Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Bewusstsein, Definition; bewusst: Prädikat in drei Weisen

Kurzinhalt: Let us therefore define consciousness as that awareness that is had on the side of the subject and that regards not the object but the subject of an act, and the act itself, or even an action of that subject.

Textausschnitt: The Notion of Consciousness

379a 'Conscious' is predicated in three ways: (1) of the subject that is conscious, (2) of the act by which the subject is conscious, and (3) of the action whereby one act of the subject emanates from another act. Thus a man is said to be conscious; so also sensing, understanding, judging, choosing are said to be conscious; and finally reflection, whereby a judgment emanates from a grasp of evidence, and deliberation, whereby a choice emanates from a consideration of means, are also said to be conscious.1 (Fs) (notabene)

379b Consciousness, then, belongs to the genus of knowledge, since it involves some type of awareness; but it is distinguished from other species of knowing in that it denotes awareness not of an object but of the subject and of the act of the subject or even of an action of the subject. Our consciousness, therefore, is not of what we see but of ourselves seeing, not of what we hear but of ourselves hearing, not of what we understand but of ourselves understanding, not of what, we define but of ourselves defining, not of what we affirm but of ourselves affirming, not of what we choose but of ourselves choosing, not of what we desire or fear but of ourselves desiring or fearing. Besides, although we can understand, define, affirm, and love ourselves, even here a distinction must be made between what we know or desire on the side of the object and what we are aware of on the side of the subject, so that the latter belongs to consciousness but the former belongs to another species of knowledge or to appetition. Finally, although this knowledge of oneself on the side of the object is attained only through some type of introspective reflection, it would be quite incorrect to conclude that consciousness itself is attained through some type of reflection or introspection. For whether we are reflecting upon ourselves or are concerned with entirely other things that we are apprehending or desiring, we are present to ourselves in either case; and it is inasmuch as we are thus present to ourselves, and not inasmuch as we know ourselves as objects, that we have consciousness in the true sense of the word.2 (Fs)

381a Let us therefore define consciousness as that awareness that is had on the side of the subject and that regards not the object but the subject of an act, and the act itself, or even an action of that subject. (Fs)

381b Finally, note that 'conscious' adds nothing to being but denotes being itself at a certain degree of ontological perfection. Therefore, whatever is required and sufficient in order to say truly that Peter senses or understands is also required and sufficient to say truly that Peter consciously senses or consciously understands. To speak of sensing unconsciously, or of someone sensing unconsciously, or of understanding unconsciously, or of someone understanding unconsciously, is but an empty figment of the imagination. (Fs)