Autor: Vertin, Michael -- Mehrere Autoren: Lonergan Workshop, Volume 8

Buch: Lonergan's "Three Basic Questions" and a Philosophy of Philosophies

Titel: Byrne, Patrick H., Insight and the Retrieval of Nature

Stichwort: Lonergan: Natur; emergente Wahrscheinlichkeit (emergent probability); Beispiele

Kurzinhalt: Emergent probability answers the question, "How often are these other conditions the same?" ... Emergent probability is the second approximation to the transposition of Aristotle's "Nature as a whole" into the context of modern ...

Textausschnitt: 2.6 Emergent Probability

45a The second way in which schemes can be added together is over a temporal sequence-and this is what Lonergan meant by the process of "emergent probability." The basis of this notion lies in the realization that schemes may form dependent series:
We are concerned, not with single schemes, but with a conditioned series of schemes. Let us say that schemes, P, Q, R, ... form a conditioned series, if all prior members of the series must be functioning actually for any later member to become a concrete possibility (1958: 118). (Fs)

45b Emergent probability, then, is the generic process whereby temporally earlier schemes begin to operate. They thereby shift the probabilities for the emergence of a second order of schemes, which in turn shift the probabilities for later schemes. Lonergan gives a very general illustration-schemes of carnivorous animals emerge only once schemes of herbivorous animals are actually functioning, and so on (1958: 119). A more specific series can be developed from the biochemical example given above. (Fs)
(1) The cycle of insulin synthesis requires a regular supply of ATP, among other things. Without ATP, insulin production would be a random event of exceptionally low probability. (Fs)
(2) The oxidative phosphorylation cycle of ATP provides a regular supply of ATP, but in turn requires a regular supply of energetic electrons, as well as a supply of oxygen to later receive them. (Fs)
(3) The Krebs cycle regularly supplies electrons (via NAD-H2), but requires a constant supply of pyruvic acid. (Fs)
(4) The glycolysis cycle regularly converts glucose (C6H12O6) into pyruvic acid, but requires a regular supply of glucose for its functioning. (Fs)
(5) Various plant cycles regularly supply glucose or compound starches, but require supplies of biologically fixated nitrogen, water, CO2, and light energy for their functioning. (Fs)
(6) The sun's hydrogen-helium fusion cycle regularly supplies light energy, but requires a sufficient concentration and pressure for its functioning. Such a concentration could have come about in many ways, but in fact emerged from the gradual, recurrent accumulation of matter from a coincidental aggregation throughout space and time. (Fs)

46a The occurrence of scattered molecules of insulin in outer space has a distinct but negligible probability; the probability, however, of its recurrent production under such circumstances is effectively nonexistent. One of the conditions which shifts that probability is the recurrent supply of ATP. In a similar fashion, the actual emergence of earlier schemes makes possible, and increasingly probable, the later schemes. Moreover, such schemes are not confined to the "interior" of individual molecules or organisms. As Lonergan put it, "Within such schemes, the plant or animal is only a component. The whole schematic circle of events does not occur within the living thing, but goes beyond it into the environment" (1958:133). (Fs)

47a Individual things and cycles have their flexible ranges of natural functioning. These natural functionings, in turn, have their conditions. In large part, these conditions have to be supplied not just once, but regularly and recurrently. It follows, therefore, that the natural functioning of things in this universe is heavily dependent upon schemes of recurrence which are neither provided by nor part of their own immanent natural functioning. (Fs)

47b Thus, emergent probability is an explanatory notion. In part it provides an explanatory account of the supply of the naturally recurring conditions under which things function naturally. Emergent probability answers the question, "How often are these other conditions the same?" in a highly nuanced and dynamic fashion, linking species of things, series of mutually conditioning schemes and dynamically increasing or decreasing probabilities. Emergent probability is the second approximation to the transposition of Aristotle's "Nature as a whole" into the context of modern explanatory science. (Fs)
47c The third approximation comes from attending to the explanatory studies of developments. All things have natural ranges of functioning, but higher things spend considerable portions of their life cycles developing from less flexible to more flexible ranges of functioning. (Fs)

47d Developments are marked by stages. The functioning of each stage in the development is natural, in the sense that the recurrent functioning of each stage is made intelligible by combinations of explanatory conjugates along with appropriate conditions. Moreover, the development itself-the sequence of transitions from stage to stage-is also natural. The functioning of a prior stage gradually modifies its underlying conditioning schemes, thereby insuring its own demise. But at the same time, the modified underlying schemes are precisely those required by a distinct, subsequent, and more differentiated stage of functioning. Developments are, so to speak, sequences of serendipitous "leaps in the dark," which are related together in a remarkably intelligible fashion. (Fs)

47e In his treatment of development, Lonergan accepted a contemporary methodological shift away from Aristotle's notion of a developmental science. Aristotle specified the nature of a change through its achieved end. Galileo and Newton specified locomotions through the primary relativity immanent in the explanatory correlations of their parts. Thus, conditions and ends are linked together in virtue of the explanatory correlations. Under the appropriate conditions, a body can naturally fall "up."1 Likewise, contemporary study of the "nature" of development concerns not the end points, but its immanent intelligibility in terms of the "sequence of operators that successively generate further functions" (Lonergan, 1958: 461). Such an approach accounts for the remarkable flexibility of natural developments. A sequence of operators is also conditioned, and its conditions can be fulfilled either statistically or by the regularities of statistically conditioned series of schemes of recurrence, or by the regularities of statistically conditioned series of schemes of recurrence and developments of other organisms. This more generalized linking of developments and their natural conditions Lonergan referred to as "generalized emergent probability" (1958: 462). It provides the third and fullest transposition of Aristotle's "Nature as a whole." (Fs) (notabene)