Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Sujekt: zeitliches, ewiges S. in Relation auf die intellektuelle Natur; temporales Subjekt 1-4; intellektuelle Tätigkeit - 2 Phasen: spontan - habituell

Kurzinhalt: QUESTION 21/2 ... First, then, temporal subjects are subjects of another nature besides the intellectual. For an intellectual nature as such is immaterial, ...

Textausschnitt: 403a With these observations in mind, we will relate, first temporal and then eternal subjects, to what they are subjects of in their respective intellectual natures. (Fs)

403b First, then, temporal subjects are subjects of another nature besides the intellectual. For an intellectual nature as such is immaterial, and therefore a subject lacking another and material nature would not be a temporal subject. (Fs) (notabene)

403c Second, the intellectual nature of a temporal subject is potential, and that in two ways. First, temporal subjects are said to be in the genus of intellectual beings only as potency, since initially our intellect is a tabula rasa, a slate upon which nothing has been written. Second, the actuation of our intellectual nature is, in a sense,1 only a form and an act presupposing sentient life. It is in a sense a form, in accordance with the first operation of the intellect, that is, insofar as we inquire about sensible data, understand causes in these data, and conceive the causes understood, together with abstract common matter. And it is in a sense an act, in accordance with the second operation of the intellect and the consequent operation of the will, that is, insofar as by reflecting on concepts we ask whether something is so, weigh the evidence, make speculative or practical judgments, and make choices in accord with our judgments. This intellectual informing and actuation of sentient life presupposes that sentient life; for unless we are rendered conscious through the operation of our senses, we cannot operate at all by intellect or will, since in this life we actually understand absolutely nothing except in a phantasm.2

403d Third, temporal subjects are per accidens the subjects of their intellectual nature as actuated before they are per se the subjects of their intellectual nature as actuated. (Fs)

403e Anything whatever is said to be per se or per accidens depending upon whether it comes to be by the intention of the agent or apart from the intention of the agent. Now, if one considers the intention of that agent who created and conserves the nature of a temporal subject and who applies it to its action, it is quite clear that the intellectual nature of a temporal subject is actuated per se. But if one considers the intention of temporal subjects themselves, it is also clear that the actuation of their intellectual nature cannot be intended before they know that they have an intellectual nature; nor is it any less evident that temporal subjects cannot know that they have an intellectual nature before this nature has been actuated. (Fs)

405a Besides, just as temporal subjects become actually inquiring, understanding, judging, and willing not by their own intention but by a natural spontaneity, so also the same temporal subjects conduct their intellectual operations spontaneously before they learn how to direct them in accordance with their own understood and approved and chosen intention. For this fully conscious and deliberate self-direction presupposes an exact and very difficult knowledge of their own intellectual nature in all its intrinsic norms and exigencies, and this exact and difficult knowledge can be had only through their intellectual operations. Consequently, until this knowledge is acquired, the intellectual operations of temporal subjects must necessarily be conducted in accord with the spontaneity of that intellectual light which in us is a created participation in uncreated light. (Fs) (notabene)

405b From this it is clear that there are two phases of a temporal subject: the first is a prior phase, when by one's natural spontaneity one is the subject of one's actuated intellectual nature; the second is a subsequent phase, when, as knowing and willing, one is by one's own intention the subject of one's intellectual nature both as actuated and as to be actuated further. (Fs) (notabene)

405c Fourth, the condition of a temporal subject is such that one can hardly make the transition from the first phase to the second apart from the influence of other temporal subjects. (Fs)

405d For temporal subjects intellectually inform and actuate their sense life by their own intention to the extent that they experience a true self-revelation and a genuine self-acceptance. This revelation takes place either concretely and symbolically or technically and exactly: concretely and symbolically, as a particular human culture or way of life develops as delineated and expressed in its mores, customs, precepts, and stories; technically and exactly, as human nature is studied in science and philosophy.23 But it is obvious that both objectifications of human nature presuppose collaboration on the part of many; and it is also clear that all temporal subjects are greatly helped through the influence of others to come to a willing acceptance of this revelation of their human nature. (Fs)