Autor: Vertin, Michael -- Mehrere Autoren: Lonergan Workshop, Volume 8

Buch: Lonergan's "Three Basic Questions" and a Philosophy of Philosophies

Titel: Byrne, Patrick H., Insight and the Retrieval of Nature

Stichwort: Aristoteles: Natur; Das Natürliche - Unnatürliche

Kurzinhalt: He distinguished what "always comes to be in the same way" from what comes to be "for the most part," and both of these from "chance" (196b9-16).

Textausschnitt: 1.5 The Natural and the Unnatural

18b Let us now apply this lengthy interpretation of Aristotle's positions regarding nature by asking just what would be meant in saying that an occurrence is "natural" or "unnatural"? Since the principles of nature are several, the answer to this question must be multiple. From one point of view, the "nature" of anything is the form as specified by the formula or definition, and whatever occurs in accord with that definition is natural. For example, the time series of positions of a planet is natural insofar as they describe a path about the sun which conforms to the definition of an ellipse (at least to a first approximation). Likewise, the annual cycles of foliation and defoliation of maple trees. And the annual migratory patterns of Canadian Geese likewise are "natural" because they accord with the nature, the form-as-defined, of those species. (Fs)

19a Again, whatever occurs as a means to the realization of the form-as-defined is also natural. In such cases the form does not stand as the immanently intelligible integration of a thing's materials, but as final cause of the occurrences. For example, the swimming and feeding patterns of a mosquito larva can be said to have a "form" of their own; but it is a form on the move, an "imperfect," relatively unstable form of organizing the materials, which will yield to the "final form" integrating the flying and feeding behaviors of an adult mosquito. These occurrences are not made intelligible by the final form directly; rather the form-as-final-cause makes them indirectly intelligible as the form to be realized through their unimpeded occurring. (Fs)

19b Relative to the naturalness of occurrences in accord either with the formal cause as immanent nature, or with the formal cause as final cause, the naturalness of occurrences conditioned by the matter is an ambiguous issue. Insofar as the materials are either organized integrally by the form, or are being operated upon so as to bring about the integral functioning of the final form, both kinds of operations upon the matter are clearly "natural." But insofar as a second mover acts upon the matter-say, a rock falls into an eagle's nest and shatters a ten-day egg-the "naturalness" is ambiguous. Relative to the "natural" physiological functioning of the embryonic organism, the changes wrought are disastrously disruptive and violent, "unnatural." Again, relative to the final form which would have resulted from the continued embryological and maturational development, the rock's effects are also violent and unnatural. However, either the viewpoint of the embryo's functioning or that of the eagle's final form are not the only natural viewpoints. Relative to the rock's natural downward fall and its naturally accumulated "impetus" (to use a pre-modern term), the shattering is also perfectly causal and natural. From its standpoint, the only thing which might be called "violent" is the fact that the rock was impeded from reaching its "natural" place, the center of the earth. Finally, from the viewpoint of Nature as the totality of the changing, one could say that nothing is unnatural (in the sub-human realm, at least). (Fs)

20a Why, then, do we tend to speak of the eagle's hatching and maturation as natural, but the rock's smashing, or the birth of a mutant, as unnatural? Clearly there is a notion that these two sorts of events are not on the same footing with regard to nature. Since the prevailing feature of Nature is its regularity, Aristotle drew upon this feature to distinguish these different types of events from one another. He distinguished what "always comes to be in the same way" from what comes to be "for the most part," and both of these from "chance" (196b9-16).1 Celestial phenomena-movements, positions, and phases of the sun, moon, planets, and stars-"always come to be in the same way," and that way is known scientifically when one knows their forms. Meteorological phenomena and the vegetative and animal cycles which depend upon them happen regularly "for the most part." Chance phenomena exhibit virtually no regularity at all. Hence, the classicist tradition has fostered a tendency to regard what "always" happens as most natural, what happens "for the most part" as more or less so, and what happens "rarely," or by chance, as virtually unnatural. (Fs)

20b It should be noted that in the foregoing examples there is an incompletely acknowledged combination of form, matter, and something else. Aristotle does not seem to have had under complete systematic control the indeterminacy inherent in any proper definition.2 That is to say, one may indeed have the matters integrated and organized in accord with the definition, but unless a whole host of "other things remain equal," the regularity of occurrences will neither occur nor recur. Hence for Aristotle and the classicist tradition, the "natural" all too frequently amounts to the undifferentiated combination of form and "other things being equal." It is precisely the "other things" which the notions of "what always comes to be in the same way" and "what comes to be for the most part" imply as being the case. Clearly, "what always comes to be in the same way" and "what comes to be for the most part" for Aristotle were more natural than chance, so that occurrences which have high probabilities were taken to be more natural than those which have lesser probabilities. This lack of differentiation is the source of virtually all future distortions of the meaning of "nature." (Fs) (notabene)