Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Trinität; Person - Kommunikation - Unmitteilbarkeit (incommunicability); Vorüberlegungen: Einheit (dreifach); Analogie: Seiendes (Subsistentes)

Kurzinhalt: QUESTION 17/1 -- How is person related to incommunicability and to interpersonal communication?; For an understanding of this question we must begin with the meaning of 'one.' There are three uses of'one.'

Textausschnitt: QUESTION 17 -- How is person related to incommunicability and to interpersonal communication?

345d For an understanding of this question we must begin with the meaning of 'one.' There are three uses of'one.' First, 'one' is used numerically, in relation to discrete quantity; in this way, regarding material objects we distinguish the first, the second, the third, and so on. Second, 'one' is used formally, or in relation to a nature, and in this way we say that a pile of stones is one per accidens but a man is one per se; for there is in a man, but not in a pile as such, a formal, natural principle whence there is unity among the many parts. Third, 'one' is used in an actual sense, and in this way 'one' is defined as that which is undivided in itself and divided from everything else. What this means is simply that everything whatever is subject to the principle of identity ('undivided in itself) and to the principle of noncontradiction ('divided from everything else').1 (Fs; tblVrw) (notabene)
347a Now, numerical unity is not part of the essential meaning of person, since angels and the divine persons are entirely immaterial. Nor does natural unity belong to the essential meaning of person, for in Christ there is one person but two natures, and in God there is one nature but three persons. Therefore, the kind of unity that belongs to person is actual unity. (Fs)

1.Kommentar (23/09/09): Sertillanges, SETH_37; siehe auch Liddy:

347b Thus, actual unity adds only negations to being; for 'undivided in itself negates internal division, and 'divided from everything else' negates commingling with anything else. Therefore, since negations add nothing to things, something is one in the same way and with the same perfection as it is being. But being is predicated analogously. Therefore, actual unity is also predicated by analogy, so that the same notion is verified differently in different things. (Fs) (notabene)

347c Furthermore, the analogy of being implies especially three divisions among beings. First, some are called beings which, however, do not subsist; such are the intrinsic causes of a being; accidents, to which it belongs to exist in another; possible beings, which add nothing in reality to the potency of an agent or even to that of matter; and conceptual beings, which exist only in the mind. Again, some are beings in the strict sense, because they themselves subsist even-though not all that belongs to them subsists; such are minerals, plants, animals, humans, and angels, all of which subsist and yet are composed of intrinsic nonsubsistent principles. Finally, there is the act of existence itself that not only subsists but also is absolutely simple, so that everything that is really identical with it also subsists; such is God, and God alone. (Fs) (notabene)

347d The analogy of actual unity is consequent upon this analogy of being. Just as nonsubsistents are beings in a lesser sense, so they are actually one in a lesser sense. The constitutive principles of a being are mutually related, so that the definition of each implies the definition of another; therefore, although they are undivided in themselves, still they are not simply divided from one another. The same reasoning applies to accidents, and all the more to possible beings and conceptual beings. As created subsistent beings are in the strict sense, so also they are one in the strict sense; yet they are multiple in a certain respect since they are composed of many intrinsic causes. Besides, although subsistents are (in the strict sense of are) on the basis of an act of existence, still in regard to operation they need one another, in accordance with the order of the universe. Since the subsistent act of existence itself is absolutely simple, as it is most perfectly being, so it is most perfectly one. (Fs) (notabene)

349a Once this is grasped, we must add a further point. From intellectual emanations there follow real relations that are really distinct from one another. Now such relations, except those in God, have no greater being or unity than that which is found at the lowest ontological level of the nonsubsistents. And if there are such relations in God, then, since God is absolutely simple, these relations are also God, and therefore subsist; nor do they subsist by participation, as do minerals, plants, animals, humans, and angels; they subsist by essence, since their existence is divine existence and their subsistence is divine subsistence. Therefore, the real divine relations possess the most perfect reality and subsistence. But 'one' adds only negations to being, so that all perfection of unity is both had and measured from the perfection of being. Therefore, just as the real divine relations possess the most perfect reality and subsistence, so also they possess the most perfect unity. (Fs)