Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: Phenomenolgy and Logic: The Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic and Existentialism

Titel: Phenomenolgy and Logic: The Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic and Existentialism

Stichwort: Kritik 1 u. 2 an Husserl: Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften; Wissenschaft, Philosophie, Theologie; "wissenschaftlich": Flucht vom Menschsein (Wissenschaftler - Objekt); absolute Sicherheit - virtuell bedingte S. (Kritik an H.)

Kurzinhalt: The history of the human sciences, where the element 'scientific' has been emphasized, has been a continual flight from what is truly human to what, in man, is not properly human... we have to disagree with Husserl in his pursuit of philosophy as ...

Textausschnitt: 9 Critique of Husserl's Krisis

260b Such is Husserl's program, and we will attempt right away a few of the more obvious criticisms. In the next hour, we will go on to his key notion of phenomenology, which has of course had a far richer life than Husserl's philosophic ideal.1 (Fs)

9.1 Human Science, Philosophy, and Theology

260b First of all, then, there is a real problem set by science and especially by human science, and its only solution lies in going to a philosophy. Natural science can get along pretty well by relying simply on the pragmatic criterion of success. We produce the results, and everybody can see the results. They can keep going on that basis. But even so, they suffer from a neglect of basic research, of fundamental thinking, simply because it is difficult to see the necessity of fundamental research when your criteria ultimately are pragmatic, the results that everyone can appreciate. But human science cannot get along on that basis. Human science is involved in philosophic issues from the simple fact that the human scientist is one of his own objects. He cannot be totally detached in the science without special guidance. The history of the human sciences, where the element 'scientific' has been emphasized, has been a continual flight from what is truly human to what, in man, is not properly human. That flight has grounded a great deal of the success of the phenomenological movement. (Fs) (notabene)

261a So we can admit, in the main, Husserl's strictures on the situation of modern science. In other words, science has problems that it cannot solve, that can be solved only in terms of a philosophy. Further, not only does the problem of science raise philosophic questions. The problem of human science raises theological questions. We have today a situation that is essentially different from the medieval situation. St Thomas could produce the synthesis in a vertical line: theology, philosophy, science, where philosophy was the 'handmaid of theology,' ancilla theologiae, because in his time science was simply a department of philosophy. It was Aristotelian science and a part of Aristotelian philosophy. In subsequent periods, as long as science did not become strictly human, that mode of organization could be maintained. But at the present time, where we have empirical human sciences, where we have sciences dealing with men as they are, men under the influence of original sin, offered God's grace, and either accepting it or refusing it, there are theological issues involved in concrete human living, and consequently science, insofar as it includes human science, cannot be simply subsumed under philosophy, where philosophy prescinds entirely from theology. The problem of synthesis today is the problem of synthesis in the form of some sort of triangle, where philosophy, in our traditional sense, is related to theology and is related to science, but where science is not related simply to philosophy. A part of it, namely the human science, is in need of a direct contact with theology. (Fs)

9.2 Science, Necessity, and Certitude

261b Secondly, while we admit Husserl's problem and, moreover, point out the necessity not only of philosophy but in certain respects also of theology, we have to disagree with Husserl in his pursuit of philosophy as rigorous science in the sense in which he understood this, namely, as grounded in necessity and yielding absolute certitude. This ideal has undoubtedly its Greek and its Cartesian antecedents, but it stands in need of distinction. All human judgments rest on a virtually unconditioned, as I argued last week.2 They are true as a matter of fact. The pursuit of absolute necessity, absolute certitude, is the pursuit of more than man can have, and consequently it is doomed to failure because it is overshooting the mark. I think that is the fundamental criticism of Husserl, but obviously it needs considerable development and we cannot attempt that here. We do not automatically go along with a philosopher simply because he is out for absolute necessity and absolute certitude. God is absolutely necessary, and God has absolute certitude without any conditions whatever. But we arrive at our certitudes and our knowledge of necessity insofar as, as a matter of fact, each one of us reaches in particular cases the virtually unconditioned. Our knowledge is based on the knowledge of a contingent world, and our knowing is a contingent event. To demand the absolute and to be content with absolutely nothing else results in a skepticism. (Fs)