Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Notwendigkeit des Wortes in uns; Beweis: Wort in Gott?; falsches Verständnis von Sein (Objekt - Subjekt): Plato, Scotus, Rosmini, Satre; intellectus in actu ...;

Kurzinhalt: QUESTION 2: Can the existence of a Word in God be demonstrated by the natural light of reason? ... we must consider by what necessity there is a word in us, so that we can determine whether ...

Textausschnitt: 207d As to the fact, the answer is obvious from the condemnation of the semirationalists by the Vatican Council (DB 1816, DS 3041, ND 137). Still, in order to add some understanding to our certitude, we must consider by what necessity there is a word in us, so that we can determine whether there is any necessity for a word in God that we can know naturally.1 (Fs)

207e A first reason, then, that a word is necessary in us is to enable us to proceed from a grasp of a cause or quiddity to a conception of a thing. For we are moved to an act of understanding by the causes or quiddities of things; but these causes or quiddities are not the things themselves, but parts or relations of the things; so the first reason that a word is necessary in us is so that from having grasped a quiddity, we may proceed to a thing as quidditatively defined. (Fs)

209a A second reason is to enable us to proceed from definitions and from a grasp of evidence to things as existing. This does not occur unless from a grasp of evidence there proceeds a true affirmation in which, as in a medium, being is known.1 (Fs)

209b A third reason is to enable us to cultivate the sciences. For if universal words were not being produced we would never be able to know the whole visible universe; rather, we would be confined to experienced or imagined particulars. Again, if exactly defined words were not being produced, we would be tossed about by the flow of images after the manner of the mythic mentality, since it would never be clearly and distinctly determined what we were talking about. (Fs)

209c A fourth and final reason is to enable us to proceed beyond the limits of the visible universe by means of analogies and the way of eminence. One could never so proceed unless interior words were being formed both for defining and for judging. (Fs)

209d These four reasons for the necessity of a word have this common source, that the object that moves us to the act of understanding is different from the object toward which we tend as toward a goal. For the object that moves our intellect in this life is the quiddity of a material thing; but the goal toward which intellect tends is the totality of being. Because we begin from a quiddity, the word is required, first, so that the thing may be defined through its quiddity; second, so that we may judge whether what we have defined exists; third, so that we may be directed away from sensibly perceived particulars toward the entirety of the visible universe; and fourth, so that we may be able to reach beyond the material world to God. (Fs)

209e Now the necessity of the word in God cannot be of this kind. For the divine intellect is not moved by something else, nor does it tend toward something else as toward a goal, but being infinite in perfection, it exists eternally, perfectly comprehending itself and perfectly understanding and knowing everything else in itself. (Fs)

209f The arguments which are sometimes presented as demonstrating the existence of a divine Word are easily answered. (Fs)
Thus, one can object that an understanding that is not expressed in words is not clear and distinct; but divine knowledge is perfectly clear and distinct; therefore, divine knowledge is not without expression through a word. (Fs)

209g Response: I concede that an understanding through many acts is not clear and distinct without words; I deny that an understanding through one infinite act is not clear and distinct without words. And I contradistinguish the minor. (Fs)

211a The distinction is explained in the following manner. Of itself, the word can add no clarity and no distinctness above understanding, since the word is merely the expression of what becomes known through the act of understanding. In an incidental manner, however, words are necessary for clarity and distinctness when there are many diverse and imperfect acts of understanding; and so if there were no words in us, we should hardly be able to know what we have already grasped and what remains to be investigated. (Fs) (notabene)

211b Objection: The duality of subject and object is intrinsic to the very idea of knowledge. Therefore, if the divine subject were not to utter a word, he would not be able to know himself. But God knows himself. Therefore, he utters a word. (Fs)
Response: The principle presupposed is simply false and has no basis other than imagining a person looking and the object looked at. (Fs)

211c Because of this presupposed principle, the Platonists postulated simple, subsistent, eternal Ideas in a first order, and on the second level the gods who contemplated the Ideas. Because of the same principle, Scotus posited his formal distinction a parte rei, as will be clear below. Because of the same principle, Anton Günther and Antonio Rosmini thought they had discovered a demonstration of the divine Word. Because of the same principle, Jean-Paul Sartre distinguishes between en soi and pour soi in such a way that he impugns as contradictory a God who is real, who is conscious of himself, and who is simple. Because of the same principle, consciousness is conceived as perception of oneself, a view that leads to insoluble difficulties regarding the consciousness of Christ.1 (Fs) (notabene)

211d Aristotelian and Thomist principles are entirely opposed to this supposed principle. For the intelligible in act is the intelligent in act.2 The intelligent and the understood are the same in those things that are without matter. Accordingly, the only reason why the intellect and the intelligible object are not the same is that both are in potency.3 (Fs)

213a Objection: Finally, dynamic intellectual consciousness is so perfect that it must be posited in God, who is infinite in perfection. (Fs)

Response: If this statement is considered in itself, I concede. If it is considered in relation to us, I deny it. For the procession of the Word in God is utterly necessary and utterly perfect. But in what we know naturally concerning God there is no demonstration that dynamic intellectual consciousness is a pure perfection, and so it cannot be demonstrated that it must be posited in God. We do not attain a perfect understanding even from what we believe by faith; indeed, the reality of the emanation and the consubstantiality of the one emanating seem so to conflict with each other that we can hardly consider the two of them simultaneously. (Fs)