Autor: Strauss, Leo

Buch: Natural Right and History

Titel: Natural Right and History

Stichwort: Naturrecht: Ursprung; Analyse: Gesetz - Gemeinwohl (common good); Konventionalismus

Kurzinhalt: ... analysis of law. Law reveals itself as something self-contradictory ... But if the just is identical with the common good, the just or right cannot be conventional: ...

Textausschnitt: 101a The decision depends now on the result of the analysis of law. Law reveals itself as something self-contradictory. On the one hand, it claims to be something essentially good or noble: it is the law that saves the cities and everything else. On the other hand, the law presents itself as the common opinion or decision of the city, i.e., of the multitude of citizens. As such, it is by no means essentially good or noble. It may very well be the work of folly and baseness. There is certainly no reason to assume that the makers of laws are as a rule wiser than "you and I"; why, then, should "you and I" submit to their decision? The mere fact that the same laws which were solemnly enacted by the city are repealed by the same city with equal solemnity would seem to show the doubtful character of the wisdom that went into their making.1 The question, then, is whether the claim of the law to be something good or noble can be simply dismissed as altogether unfounded or whether it contains an element of truth. (Fs)

101b The law claims that it saves the cities and everything else. It claims to secure the common good. But the common good is exactly what we mean by "the just." Laws are just to the extent that they are conducive to the common good. But if the just is identical with the common good, the just or right cannot be conventional: the conventions of a city cannot make good for the city what is, in fact, fatal for it and vice versa. The nature of things and not convention then determines in each case what is just. This implies that what is just may very well differ from city to city and from period to period: the variety of just things is not only compatible with, but a consequence of, the principle of justice, namely, that the just is identical with the common good. Knowledge of what is just here and now, which is knowledge of what is by nature, or intrinsically, good for this city now, cannot be scientific knowledge. Still less can it be knowledge of the type of sense-perception. To establish what is just in each case is the function of the political art or skill. That art or skill is comparable to the art of the physician, who establishes what is in each case healthy or good for the human body.1 (Fs)