Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: A Second Collection

Titel: A Second Collection

Stichwort: Moderne Wissenschaft: Abwesenheit Gottes; endgültiger Bruch: Forderung der Verifikation von Daten (Newton; anders bei: Anselm, Thomas, Descartes)

Kurzinhalt: Still Descartes did not attempt to separate philosophy and science; on the contrary, ... Such a separation was effected materially when Newton did for mechanics what Euclid had done for geometry. It was effected formally by the rule that, ...

Textausschnitt: 107a I have been attempting to characterize the reflexive, objectifying superstructure in modern culture, and I may now draw closer to my topic and observe that the modern notion of science tends to replace theology, which treats of God and all other things in their relation to God, with religious studies, which treat of man in his supposed dealings with God or gods or goddesses. (Fs)

107b For a modern science is an empirical science. Whether it studies nature or man, whether it is orientated by behaviorism or by the Geisteswissenschaften, it begins from data, it discerns intelligible unities and relationships within data, and it is subject to the check of verification, to the correction and revision to be effected by confrontation with further relevant data. Now such procedures cannot lead one beyond this world. The divine is not a datum to be observed by sense or to be uncovered by introspection. Nor will any intelligible unity or relationship verifiable within such data lead us totally beyond such data to God. Precisely because modern science is specialized knowledge of man and of nature, it cannot include knowledge of God. God is neither man nor nature. It would only be the idolatry of identifying God with man or with nature if one attempted to know God through the methods of modern science. (Fs)

107c Religion, however, is very human. So we have histories of religion, phenomenologies of religion, psychologies of religion, sociologies of religion, philosophies of religion and, to unite these many parts into a whole, the science of religion. These disciplines cannot, of course, escape the radical dilemma confronting modern science. In the measure that they follow the model provided by natural science, they tend towards a reductionism that empties human living and especially human religion of all serious content. In the measure that they insist on their specific difference from the natural sciences, they risk losing their autonomy and becoming the captive of some fashion or fad in philosophy. But whichever way they tend, at least this much is certain: they cannot make scientific statements about God. As long as they remain within the boundaries specified by the methods of a modern science, they cannot get beyond describing and explaining the multiplicity and the variety of human religious attitudes. (Fs)

108a God, then, is absent from modern science. Even the modern science of religion, though it bears witness to the divine, speaks not of God but of man. This, of course, is simply the inevitable result of specialization, of distinguishing different fields of investigation, of working out appropriate methods in each field, and of excluding conflicts of methodical precepts by pursuing different subjects separately. In the writings of St. Anselm there is no systematic distinction between theology and philosophy, and so his ontological argument is not what later would be desired, a strictly philosophic argument. In the writings of St. Thomas philosophy and theology are distinguished, but the distinction does not lead to a separation; so his celebrated five ways occur within a theological Summa. With Descartes occurs the effort to provide philosophy with its proper and independent foundations, and so not only to distinguish but also separate philosophy and theology. Still Descartes did not attempt to separate philosophy and science; on the contrary, he attempted to prove the conservation of momentum by appealing to the immutability of God. Such a separation was effected materially when Newton did for mechanics what Euclid had done for geometry. It was effected formally by the rule that, if a hypothesis is not verifiable, it is not scientific. (Fs) (notabene)