Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: A Second Collection

Titel: A Second Collection

Stichwort: Konstitution Dei Filius: Position Lonergans; Unterschied: Gott der Philosophen - Abrahams? quaestio iuris - facti

Kurzinhalt: It is the view that man's spirit, his mind and his heart, is an active power, an eros, for self-transcendence; consequently, the subject is related intrinsically and indeed, constitutively to the object towards which it transcends itself; finally, ...

Textausschnitt: 130a I have been contending, then, that the intellectual, the moral, and the religious are quite distinct but not at all disparate. They are three distinct phases in die unfolding of the human spirit, of that eros for self-transcendence that goes beyond itself intentionally in knowledge, effectively in morality, totally in religion. With the affirmation of this continuity our efforts at basic clarification come to an end, and we turn to meeting explicitly some of the questions that were raised initially but so far have not been treated. (Fs)

130b First, however, let us note very briefly our position. It is not the naive realist, Kantian, positivist view of the object. It is not the mixed view that leaves science to naive realists, Kantians, and positivists to add for humanist or religious reasons an insistence on the subjectivity of the subject. It is the view that man's spirit, his mind and his heart, is an active power, an eros, for self-transcendence; consequently, the subject is related intrinsically and indeed, constitutively to the object towards which it transcends itself; finally, knowledge, morality, and religion are the three distinct phases in which such self-transcendence is realized. (Fs) (notabene)

130c Next, it was asked what is the relevance of the doctrine of natural knowledge of God, what difference does it make to human living and human society. Obviously, I cannot attempt to treat this question in any but a very summary fashion. There are those today for whom any thought about, any mention of, either theism or atheism is just meaningless, for whom all religion at best is just a comforting illusion. Such opinions involve a profound ignorance of man's real nature, and such ignorance cannot but have a gravely distorting effect on the conduct of human affairs. The doctrine of natural knowledge of God means that God lies within the horizon of man's knowing and doing, that religion represents a fundamental dimension in human living. (Fs) (notabene)

131a Thirdly, it was urged that we have to drop the words, "nature," "natural," that we should be content to speak with Scripture and the Fathers of God's grace and man's sinfulness. Now I have no doubt that such words as "nature" and "natural," no less than object and verification, can be abused. But I also have no doubt that if we are not only going to speak about God's grace and man's sinfulness but also we are going to say what precisely we mean by such speaking, then we are going to have to find some third term over and above grace and sin.1 (Fs)

131b Fourthly, can a person be an object? A person cannot be an object if "object" is taken in a naive realist, Kantian, or positivist sense. But if "object" means that towards which self-transcending heads, obviously persons are objects: we know them and we love them. (Fs) (notabene)

131c But, it will be urged, according to Max Scheler, we know other persons only intersubjectively. I would grant that such a conclusion follows from Scheler's cognitional theory but, at the same time, I would point out that, just as we pass from consciousness of the self as subject to an objectification of the self in conception and judging, so too we pass from intersubjectivity to the objectification of intersubjectivity. Not only do we (two subjects in a subject-to-subject relation) speak and act. We speak about ourselves; we act on one another; and inasmuch as we are spoken of or acted on, we are not just subjects, not subjects as subjects, but subjects as objects. (Fs) (notabene)

131d Fifthly, is not philosophy totally different from religion, and is not the God of the philosophers totally different from the God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob?

131e On my analysis philosophy and religion are quite distinct but they are not totally different; they are two of the three phases of that single thrust by which the human spirit moves towards self-transcendence. What gives rise to the appearance of total difference, I should say, is a failure to distinguish between undifferentiated and differentiated consciousness. Undifferentiated consciousness is global; it is at once intellectual, moral, and religious; it does not sort out different types of issues, specialize now in one type and later in another, seek the integration of separate, specialized developments. Differentiated consciousness results precisely from this process of distinguishing, specializing and, eventually, integrating. As intellectual, it becomes technical. As moral, it concentrates on moral development. As religious, it heads towards mysticism. Now while differentiated consciousness understands undifferentiated, undifferentiated consciousness finds differentiated incomprehensible, totally different; not only does it find the technical aspects of science and philosophy simply alien to its religious piety; it also finds asceticism and mysticism equally or more alien. (Fs)

132a There remains the further question: Is not the God of the philosophers totally different from the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob?

132b I am quite ready to grant that there are many mistaken philosophies and many mistaken notions of God. I am also ready to grant that undifferentiated consciousness has very little grasp of any philosophic notion of God, and so would find it impossible to equate the God of its piety with the God of philosophic discourse. Again, I should insist that moral and religious development vastly enrich our relations to God and our apprehension of him; in this respect I am greatly in agreement with Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand. But I should deny that our intellectual apprehension of any real object, least of all, of God is ever complete, closed, excluding further development. I should deny that the developments from moral and religious experience in any way fail to harmonize with intellectual apprehension. I should urge that just as the intellectual, the moral, and the religious are three phases in the single thrust to self-transcendence, so too moral and religious development only reveal more fully the God that can be known by the natural light of human reason. (Fs)

133a Sixthly, natural knowledge of God is not attained without moral judgments and existential decisions. These do not occur without God's grace. Therefore, the natural light of human reason does not suffice for man's so-called natural knowledge of God. (Fs)

133b I mention this objection, not because it is to the point, but because the point is often missed. One misinterprets Vatican I if one fancies it is speaking, not about a quaestio iuris, but about a quaestio facti. The quaestio iuris is (1) whether there exists a valid argument for God's existence and (2) whether the apprehension of that argument is an actus supernaturalis quoad substantiam. Natural knowledge of God is denied if one holds that there is no valid argument or if one holds that apprehending the argument is an intrinsically supernatural act. Natural knowledge of God is affirmed if one holds that there is a valid argument and if one holds that apprehending the argument is intrinsically natural. One goes beyond the quaestio iuris to the quaestio facti, when one turns from conditions of possibility to conditions of actual occurrence. Such conditions are always very numerous. In the present instance men must exist. They must be healthy and enjoy considerable leisure. They must have attained a sufficient differentiation of consciousness to think philosophically. They must have succeeded in avoiding all of the pitfalls in which so many great philosophers have become entrapped. They must resist their personal evil tendencies and not be seduced by the bad example of others. Such are just a few very general conditions of someone actually grasping a valid argument for God's existence. An adequate account would include every entity that conditioned the actual occurrence. Now Vatican I was not speaking of a quaestio facti but of a quaestio iuris, not of conditions of actuality but of conditions of possibility. I do not think that in this life people arrive at natural knowledge of God without God's grace, but what I do not doubt is that the knowledge they so attain is natural. (Fs)