Autor: Strauss, Leo

Buch: Natural Right and History

Titel: Natural Right and History

Stichwort: Locke; Inkonsistenz: Offenbarung - "partielles" Naturrecht (Mangel an Begründung);

Kurzinhalt: We thus arrive at the conclusion that Locke cannot have recognized any law of nature in the proper sense of the term. This conclusion stands in shocking contrast

Textausschnitt: 219a It can safely be said, we think, that Locke's "partial law of nature" is not identical with clear and plain teachings of the New Testament or of Scripture in general. If "all the parts" of the law of nature are made out in the New Testament in a clear and plain manner, it follows that the "partial law of nature" does not belong at all to the law of nature. This conclusion is supported also by the following consideration: In order to be a law in the proper sense of the term, the law of nature must be known to have been given by God. But the "partial law of nature" does not require belief in God. The "partial law of nature" circumscribes the conditions which a nation must fulfil in order to be civil or civilized. Now the Chinese are "a very great and civil people" and the Siamites are a "civilized nation," and both the Chinese and the Siamites "want the idea and knowledge of God."1 The "partial law of nature" is, then, not a law in the proper sense of the term.2 (Fs)

220a We thus arrive at the conclusion that Locke cannot have recognized any law of nature in the proper sense of the term. This conclusion stands in shocking contrast to what is generally thought to be his doctrine, and especially the doctrine of the Second Treatise. Before turning to an examination of the Second Treatise, we beg the reader to consider the following facts: The accepted interpretation of Locke's teaching leads to the consequence that "Locke is full of illogical flaws and inconsistencies,"1 of inconsistencies, we add, which are so obvious that they cannot have escaped the notice of a man of his rank and his sobriety. Furthermore, the accepted interpretation is based on what amounts to a complete disregard of Locke's caution, of a kind of caution which is, to say the least, compatible with so involving one's sense that one cannot easily be understood and with going with the herd in one's outward professions. Above all, the accepted interpretation does not pay sufficient attention to the character of the Treatise; it somehow assumes that the Treatise contains the philosophic presentation of Locke's political doctrine, whereas it contains, in fact, only its "civil" presentation. In the Treatise, it is less Locke the philosopher than Locke the Englishman who addresses not philosophers, but Englishmen.2 It is for this reason that the argument of that work is based partly on generally accepted opinions, and even to a certain extent on scriptural principles: "The greatest part cannot know, and therefore they must believe," so much so, that even if philosophy had "given us ethics in a science like mathematics, in every part demonstrable, ... the instruction of the people were best still to be left to the precepts and principles of the gospel."3 (Fs)