Autor: Mehrere Autoren: Method, Journal of Lonergan Studies, 11,1

Buch: Method, Journal of Lonergan Studies, Volume 11, Number 1

Titel: Lonergan, Bernard - Analytic Concept of History

Stichwort: Geschichte: Formalobjekt, Materialobjekt; Prinzip der Selektion

Kurzinhalt: 2. History ... Hence we may simply say that history is the aggregate of human actions in their causes.

Textausschnitt: 2.1 [History and historiography]

9a Distinguish [a] history that is written, history books; call it historiography; [b] history that is written about.1 (Fs)

2.2 [Material and formal objects of history]

9b The material object of history is the aggregate of human thoughts, words and deeds. (Fs)

The formal object of history is this aggregate placed in a perspective by the historian's principle of selection. Now this principle of selection is that 'an event is historic in the measure it influences human action.' Hence we may simply say that history is the aggregate of human actions in their causes. As such it is a science. (Fs) (notabene)

But it is to be noted that the historian considers the aggregate only by considering the parts, that he finds his causes principally not without but within the aggregate, and finally that effect is only a different aspect of cause so that asking what are the effects of given actions is tantamount to asking the cause of subsequent ones. (Fs)

2.3 [The formal object of the analytic concept of history]

9c The formal object of the analytic concept of history is to be obtained by removing from the formal object of history all that is not subject to a priori determination, so far as our knowledge goes.1 (Fs)

The formal object of history is the aggregate of human actions in their causes (or effects). From this we remove the following elements. (Fs)

9d First, because there is no science of the particular, we shall not be concerned with, Who did it? with persons or peoples, but solely with, What is done? (Fs)

10a Second, because the action of the First Cause though more excellent in itself is less known to us, we shall confine ourselves to secondary causes. N.B. This will not exclude a hypothetical consideration of the supernatural virtues and the conditions of their emergence in history. (Fs)

Third, among secondary causes we must distinguish essential and accidental, to omit the latter. (Fs)

10b Among accidental causes are acts of a human person that do not involve the human element2 and 'acts of God' such as plagues, famines, earthquakes, floods. We do not pretend to deny that such events may have the greatest historical importance (for example, the Black Death); our position is that history is not essentially a succession of such events. (Fs)

10c By direct influence we mean the influence exerted by one man upon others, whether it is convincing of what is true, persuading to what is right, indoctrinating with falsehood, conspiring to evil, or adding to all these the necessary use of force. (Fs)

By indirect influence we mean the influence of the manmade environment, for instance, that of being born and brought up in Mayfair or in the jungle; also, the influence of the historical situation which past action created and present action has to face. (Fs)

10d Fourth, in the essential causes of history we distinguish between those of formal and those of material import, that is, between vectors which give the magnitude and direction of forces and mere friction. The former is will exerted upon the manner of life; the latter is the will to live and to propagate. (Fs)

Briefly, the formal object of the analytic concept of history is the MAKING AND UNMAKING OF MAN BY MAN. (Fs)

10e To the objection that the human will is free, that it is not subject to a priori determination, that therefore it cannot enter into our own view of the formal object of the analytic concept (see §2.3 above), we answer that we have a method of outflanking this difficulty which will appear in due course. (Fs)