Autor: Melchin, R. Kenneth

Buch: History, Ethics and Emegent Probability

Titel: History, Ethics and Emegent Probability

Stichwort: Ordnungsgut, soziale Struktur: Lonergan - Hobbes (Leviathan); G. Winter: 3-fache Struktur der Sozialität; Tradition - intelligente Ordnung;

Kurzinhalt: ... Hobbes' theory of political obligation is rooted in an implicit social theory of a possessive market society ... Lonergan develops a complementary account of the structure of social processes that aims at righting a distortion in this view of society

Textausschnitt: 7.1 The Good of Order and Social Structure: Lonergan and Hobbes

4/7 In the thirteenth chapter of Leviathan, part one, Thomas Hobbes begins his consideration of the social state of man.1 On his own man could achieve some limited success in securing the objects of his desire, in securing his own happiness or 'felicity.' But placed in the permanent and inescapable company of other men who are all equally matched in skill, intelligence and strength, the pursuit of the objects of desire becomes a permanent state of competition for the same things. Thus, social life is the permanent state of struggle or war among equally matched opponents for the same, scarce objects of desire. To achieve any worthwhile goal is simply an invitation for someone to come and take it away. And since worth is a comparative term men need not even want the same things for them to stand in conflict. For whatever their possessions, their relative superiority or inferiority in their respective states of felicity will always be an object of competition.2 Thus, in the words of Michael Oakeshott: (210; Fs)

There is a radical conflict between the nature of man and the natural condition of mankind; what the one urges with hope of achievement, the other makes impossible.3
5/7 Man's deliverance from this permanent state of all out war rests in his fear of death. And so out of fear men are willing to transfer the right to the exercise of their own free will, in specific matters, to a third party, the 'Commonwealth,' who will exercise this right on their behalf and who will enforce each man's commitment to his contracted restrictions. Hobbes thus conceives social order as the necessary constraint upon each individual's free pursuit of his or her own desires, in the interest of securing the basic conditions for any pursuit of personal happiness.4 (210; Fs)

6/7 The power of Hobbes' theory of social order has been immeasurable. His conception of society as a constraint upon the individual's exercise of his natural rights and freedoms has prevailed in a line of social and political theory that continues to this day.5 In the view of C. B. Macpherson, Hobbes' theory of political obligation is rooted in an implicit social theory of a possessive market society.6 And in Macpherson's view, the historical conditions for such a possessive market society were, in fact, met between the seventeenth century and the mid-nineteenth century.7 The individual in this society is seen as 'the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them,' as sole owner of himself, as part of no larger social whole, as one whose freedom consists in independence from the wills of others. (210f; Fs)

7/7 Society consists of relations of exchange between proprietors. Political society becomes a calculated device for the protection of this property and for the maintenance of an orderly relation of exchange.8 In response to the various theories about the meaning of Hobbes' use of the term 'nature of man' Macpherson argues that what Hobbes was doing was describing the behavior of men in a particular type of society.9 He draws out explicitly some of the elements of this type of society and contrasts it with two other types of society in an effort to argue that Hobbes' political theory remains untenable in a historical age where the conditions of the possessive market society no longer prevail.10 (211; Fs)

8/7 Macpherson's brief account serves to highlight the essential elements of Hobbes' social and political theory. Man is essentially and perpetually in conflict or competition with his or her fellow man, and capable of securing the minimum conditions for commodious living only through the transfer of personal rights to an all powerful sovereign.11 In his 'Introduction' to the Penguin edition of Leviathan, Macpherson calls Hobbes the 'analyst of power and peace.' For more than any other his concern was dominated by the fear of civil war and the control of power which could secure some lasting relief from its hideous threat.' But in contrasting some of the characteristics of the possessive market society with two alternatives, Macpherson indirectly draws attention to some more basic characteristics of the structure of societies in general. If Macpherson is correct, then concurrent with the competition of man against man, there is operative an intricate set of relations of exchange and cooperation in Hobbes' marketplace. And I would suggest that Lonergan's intent in his notion of the 'good of order' is captured in his description of this possessive market model." (211)

