Autor: Strauss, Leo Buch: Natural Right and History Titel: Natural Right and History Stichwort: Naturrecht; Zivilisation; Unterschied: das beste Regime - das legitime; Kurzinhalt: ... while the best regime is possible, its actualization is by no means necessary. Its actualization is very difficult, ... The distinction between the best regime and legitimate regimes has its root in the distinction between the noble and the just! Textausschnitt: 138a The central significance of the phenomena called "regimes" has become somewhat blurred. The reasons for this change are the same as those responsible for the fact that political history has ceded its former pre-eminence to social, cultural, economic, etc., history. The emergence of these new branches of history finds its culmination--and its legitimation--in the concept of "civilizations" (or "cultures"). We are in the habit of speaking of "civilizations," where the classics spoke of "regimes." "Civilization" is the modern substitute for "regime." It is difficult to find out what a civilization is. A civilization is said to be a large society, but we are not told clearly what kind of society it is. If we inquire how one can tell one civilization from another, we are informed that the most obvious and least misleading mark is the difference in artistic styles. This means that civilizations are societies which are characterized by something which is never in the focus of interest of large societies as such: societies do not go to war with one another on account of differences of artistic styles. Our orientation by civilizations, instead of by regimes, would seem to be due to a peculiar estrangement from those life-and-death issues which move and animate societies and keep them together. (Fs)
138b The best regime would today be called an "ideal regime" or simply an "ideal." The modern term "ideal" carries with it a host of connotations which obviate the understanding of what the classics meant by the best regime. Modern translators sometimes use "ideal" for rendering what the classics call "according to wish" or "according to prayer." The best regime is that for which one would wish or pray. Closer examination would show that the best regime is the object of the wish or prayer of all good men or of all gentlemen: the best regime, as presented by classical political philosophy, is the object of the wish or prayer of gentlemen as that object is interpreted by the philosopher. But the best regime, as the classics understand it, is not only most desirable; it is also meant to be feasible or possible, i.e., possible on earth. It is both desirable and possible because it is according to nature. Since it is according to nature, no miraculous or nonmiraculous change in human nature is required for its actualization; it does not require the abolition or extirpation of that evil or imperfection which is essential to man and to human life; it is therefore possible. And, since it is in accordance with the requirements of the excellence or perfection of human nature, it is most desirable. Yet, while the best regime is possible, its actualization is by no means necessary. Its actualization is very difficult, hence improbable, even extremely improbable. For man does not control the conditions under which it could become actual. Its actualization depends on chance. The best regime, which is according to nature, was perhaps never actual; there is no reason to assume that it is actual at present; and it may never become actual. It is of its essence to exist in speech as distinguished from deed. In a word, the best regime is, in itself--to use a term coined by one of the profoundest students of Plato's Republic--a "utopia."1 (Fs)
139a The best regime is possible only under the most favorable conditions. It is therefore just or legitimate only under the most favorable conditions. Under more or less unfavorable conditions, only more or less imperfect regimes are possible and therefore legitimate. There is only one best regime, but there is a variety of legitimate regimes. The variety of legitimate regimes corresponds to the variety of types of relevant circumstances. Whereas the best regime is possible only under the most favorable conditions, legitimate or just regimes are possible and morally necessary at all times and in all places. The distinction between the best regime and legitimate regimes has its root in the distinction between the noble and the just! Everything noble is just, but not everything just is noble. To pay one's debts is just, but not noble. Deserved punishment is just, but not noble. The farmers and artisans in Plato's best polity lead just lives, but they do not lead noble lives: they lack the opportunity for acting nobly. What a man does under duress is just in the sense that he cannot be blamed for it; but it can never be noble. Noble actions require, as Aristotle says, a certain equipment; without such equipment they are not possible. But we are obliged to act justly under all circumstances. A very imperfect regime may supply the only just solution to the problem of a given community; but, since such a regime cannot be effectively directed toward man's full perfection, it can never be noble.2 (Fs) ____________________________
|