Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Göttliche Relationen: voneinander unterschieden - identisch mit der göttlichen Substanz?; Identität: Relative - Absolute; Unterschied: logisch - real; real und begrifflich - real und nicht begrifflich; Aristoteles: Identität: Bewegung: actio, passio

Kurzinhalt: QUESTION 6 - Is it possible for the real divine relations to be really distinct from one another and really identical with one and the same divine substance?

Textausschnitt: QUESTION 6
Is it possible for the real divine relations to be really distinct from one another and really identical with one and the same divine substance?

279d It seems impossible, since two things that are the same as a third thing are identical with one another. Hence, if real relations are really distinct from one another, they cannot be really identical with one and the same divine substance. If, however, they are really identical with one and the same divine substance, they cannot be really distinct from one another. (Fs)

281a But against this is the fact that the Father is not the Son, and nevertheless one and the same God is the Father and is the Son. (Fs)

In replying to this question, we must point out that it has two aspects. The first aspect is logical, in that an appeal is made to the principle of compared identity, namely, that two that are identical with a third are identical with each other. The other aspect is real, since absolutes and relatives are not real in the same way and are not really distinct from each other in the same way. (Fs)

281b As far as the logical aspect is concerned, the formality of the principle of identity is the same as that of the principle of contradiction; for the principle of identity is simply the positive statement of that whose opposite is negated by the principle of contradiction. Now all agree that it is illegitimate to apply the principle of contradiction whenever the question is about either different things or about the same thing under different aspects; therefore, the only thing denied by the principle of contradiction is that the same thing in the same way - the same both really and conceptually - both is and is not. It is similarly illegitimate to apply the principle of identity whenever the question is about different things or about the same thing under different aspects; therefore, the only thing that falls under the principle of identity is the same thing under the same aspect - the same thing both really and conceptually. (Fs)

281c In view of this it is quite easy to reply to the above objection, since it incorrectly appeals to the principle of compared identity. The real divine relations are identical with the divine substance in reality but not conceptually. Therefore the principle of identity does not apply, since it regards only those things that are the same not only really but also conceptually. (Fs)

Since, however, a strictly logical solution can seem to be merely an evasion if there is no added explanation about the things themselves, we must also consider how the distinction we have made applies in different cases. (Fs)

281d To begin, then, if an absolute, A, is really the same as an absolute, C, and an absolute, B, is likewise really the same as an absolute, C, then the distinction between A and C and between B and C can be only verbal: for example, A is this vestment, B is this garment, and C is this tunic, where 'vestment,' 'garment,' and 'tunic' are but different nouns for a thing that is entirely the same. This is so because, if two absolutes are really the same, there is no intelligibility in one that is not identical with the intelligibility of the other. And when they are the same both in reality and in intelligibility, they can be distinct only verbally. For this reason, if only absolutes are being considered, the distinction we have made between 'really and conceptually' and 'really but not conceptually' is quite meaningless. (Fs)

283a Next, if a relative, A, is really identical with an absolute, C, and a relative, B, is really identical with the same absolute, C, the distinction between A and C or between B and C cannot be merely verbal. For an absolute is such that it contains and encloses its essential meaning within its own reality, whereas a relative is such that by reason of its essential meaning it goes beyond its own reality to look towards another. Therefore, an absolute and a relative are not only verbally distinct but are also necessarily distinct in intelligibility, since it is impossible that the same meaning be both totally contained within its own reality and at the same time look towards another reality beyond its own. This is why when two relatives are related to the same absolute, our distinction between 'really and conceptually' and 'really but not conceptually' necessarily signifies not only different words for the same reality but also different intelligibilities of the same reality. (Fs) (notabene)
283b The classic example of this is the real identity that Aristotle affirmed between motion and action and between motion and passion. He defines action as 'the act of a thing considered as being from this thing,' that is, an act of an agent considered as proceeding from the agent, and passion he defines as 'the act of a thing considered as being in this thing,' that is, the act of a recipient considered as being received in the recipient. And since the act that proceeds from the agent is the same as that which is received in the recipient, namely, the motion produced by the agent and received in the recipient, it follows that both action and passion are really identical with motion. One can see from this example why this theorem is apparently so difficult for so many. For 'action' and 'passion' add to motion the relations 'as from this' and 'as in this'; but this added intelligibility is far different from the intelligibility of the motion of an absolute, and therefore to many it seems extremely difficult to see that such diverse intelligibilities of the absolute and of relatives are present in one and the same reality. (Fs) (notabene)

283c Finally, when two relatives are really identical with the same absolute, not only must they be distinct in intelligibility from the absolute but also they can be really distinct from each other. For, as we demonstrated above, relations that are both real and mutually opposed are necessarily really distinct from one another. But relations that are really identical with the same absolute are real relations. Therefore, if their intelligible conceptions are opposed to one another, such relations are really distinct from one another. (Fs)

283d This surely is the key to the solution of our whole problem. Absolutes are such that there is no real distinction between them unless the same conception can be posited of one and not of the other. In the case of relatives, on the other hand, there is the further fact that they are really distinct from one another not only by the positing and non-positing of the same conception but also by the mutual opposition of diverse conceptions. This opposition, as real, depends upon the reality of the relations, and this reality can be had from one and the same absolute. But this same opposition, as opposition, depends solely upon the conceptions. For relations are opposite inasmuch as each is the term of the other, and each is the term of the other not because the relations are real but because their conceptions regard one another. Hence, what are identical with the same third are not necessarily identical with one another. For two relatives can be really identical with the same third; but if they are really identical, they are distinguished from the absolute at least by an intelligible conception. And if their conceptions are such that they are mutually opposed, the relatives must also necessarily be really distinct from one another.1 (Fs)

285a Still, we must admit that there is no example of this to be found in creation. Action and passion in the Aristotelian sense, which are really identical with motion, are not mutually opposed, since action regards the agent and passion the recipient. In fact, since 'from the agent' and 'in the recipient' pertain to one undivided intelligibility, they stand in a single order and constitute but one order or one real relation. (Fs)

285b If, however, action is understood as a relation of the agent to the recipient and passion as a relation of the recipient to the agent, then indeed we have relations that are real and mutually opposed. Nevertheless, action and passion understood in this way cannot be really identical with the same third, since action supposes act, passion supposes potency, and the same reality in the same respect cannot be both in act and in potency. (Fs) (notabene)

Only in God, then, are to be found relations that are real, mutually opposed, and really identical with the same absolute, inasmuch as through one infinite act there are in God the principle of the word, the word, and proceeding love. (Fs)