the first, a divine procession is presupposed, but a mission is found formally in an external term. In the third, however, an external term is indeed required as a consequent condition, but the mission of a divine person itself is constituted by a divine relation of origin. The second group occupies the middle ground between these two extremes, maintaining that a mission is constituted according to some remote analogy taken from composite things. (Fs) (notabene)

461c Now, from the first opinion there follows the corresponding doctrine put forth by Galtier: that while a procession belongs to the formality of a mission, still a term is what determines and constitutes it;6 that a mission presupposes and includes an eternal procession, but exists formally from the production of a new effect;7 that external operations are common, that relations of a creature to God are consequent upon these operations, and since there is nothing proper to the Holy Spirit in an operation, there can be nothing proper to the Holy Spirit in such a relation; that therefore it is by appropriation that the Holy Spirit is said to be sent invisibly;8 and that the Greek Fathers themselves do not assert such a proper operation or a consequent relation.9

461d The third opinion proceeds in the opposite way. For if the Holy Spirit is really and truly sent by the Father and the Son, there is present in the Holy Spirit himself a real relation, 'who from others.' This real relation is really identical with passive spiration but conceptually distinguished from it. It is really identical, because nothing real and intrinsic can be added to the infinite perfection of a divine person; it is conceptually distinct, because passive spiration is eternal and necessary and needs no created term, whereas a mission is temporal and contingent and requires a created consequent term as a condition. You can hardly say that this is most strange, since it is exactly what you hold with regard to God as really and truly knowing, willing, and creating contingent things, namely, that such knowing, willing, and creating adds nothing to pure act except a conceptual relation. (Fs) (notabene)

463a But the greatest theological difference is between the first and the third opinion. For according to the third opinion, a term follows a mission, and therefore if there is a mission there is necessarily a term. Nor is there any requirement that scripture or the Fathers posit a term that theologians consider appropriate; it is quite sufficient that the sources of revelation affirm that one divine person is the one sending and another the one sent.10 But according to the first opinion, a mission follows a term, and unless an appropriate term as such is clearly and distinctly affirmed in the documents, a theologian can doubt whether the question here is really about a mission in the proper sense.11 (Fs) (notabene Fußnoten)

463b The second and third opinions differ in the analogies they use. The second opinion seeks an analogy in composite created things, so that the union of the just and the Spirit that is given is conceived as somehow like the union of matter and form or of potency and act.12 The third opinion, however, seeks its analogy in the divinity itself: just as proper contingents are predicated of one or other of the divine persons, so common contingents are predicated of the three divine persons; and just as the latter are constituted by infinite act with the addition of a conceptual relation, so also the former are similarly constituted by an infinite relation of origin with the addition of a conceptual relation. (Fs)