Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Relation: Vater - Sohn: identisch mit Gott real, aber nicht begrifflich; Beispiel: sterblich - unsterblich, Vater - Sohn

Kurzinhalt: QUESTION 6/2 - Is it possible for the real divine relations to be really distinct from one another ...; we grant that what are identical with one third thing both really and conceptually are identical with one another; but what are identical with one ...

Textausschnitt: 285c The objection that was put at the beginning of this question can be stated as follows, together with the replies and the further objections. (Fs)

What are identical with one third thing are identical with one another; but the Father and the Son are identical with the one God, and therefore are identical with one another. (Fs)

In response, we grant that what are identical with one third thing both really and conceptually are identical with one another; but what are identical with one third thing in reality but not conceptually are not identical with one another. And we deny that the Father and the Son are identical with the one God both in reality and conceptually; we do concede that they are identical with the one God in reality but not conceptually. (Fs)
(notabene)

287a It might be urged that a conceptual distinction can contribute nothing to making a real distinction. (Fs)
In response, we grant that through a merely verbal distinction, nothing is produced pertaining to a real distinction. We deny that nothing is produced pertaining to a real distinction when diverse intelligible conceptions, namely, that of the absolute and that of the relative, are verified in the same reality. (Fs)
287b It might be urged further that there cannot be verified in the same reality intelligible conceptions so diverse as to be able to ground a real distinction. (Fs)

In response, we grant that in the same reality there cannot be verified intelligible conceptions so diverse as to be able to ground a real distinction between absolutes, or a real distinction between relatives that are not mutually opposed; but we deny that diverse intelligible conceptions verified in the same reality cannot ground a real distinction between relatives that are mutually opposed. The reason is that both absolutes and relatives not mutually opposed are really distinguished only through affirmation and nonaffirmation of the same conception, and obviously a single conception cannot be simultaneously affirmed and not affirmed by reason of the same reality. On the other hand, we have shown that real and mutually opposed relatives are really distinct by reason of their mutual opposition; and there is no contradiction in the fact that mutually opposed relatives are verified in the same reality. (Fs) (notabene)

287b It might be urged further that there cannot be verified in the same reality intelligible conceptions so diverse as to be able to ground a real distinction. (Fs)

In response, we grant that in the same reality there cannot be verified intelligible conceptions so diverse as to be able to ground a real distinction between absolutes, or a real distinction between relatives that are not mutually opposed; but we deny that diverse intelligible conceptions verified in the same reality cannot ground a real distinction between relatives that are mutually opposed. The reason is that both absolutes and relatives not mutually opposed are really distinguished only through affirmation and nonaffirmation of the same conception, and obviously a single conception cannot be simultaneously affirmed and not affirmed by reason of the same reality. On the other hand, we have shown that real and mutually opposed relatives are really distinct by reason of their mutual opposition; and there is no contradiction in the fact that mutually opposed relatives are verified in the same reality. (Fs) (notabene)

287c Still, one might object, at least there is no concrete possibility for mutually opposed relatives to be verified in the same reality. For there is no instance of this whatever in creation; and in God this can be conceived only by positing a real procession in which the really same act somehow or other originates from itself. (Fs)
To this we answer that, although there is in the created world no instance that has been proven or is perfectly understood by us of mutually opposed relations being verified in the same reality, nevertheless such an instance is to be believed with certitude from divine revelation, and is to some extent understood by us. (Fs)

For from faith we are certain that the same God is Father and Son, and that the Father is not the Son. (Fs)
287d We understand this to a certain extent through the psychological analogy. For the present problem is but a transposition of the problem with which we began, namely, how the Son is both from himself and not from himself, or how there is present both the reality of the emanation and the consubstantiality of that which emanates. For if these two are present, there are also two real, mutually opposed ... relations, really distinct from each other and yet identical with the same divine substance. (Fs) (notabene)

287e As to what the objector adds about an act emerging from the same act, one must note the difference between the statement of the Council of Nicea and that of the Fourth Lateran. The phrase in Nicea, 'God from God,' must be understood to mean that God the Son is from God the Father, in which the name of the divine essence is expressed concretely, without prescinding from the personal relations. But in the statement of the Fourth Lateran Council, '... that reality does not generate nor is it generated nor does it proceed,' the expression 'that reality' is the divine substance, essence, or nature as conceptually distinct from the personal relations. (Fs)