Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Emanation; Unterschied: Akt des Verstehens - inneres Wort; erste, zweite Tätigkeit des Verstandes - die entsprechenden Objekte; intellectus agens, possibilis, phantasma; Beispiele; Hylophormismus

Kurzinhalt: QUESTION 1: Is our act of understanding different from our [inner] word? ... in relation to our intellect one distinguishes the object that is the goal of intellect (being), the object that is the term of the second operation of intellect (the true) ...

Textausschnitt: QUESTION 1
Is our act of understanding different from our [inner] word?1

203c Since an act takes its species from its object, if one discovers different specific objects, one must distinguish different acts.2 (Fs)

203d Now, in relation to our intellect one distinguishes the object that is the goal of intellect (being), the object that is the term of the second operation of intellect (the true), the object that moves the intellect toward its second operation (sufficient evidence), the object that is the term of the first operation of intellect (a definition, a hypothesis), and the object that moves the intellect toward its first operation (the quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter). (Fs) (notabene)

203e Furthermore, being and the true are convertible; whatever are convertible are not different in species; so being is also attained by the same act by which the true is attained. For this reason, the true is said to be the medium in which being is known. (Fs)

203f But the true is one thing, and sufficient evidence is another; so the act by which evidence is grasped as sufficient is different from the act by which the true is affirmed and the false is denied. It is quite clear that these two acts are connected to each other by an intellectual emanation, for we are able to affirm the true because we have grasped evidence as sufficient.1 Therefore, as regards the second operation of intellect, by which we respond to the question, Is it? one must distinguish very carefully between the act of understanding by which the sufficiency of evidence is grasped and the act of affirming the true, which is a word uttered within. (Fs)

205a With respect to the first operation of intellect,2 the object that moves, which is external, is the quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter. First, corporeal and individual matter is made known through the senses. Second, from the agent intellect a wondering arises that asks, 'What is it?' or 'Why is it so?' Third, a phantasm is formed in which the intelligible that is to be grasped in sensible data becomes more clearly manifest in the sensible data themselves. Fourth, the possible intellect, directed to the phantasm, grasps in the phantasm an intelligible, a quiddity, or another cause. Fifth, the possible intellect, since it now actually understands the quiddity of a reality, or another cause, utters a simple inner word, which is the definition of the reality through its quiddity or through another cause. (Fs) (notabene)

205b Now the intelligible that is grasped in sensible data is the same as the intelligible that is uttered in the definition. Nevertheless, the object when grasped is different from the object when defined. For when it is grasped, corporeal matter becomes known separately through the senses, but the quiddity or nature or cause becomes known separately through the intellect. However, when it is defined, what became known earlier through distinct acts are now brought together into one; for in the definition common corporeal matter is posited, but not individual corporeal matter; and the quiddity, nature, or cause are not themselves defined, but rather the reality is defined in accordance with its quiddity, nature, or cause. Therefore, because the objects are different, the acts must be different. (Fs) (notabene)

205c Lest one be deterred by this terminology, we add these examples. (Fs)

What is an eclipse? An eclipse is the darkening brought about on a heavenly body by the interposition of another heavenly body. That is a quidditative definition, for it states what an eclipse is. How, then, does it differ from any other kind of definition? It differs in that not only does it set forth sensible similarities, but it also assigns a cause or reason why. For the cause of an eclipse is the interposition of another heavenly body: that cause is grasped in the sensible data themselves, or at least in the phantasm, by an act of understanding, before an eclipse can be defined through its cause. (Fs)

207a What is a circle? A circle is the locus of points lying on the same plane surface and equally distant from a center. That is another quidditative definition. For it does not state that the circle is a perfectly round plane figure; rather, it assigns the cause why the circle necessarily is perfectly round. Moreover, this necessary consequence itself must be grasped in the phantasm by an act of understanding before there can be an intellectual emanation of the definition of the circle.1 (Fs)

207b What is a human being? A rational animal. That again is a quidditative definition, because it assigns the cause. For what becomes known through the senses is a certain kind of organic body. A form is understood in this body: the soul that is both sensitive and rational. Because the form is a sensitive soul, the reality is an animal. Because the form is a rational soul, the reality is a rational animal. (Fs)

207c Once these things have been grasped, the gnoseological foundation of hylomorphism comes to light: because we conceive realities by means of sensation and understanding, it is necessary that they be composed of matter and form. (Fs) (notabene)