Autor: Vertin, Michael -- Mehrere Autoren: Lonergan Workshop, Volume 8

Buch: Lonergan's "Three Basic Questions" and a Philosophy of Philosophies

Titel: Michael Vertin, Lonergan's "Three Basic Questions" and a Philosophy of Philosophies

Stichwort: Lonergan: 3 philosophische Grundfragen (Fragen)

Kurzinhalt: Lonergan argues that, when all is said and done, the truly fundamental philosophical questions, the basic issues in philosophy, may be reduced to three: "What am I doing when I am knowing?" "Why is doing that knowing?" ...

Textausschnitt: 3.1 On the basic philosophical issues

216b Lonergan argues that, when all is said and done, the truly fundamental philosophical questions, the basic issues in philosophy, may be reduced to three: "What am I doing when I am knowing?" "Why is doing that knowing?" "What do I know when I do it?" (1974: 37, 86; 1972a: 307; 1972b: 25, 83, 261, 297, 316). The first question regards one's own concrete activity as a knower: what are the recurrent features of whatever conscious-intentional performances I label "knowing"? The full-blown answer to this question, arrived at through a reflexive objectification of operations that one already experiences oneself performing, constitutes one's cognitional theory, gnoseology, phenomenology of knowing. The second question regards the justification for the positive epistemic value that one ordinarily attributes to the conscious-intentional performances just noted: upon what grounds do I consider my "knowing" to be epistemically valid, secure, objective? The sufficiently detailed response to this question constitutes one's epistemology. The third question regards what one's cognitional performances are oriented toward: what in general is the character of the to-be-known, reality, the universe of being? The fully developed reply to this question constitutes one's metaphysics. Furthermore, the question about reality is third because an adequately critical answer to it is prefigured by one's answers to the other two questions together; and the question about epistemic objectivity is second because an adequately critical answer to it is prefigured by one's answer to the first question alone (1974: 37; 1972a: 307; 1972b: 20-21). Finally, the three questions, ordered in this way, make up what I am calling the integral set of basic philosophical issues. (Fs)