Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Relationen; Substanz, Akzidenz

Kurzinhalt: QUESTION 5: Can a relation be really identical with a substance?

Textausschnitt: QUESTION 5
Can a relation be really identical with a substance?

267d It may seem that a relation cannot be the same as a substance, for the ten categories of being are really distinct from one another; but relation and substance are different categories, namely, 'something' and 'to something'; therefore, a relation cannot be really identical with a substance. (Fs)

269a Besides, a relation is an accident; but accident and substance are really distinct, and therefore a relation cannot be really identical with a substance. (Fs)
Again, a relation is essence in a qualified sense, whereas substance is simply essence without qualification; but essence in a qualified sense and essence without qualification are not the same, and so a relation cannot be really identical with a substance. (Fs)

Against these arguments, however, is the fact that the real divine relations are distinguished from the divine substance not in reality but only in concept; therefore, at least in God a relation can be really the same as the substance. (Fs)

Moreover, every subsistent is in the category of substance; but the real divine relations are subsistent, and therefore at least in God a relation can be really the same as the substance. (Fs)

269b I respond that two considerations are required to resolve this question: first, the very notions of relation, accident, and substance must be understood exactly; second, the way in which these notions are verified in things must be clearly and distinctly grasped. (Fs)
Regarding the first consideration, note that relation, accident, and substance are generic notions and are derived through different ways of defining. Some things are defined by what they themselves are; others are defined by what they themselves are not, and this is so in two ways, since some are defined in terms of another in which they are, and others are defined in terms of another to which they are. (Fs)

269c For example, a human being is defined by what a human being is: for a human being is defined as a rational animal, where a human being is both animal and rational. But snubness, eclipse, and circle are defined by what they themselves are not. 'Snubness' is defined in terms of 'nose,' 'eclipse' in terms of a heavenly body such as the sun or the moon, and 'circle' in terms of a plane surface. Snubness is not a nose but in a nose, an eclipse is not the sun or the moon but a darkening in the sun or in the moon, and a circle is not a plane surface but in a plane surface. Thus, in these examples the definition is stated in terms of another in which is found what is defined. Finally, all relatives are defined in terms of another; for relatives are those whose existence is to be to another, and so one must take note that relatives are defined not in terms of another in which they are but in terms of another to which they are. (Fs)

269d Now, the essences of things are known through definitions, and so there are as many kinds of essences as there are kinds of definitions. The essences of what are defined by what they themselves are, or through themselves, are essences without qualification. The essences of what are defined through another are essences in a qualified sense, and this in two ways: the essences of what are defined through another in which they are are essences that are in another, and the essences of what are defined in terms of another to which they are are essences that are to another. (Fs)

271a Further, it is proper to each thing to be in accord with its essence. Those whose essences are without qualification are defined through themselves, and so it is proper to them to be through themselves. Those whose essences are qualified in some respect are defined through another, and so it is proper to them to be through another. This is so in two ways: it is proper to those that are defined through another in which they are, to be in another, and it is proper to those that are defined through another to which they are, to be to another. (Fs)

271b From all this, then, it is clear
(1) what substance is,
(2) the various meanings of 'accident,'
(3) in what sense a relation is an accident, and
(4) how generic these definitions are.

First, then, it is clear that a substance is that to which it is proper to be through itself. Second, it is clear that 'accident' is used in two ways: in a broader sense, an accident is whatever has a qualified essence, but in a stricter sense an accident is that to which it is proper to be in another. Third, it is clear that a relation is both an accident in a broader sense, since it is defined through another, and not an accident in the strict sense, since it is not defined through another in which it is, and therefore 'to be in another' is not what is proper to a relation by definition. Fourth, it is clear that these definitions of substance, accident, and relation are not derived proximately from the concrete reality of things, but quite remotely from generic ways of defining, namely, through self, through another, through another in which the defined is, and through another to which the defined is. (Fs) (notabene)

