Autor: Vertin, Michael -- Mehrere Autoren: Lonergan Workshop, Volume 8

Buch: Lonergan's "Three Basic Questions" and a Philosophy of Philosophies

Titel: Michael Vertin, Lonergan's "Three Basic Questions" and a Philosophy of Philosophies

Stichwort: Neuformulierung der philosphischen Grundfragen Lonergans

Kurzinhalt: I would propose that the basic phenomenological, epistemo-logical, and metaphysical questions can each be restated in such a way as to bring out more fully both its precise nature ...

Textausschnitt: 4.1 Reformulations of the "three basic questions"

220b I would propose that the basic phenomenological,1 epistemo-logical, and metaphysical questions can each be restated in such a way as to bring out more fully both its precise nature and-so I would allege-the fact that it possesses not just one main part but two. Let me expand these points by considering the questions in turn. (Fs)

220c The basic phenomenological question, "What am I doing when I am knowing?", need not presuppose positive epistemic value on the part of the concrete conscious-intentional performances about which it asks: that matter properly falls within the ambit of the second basic question, not the first. That is to say, the first question is not necessarily concerned with purportedly epistemic processes insofar as they are genuinely epistemic, valid;2 it may regard them simply insofar as they are functionally-phenomenal, apparent. Again, however, it is concerned not with the whole of apparent knowing, either: the basic phenomenological question regards just the essential traits, the constitutive characteristics, the distinctive features, of apparent knowing. Nor must the first question presuppose even that there actually is such a thing as apparent knowing: in fact, the benefit of avoiding that presupposition will become obvious in the fifth section of this paper. Finally, besides the matter of whether there is any apparent knowing and, if so, what its distinctive features are, there is a further highly important matter that deserves to be made explicit-the matter of why one thinks that one's claim about apparent knowing's distinctive features is correct, the matter of the cognitional ground, rational justification, evidential basis, upon which one's claim rests, and, consequently, the certitude of that claim. In light of these considerations, I would propose the following restated form of the basic phenomenological question:

(i) What are the DISTINCTIVE FEATURES of my apparent knowing, if any; and (ii) what is the EVIDENTIAL BASIS and the CERTITUDE of the response I give to that query? (Fs)

221a The basic epistemological question, "Why is doing that knowing?", is concerned not just with apparent knowing but rather with valid knowing, with cognitional performances actually possessing positive epistemic value. Now, although Lonergan's usual form of this question presupposes that such knowing does indeed occur, it strikes me that this presupposition is not essential: in fact, as will become clearer in the fifth section of this paper, there is some advantage in leaving the matter open at the outset. Again, as with the first basic question, there are two parts: whether there is any valid knowing and, if so, what its distinctive features are; and, secondly, why-that is, on what evidential basis-one makes whatever claim about it that one does, and hence with what certitude. By contrast with the first basic question, however, Lonergan's usual way of posing the second basic question highlights this second part-but at the expense of the first part; and while this brings a happy economy of expression, it also brings an unhappy reduction of clarity. For all these reasons, I would suggest the following expanded form of the basic epistemological question:

(i) What are the DISTINCTIVE FEATURES of my valid knowing, if any; and (ii) what is the EVIDENTIAL BASIS and the CERTITUDE of the response I give to that query? (Fs)

222a The basic metaphysical question, "What do I know when I do it?", regards what it is that one validly knows or at least in principle could know, the (intrinsically knowable) real, (inherently epistemically accessible) reality.1 More exactly, it regards not the whole of the latter but only its constant characteristics, constitutive traits, distinctive features. Again, while Lonergan's usual form of this question presupposes that there is such a to-be-known, that presupposition is not essential, in my view; and, as will become evident below, there is even some advantage in omitting it. Finally, like the first two, the third basic question has two parts, and an adequate grasp of the question's thrust requires that both be spelled out: whether (epistemically accessible) reality actually exists and, if so, what its distinctive features are; and, secondly, why-that is, on what evidential basis-one makes whatever claim about it that one does, and therefore with what certitude. Accordingly, I would offer the following reformulation of the basic metaphysical question:

(i) What are the DISTINCTIVE FEATURES of (epistemically accessible) reality, if any; and (ii) what is the EVIDENTIAL BASIS and the CERTITUDE of the response I give to that query? (Fs)