9/7 "In chapter seven of Insight, Lonergan develops a complementary account of the structure of social processes that aims at righting a distortion in this view of society. Society certainly operates as a constraint upon individuals, as a constraining condition into which individuals are born and raised, as an imposition upon the individual's exercise of freedom, and as a contracted compromise that seeks to secure the minimum conditions for public order. But society is also collaboration in the achievement of ends that none could secure on his or her own. And it is to this dimension of social order that Lonergan turns in his account of the 'good of order.' (212; Fs)

10/7 In the terms of the last chapter's presentation of Gibson Winter's threefold structure of sociality, intersubjective exchange proceeds in three stages: with the gesture, the response and the drive to unification.12 The unification that is sought between two subjects is on two levels: on the level of the truth or the value in the meaning intended by the gesture and on the level of mutual confirmation of the two subjects as subjects. The structure of the drive towards unification is dialectical. The two principles of the dialectic are the two drives of the subjects towards intelligent grasp, reasonable affirmation and responsible decision on the content of the gesture and the response, and towards mutuality in personal expression and confirmation. In the primitive, intersubjective community the bonds that unite the members of the family or tribe as the foundation for interpersonal exchange are not the products of acts of intelligence, but they precede such acts as a condition for their occurrence. And so in the dialectic of gesture and response it is the spontaneously apprehended drive toward mutual respect and approval with, for example, a mother or father, that tends to prevail as the operator in the drive towards unification. (212f; Fs) (notabene)

11/7 But as acts of practical intelligence begin to yield more and more palpable success in securing advantages in living, the immanent criteria of intelligence are given more and more sway in the dialectic of social exchange. The authority of social relations and roles begins to give way to the authority of practical success when the fruits of such success begin to be felt in war, in hunting and in agriculture. And when experiments in the division of labour begin to produce craftsmen who can devote their total time to the pursuit of their craft, their achievements become cumulative. Children learn the skills of their fathers and mothers and carry the development of those skills forward with their own innovation. Gradually the community realizes that it is worthwhile to provide such craftsmen with the food, clothing and shelter they require to pursue their craft. For the fruits of their labour increase the gross product of the whole community. Thus the dialectical drive towards unification among subjects begins to demand the demonstrations of practical intelligence to complement and to found the roles and the authority of intersubjective spontaneity. With this trend there begins to emerge a new notion of 'the good' in which the talents, roles, and contributions of each are measured not in terms of some antecedent image or tradition of social order but in terms of their practically demonstrable contributions to the good of all. The undeniable success of practical intelligence becomes an operative principle in the dialectical drive towards the unification among subjects. And mutual respect and admiration becomes respect for competence and admiration for socially valuable skill.13 (213; Fs)

12/7 Once again, it must be emphasized that Lonergan recognizes the truth in Hobbes' claim.14 Society is not all cooperation and collaboration. It is also constraint and coercion. But while Hobbes' principle datum was the fact of competition for scarce goods, Lonergan's central datum was the fact of collaboration towards hitherto unknown goods.15 Social process is not entirely the one or the other. And so an account based solely on the one or the other will lead to a distortion in one's understanding of society. Furthermore it will lead to a distortion in one's direction of society, for an account of the structure of a social process will constitute a foundation for a science of the direction of social process, for a political theory.16 (213; Fs)

13/7 What Hobbes understood and expressed well in his Leviathan was the spontaneous orientation of the subject to pursue his or her own individual desires and the negative, constraining aspect of the dialectical tension that ensures between this individual pursuit and the intelligently emergent common good. Hobbes conceived the spontaneous pursuit of individual felicity to be the 'natural' state of man. But Lonergan recognizes Hobbes' own passionate concern for the good or order to be no unnatural accomplishment. And Hobbes' achievement was a responsible act in which Hobbes transcended his own vital desires and fears. Consequently Lonergan's method of proceeding begins by taking Hobbes' own drive towards the practical realization of value as an equally 'natural' state of man and then accounting for the human phenomena that Hobbes describes in these chapters of Leviathan, part one, as an earlier stage in an ongoing personal and/or social development or as one or another form of 'bias.' (213f; Fs)