271c Once these notions are understood exactly, we may proceed to the second part of the solution to this question. From notions alone we can conclude to conceptual distinctions, but unless notions are related to things, we shall never arrive at real distinctions. For those things are distinct conceptually when the concept of one is not the concept of the other, and therefore from what we have said it is quite easy to conclude that substance and accident, and also accident in the strict sense and relation, are conceptually distinct. But there is a real distinction when one as real is not the other as real, and so to prove a real distinction we must definitely consider the reality itself to which the notions apply. Although this is universally true, it must especially be observed when the notions are generic and quite remote, since nothing real is merely generic. (Fs)

271d Thus, from the fact that it is proper to a relation to be to another, and to an accident in the strict sense to be in another, it is not legitimate to conclude to anything other than a conceptual distinction between relation and accident in the strict sense. This is clearly demonstrated in the case of material things, in which there are many relations that in fact are in another even though this is not what is proper to relations by definition. (Fs)
273a Again, from the fact that substance is essence without qualification and relation is a qualified essence, it is not legitimate to conclude to anything other than a conceptual distinction between substance and relation. For the generic aspect according to which a given reality is a substance does not at all exclude the possibility of another aspect according to which the same reality may be relative. Thus every finite substance, as substance, is defined through itself and has an essence without qualification, and it is proper for it to be through itself. But every finite substance is also a nature; every finite nature is an intrinsic principle of operation; and every real principle of operation is really related to its really distinct operation. Therefore, once the concrete reality of things is understood, it is clear how the same thing according to one aspect is a substance and according to another aspect is a real relation. (Fs)

273b When all these matters are considered together, it is evident that a relation can be either an accident in the strict sense or a substance. The reason for this is that the opposition between being to another and being in another, or between essence without qualification and qualified essence, is not a contradictory opposition. For what is to another can also be in another; and what according to one aspect of its reality has essence without qualification, according to another aspect of the same reality can have qualified essence. On the other hand, since there is a contradictory opposition between being through itself and being in another - for 'through itself is the same as 'not in another' - it is impossible for the same reality to be both a substance and an accident in the strict sense. It is because of this that the eucharistic accidents, although in fact they are not in another, nevertheless remain accidents, because by their formality and nature it is proper to them to be in another. (Fs) (notabene)

273c If this is the case in creation, all the more must it be acknowledged in God. For God is not in any genus,1 and therefore, although we talk about the divine substance and the divine relations according to our limited way of conceiving things, yet through such concepts we attain little understanding of divine reality itself, and so it would be presumptuous to conclude with certitude from these concepts that the divine substance cannot be really the same as a divine relation. (Fs)

273d Besides, in this life we know, not what God is,2 but rather what God is not. Hence we know merely aspects of divine perfection, and those are for the most part negative ones. We do not enjoy a positive understanding of God so as to be able to understand how these many diverse aspects come together into one. As a result, no serious argument can be made on the basis of the fact that we do not understand how the formality of substance and the formality of relation can come together into one reality. Even in what we know naturally it is better to argue from what we understand than from what we do not understand; and in the case of the divine mysteries we have to seek, not a perfect understanding, but that imperfect understanding that reason enlightened by faith generates when it inquires diligently, reverently, and judiciously. (Fs)

275a Moreover, one cannot say that substance and relation are so incompatible that they cannot exist in one and the same reality, since even one positive example suffices to refute a universal negative assertion. But it is clear from many examples that the reality of substance does not exclude real relations. For every finite substance is composed of potency and act, which are really related to each other; every material substance is really composed of matter and form and existence, which are really related to one another; every finite substance, whether material or immaterial, is a specific nature, which is an intrinsic principle of operations, where the operations are really distinct from the principle and the principle itself is really related to the really distinct operations. (Fs)

275b Again, the more we compare the generic notions of substance and relation with the divine reality itself, the less do being through itself and being to another seem to be opposites. The divine reality does not cease to be through itself because it is communicated by the Father to the Son and by the Father and the Son to the Spirit; for the communication of the substance does not destroy the formality of substance; and yet this very communication is the foundation of the real relations. (Fs)

