Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Trinität, Relation; Vaterschaft, Sohnschaft; Relation "in" und "zu" (being in - being to); göttliche Relationen: real unterschieden voneinander, begrifflich unterschieden von Gottes Wesen

Kurzinhalt: QUESTION 7 - What is the value of the distinction between 'being in' and 'being to'?

Textausschnitt: QUESTION 7
What is the value of the distinction between 'being in' and 'being to'?

289c The category of relation differs from the other categories in that relations are distinguished into real relations and conceptual relations. There is no similar distinction for substances or qualities or other predicaments. (Fs)

289d Moreover, a composite concept is reduplicated in two ways: for a real relation can be considered either as it is a relation or as it is real. These two reduplications are usually termed 'being to' and 'being in.' For just as it is proper to a substance to be through itself, and just as it is proper to an accident in the strict sense to be in another, so it is proper to a relation as a relation to be to another. Hence, a real relation as a relation is said 'to be to.' Furthermore, since in general all relations are accidents, they have that reality that is proper to accidents, namely, 'to be in,' and therefore a real relation as real is said 'to be in.' (Fs) (notabene)

291a From this we conclude that 'being to' and 'being in' are not to be conceived after the manner of essence and existence so as to form a whole out of parts, but are to be conceived as two aspects of one real relation. (Fs)

291a This distinction, based on reduplication, is valuable in two ways, and has one danger. (Fs)

291b It is valuable, first, because the real distinctions among the divine persons arise, not from the affirmation and nonaffirmation of the same formality, but in the single real affirmation of mutually opposed relations. In other words, the real distinction of the persons arises proximately from one 'being-to' opposing another 'being-to.'

Second, it is valuable because of the fact that the Son has all that the Father has, except paternity. The Son is not really distinct from God; God is not really distinct from the Father; yet the Son is really distinct from the Father, because the distinction of persons is by reason of the mutual opposition of one 'being-to' and another 'being-to.' The same value is clear from the fact that '... God ... is not less in each one [of the persons] nor greater in all three [together]; for there is no less reality when any one of the persons is individually called God, nor is there more when all three persons are declared to be one God' (DB 279, DS 529, ND 312). That is to say, the distinction of the persons is grounded not on real contradictory affirmations but on the mutual opposition of one 'being-to' and another 'being-to.'

291c The one danger is that one may lose sight of the fact that 'being to' is only a reduplicated aspect of a real relation, and this occurs more easily when the discussion concerns a mystery. In fact, there would be no mystery of the Trinity at all if three merely conceptual beings were attributed to one pure infinite act. This seems sometimes to be supposed, when difficulties and problems are solved too neatly and efficiently. (Fs) (notabene)

291d Hence, it is most important to note that we apprehend the same divine reality that is both truly one and truly threefold according to two conceptually distinct aspects, so that according to the absolute aspect there is one God and according to the relative aspect there are three subsistent relations really distinct from one another. The three relations, therefore, are no less real than the one essence, since the relations as well as the essence are equally present in the supreme divine reality. And yet there is no real distinction between essence and each real relation, since there is only a conceptual distinction between the absolute and the relative aspects of God. (Fs) (notabene)

293a Accordingly, when a real relation is reduplicated to consider a real relation as relation (being to) and a real relation as real (being in), it is entirely true that the real distinction between the relations arises proximately from 'being to.' But it is equally true that the same distinction between the relations would not be real but only conceptual if there were only the 'being to' without a real 'being in'; for if they are not real, then mutually opposed relations are not really distinct from one another. (Fs)

Further, it is entirely true that the Son has all that the Father has, except paternity, since filiation is really identical with deity and deity with paternity. But it is no less true that both paternity and filiation are real, and that the distinction between real paternity and real filiation is a real distinction. (Fs)

293b Again, it is entirely true that God is not diminished in each or increased in the Three, because the whole divine reality is possessed by each, and nothing more than the whole divine reality is possessed by the Three together. But it is equally true that the three real relations, which are all really distinct from one another, are conceptually distinct from the divine essence. (Fs)

Having understood this, one can easily see the value and at the same time the danger of this distinction. Since truth is one thing and the whole truth is another, it is one thing to throw more light on the divine unity and quite another to throw more light simultaneously on both the divine unity and the divine trinity. The former is what this distinction does, and therefore it has a very great value. But no short and simple distinction can achieve the latter, since we are dealing with a mystery hidden in God. Therefore, since we confess both trinity in unity and unity in trinity, we may by no means argue on the basis of this distinction between 'being to' and 'being in' as if the whole doctrine of the Trinity were contained in this distinction alone. Although this distinction is true, although it is most useful, and although there is no danger in it as long as abuse is avoided, still abuse creeps in as soon as one supposes, even implicitly, that any partial truth is the whole truth.1 (Fs)

Fußnote "whole truth":

29 [Lonergan's remark in this question that difficulties and problems concerning the unity and the threefoldness of God are solved 'too neatly and efficiently' through the use of the distinction between 'being in' and 'being to' is an obvious reference to some of the trinitarian literature with which he was familiar. In that literature, it seems, the distinction occasioned a perhaps unwitting semirationalist distortion of trinitarian theology, of the kind condemned by Vatican 1. Accordingly, Lonergan has a twofold concern in this question. First, he is concerned to emphasize that, while the distinction based on the reduplication of the composite concept 'real relation' does not capture the whole truth of the doctrine of the Trinity, it is a legitimate, valuable, and fruitful instrument of understanding when judiciously employed. For with the context of the preceding discussion, the distinction facilitates one in holding together in imperfect understanding and affirming that in God there is both real trinity in unity and real unity in trinity. At the same time, however, he is at pains to warn against the semirationalist distortion of the distinction that overlooks or forgets that 'being to' is only a reduplicated aspect of a real relation.]