Autor: Vertin, Michael -- Mehrere Autoren: Lonergan Workshop, Volume 8

Buch: Lonergan's "Three Basic Questions" and a Philosophy of Philosophies

Titel: Byrne, Patrick H., Insight and the Retrieval of Nature

Stichwort: Aristoteles: Natur; Potenz, hyle, hypokeimenon

Kurzinhalt: ... hupokeimenon is the 'x' in the statement "x is what is initially cold, but later hot" and similarly for other pairs of contraries ... "there must always be an x which is presupposed by saying, 'x becomes.

Textausschnitt: 1.2 Form and Matter

9a Aristotle's first approach to determining these principles began with a review of previous views on natural principles. He pointed out that despite their differences all earlier thinkers posited as principles contraries of one kind or another (188a19). He took this somewhat surprising commonality as the starting point of his own account of the principles of change: whatever change occurs is from one contrary to the other. He went on to indicate that the conflicts between the earlier thinkers arose because they were not at a sufficiently advanced stage of development (188b30-35). That is, their principles were instances of contraries initially "better known to us," what is closer to sensation (184a25), such as the Dry and the Moist, the Hot and the Cold, Friendship and Strife. In their place Aristotle introduced contraries "better known in themselves," namely the presence and absence of "form." Aristotle further noted (Physics, A.6-7) that there must be some other principle besides the contraries, namely that which the contraries "act upon." This other principle-something which "underlies [hupokeisthai] that which is in the process of becoming" (190al5)-is subsequently identified as hule, matter. (Fs) (notabene)
9b Aristotle's principles are known not through sensation but through nous, intelligence. Note that Aristotle did not initially use the term hule, matter, to denote the "underlying nature." That usage first appeared later on in Book B, presumably because Aristotle thought it crucial to dispel any misleading connotations of the term. And indeed the mistaken interpretations of both "matter" and "form" in Aristotle's time and throughout subsequent history have been legion. Therefore, a clarification of Aristotle's meanings is important for our study. (Fs)

9c A first clarification is that, in the context of Physics A.6-7, "underlying nature" means nothing more than "whatever it is that first possesses one contrary (for example, cold) and then another (for example, hot)." It is like an 'x' in an algebraic problem (for example, "x is whatever, when squared, yields three less than nineteen"). Yet to this clarification another must be added, for the phrase, "possesses one contrary," itself can be misleading. The phrase suggests that the one contrary is within something like a container or rests upon some underlying neutral material, only to be plucked away and replaced by the other contrary. This is why it is technically more correct to speak of "underlying nature" as "that of which one contrary is initially truly predicated, but later not." Or, to put it another way, hupokeimenon is the 'x' in the statement "x is what is initially cold, but later hot" and similarly for other pairs of contraries. Just what this 'x' ("underlying nature") is, remains to be determined. (Fs)

10a To clarify this further it must be added that while this somewhat awkward phrasing at least eliminates the mistaken connotation of some "underlying material," the fact that Aristotle actually used the terms, "underlying subject" and "underlie" (hupokeimenon and hupokeisthai) and later identified this 'x' as "matter" (hule) (191a9, 193a2-193b22), can lead to further misunderstanding. Aristotle is actually using the Greek word, hupokeimenon, in this case to mean "what is presupposed by." Hence, a translation such as, "there must always be something which underlies that which is in the process of becoming" is better be rendered as "there must always be an x which is presupposed by saying, 'x becomes.'" (Fs) (notabene)

10b Thirdly, although Aristotle mentioned the earlier philosophers' opinions that this 'x' was earth, fire, air, water, and so on (189b3, 193a22-23), he himself did not endorse such views. In fact, he pointed out that earth, air, fire, and water were themselves "already composites with contraries" (189b5). Again, one might regard "flesh and bones" as matter, but Aristotle also spoke of these as having their own "potency" ("matter") and requiring form for their being (193b1). The point is that "underlying nature" or "matter" are relative to their corresponding form. "Matter," for Aristotle, is simply the 'x' presupposed by the process of becoming of a certain form (for example, heat, a building, musical proficiency, and so on). To each form there is a range of corresponding x's (matters, potentialities), any one of which can fulfill the role of the "presupposed." Any further properties of this presupposed something remain to be determined. In other words, Aristotle's "matter" simply cannot be imagined as hard, dense, extended, particulate "stuff," as would become the case in the modern period. Rather, for Aristotle "matter" is "whatever is presupposed by." If this leaves the reader at a loss as to how to picture this "matter," that is precisely the point. Aristotle's science of nature is radically different from the science of the seventeenth century, where picturable underlying matter played such an important role. (Fs) (notabene)

11a For these reasons Aristotle claimed: "As for the underlying nature, it is knowable by analogy" (191a8). That is, "underlying nature" is knowable only in its relation to the form, as the "whatever" required in order that that form have full being (ousia). For example, almost every one knows the formula or definition of a circle. What is the matter of "circle"? The question is ambiguous because the definition is open to a variety of matters-graphite, gold, bronze, the set of space-time locations of a circulating object. Likewise, the matter of a purple finch is variable: the precise chemical composition varies from individual to individual within the species, and indeed with time for each individual bird. Yet despite all this variability, all correspond to the formula, the definition. Therefore, "underlying nature" or "matter" is, and is known to be, only in relation to form. (Fs)

11b In view of these clarifications, Aristotle's subtle identification of matter and potency, dunamis (193b1), is understandable. Matter (the totality of components), when already actually related in the manner specified in the form's formula or definition, manifests or "actualizes" a given form. Hence, that same totality, when not yet so related, has the potentiality to be so related, to be "informed." Finally, this analogous relationship establishes the basis for Aristotle's definition of motion or change: "a motion is the actuality of a potentiality qua potential" (210a11-12). That is, change is the process of relating parts together in accord with the form's formula.1 (Fs) (notabene)