275c Again, the real relations founded on communication do not relate God to another that is not God; rather, one subsistent relation is related to the other opposite subsistent relation, and since all these relations are really identical with the reality of the divine substance, the being to another of relation as well as the opposition of relation to being through itself are diminished as much as possible. (Fs)

275d In reply to the first contrary argument,3 we say that in metaphysics as in all other sciences, one must distinguish between two kinds of knowledge. The first is a prescientific knowledge of things, in which the causes of things are not yet known. The second is a scientific knowledge of things, in which things are known through their causes. Now, metaphysics is the knowledge of things through ultimate causes. The ultimate constitutive causes are potency and act, matter and form, essence and existence, and the divisions of essences stated above. The ultimate efficient cause and final cause is God. Insofar as things are known through these causes, there is scientific metaphysical knowledge. On the other hand, the ten categories are not the ultimate causes of things but the ultimate kinds of things. These ultimate kinds belong to metaphysical knowledge as prescientific, that is, as directed to investigating and discovering causes, and therefore the categories are treated in logic, not in metaphysics itself.4 (Fs)

277a Since this is so, to argue from categories as such is to proceed without due rigor. For although the kinds of things are ultimate and distinct from one another as far as prescientific metaphysical knowledge is concerned, still this prescientific knowledge is itself but a preparatory stage for properly scientific knowledge. Besides, once one has arrived at scientific knowledge, one must obviously stay with what has been clearly and distinctly demonstrated through causes and should not in any way argue from the categories unless to convince those who either do not grasp metaphysical knowledge or perhaps have as yet not understood it. (Fs)

277b Therefore, in the foregoing reply we reduced substance, accident, and relation to their ultimate real constitutive elements, that is, to essences to which it is proper to be through itself, or in another, or to another; and in accordance with this we have judged whether a substance can be the same as a relation. (Fs)

277c Moreover, practically the same argument applies to the distinction that is made between categorial relations and transcendental relations. The first are those relations that are known by prescientific metaphysical knowledge; these are the ones listed by Aristotle,5 namely, relations according to quantity, according to action and passion, and according to the measurable and the measure. The second are those relations that are known through metaphysical investigation; such relations are both those that are found in the last six categories and those that obtain among the constitutive principles of things.6 (Fs)

277d Again, another difference follows from this distinction between prescientific and scientific knowledge. Categorial relations were investigated by the earliest group of great thinkers; but transcendental relations as such could not have been investigated until after those first great minds had founded and developed metaphysical knowledge. For the metaphysics of metaphysical relation naturally emerges rather slowly. (Fs)

279a But neither the first nor the second difference makes for more than a historical distinction. And the distinction between the former relations, the categorial, and the latter, the transcendental, has this added inconvenience, that it gives the uninformed the pernicious notion that metaphysics is knowledge of things not through ultimate causes but through ultimate categories. (Fs)

Accordingly, we hold that the distinction of relations into subsistent relations, the relations of subsistents, and the relations of the constituents of subsistents, is scientific. For this division of relations corresponds to the ontological degrees of reality.7 (Fs)

279b In reply to the second contrary argument,8 we say that accident can be understood in two ways. First, it signifies that to which it is proper to be in another. Second, it signifies anything that is defined either through another in which it is or through another to which it is. If we take accident in the first sense, we must concede that a substance cannot be really the same as an accident, but we must deny that a relation by definition is an accident in this sense. But if accident is taken in the second sense, we must concede that relation is an accident, but deny that an accident in this broader sense is incompatible with the reality of substance. (Fs)

279c In reply to the third contrary argument,9 we concede that a substance is or has essence in an unqualified sense, while a relation has essence with qualification. But we must deny that it is impossible for one and the same reality to be both an unqualified essence with respect to itself and a qualified essence with respect to its communication.10 (Fs)