Autor: Melchin, R. Kenneth

Buch: History, Ethics and Emegent Probability

Titel: History, Ethics and Emegent Probability

Stichwort: Wahrscheinlichkeit - Problem der Einsicht

Kurzinhalt: In many introductory text-books in statistics or probability theory the author includes one definition of probability as a limit of a proper fraction ...

Textausschnitt: 3.1 The Empirical Stance

1/3 "In his 1958 Halifax lectures Lonergan talks a little on the background surrounding his treatment of probability in Insight. In many introductory text-books in statistics or probability theory the author includes one definition of probability as a limit of a proper fraction expressing a proportion of occurrences of an event i to a total number of cases as n approaches infinity. (61; Fs)

2/3 Such a definition is an operational definition of probability inasmuch as it defines a probability as something that can be determined through the performance of a set of experimental operations. However it is not actually operational because an accurate determination requires the performance of an infinitely large number of operations. This definition has led to a host of debates concerning the actual existence of probabilities, the possibility of their accurate calculation and the epistemological status of knowledge gained through the execution of contemporary techniques in statistics.2 And it is to some of these problems that Philip McShane has devoted a good number of pages in Randomness.3 But what is significant here, at this introductory stage, is that Lonergan is concerned with probabilities as some sort of knowledge which can be gained about a state of affairs through the implementation of a set of experimental procedures. His concern is with the a posteriori case of probabilities.4 Statistical procedures are being employed massively in the natural and human sciences. Conclusions are being drawn from experiments that involve their implementation. And such conclusions are held, to one degree or another, as claiming something about the world of human experience.5 Lonergan is curious as to what kind of knowledge, if any, the implementation of statistical techniques yields about the world of human experience. (61; Fs)

3/3 [...] To investigate any matter empirically is to attend to instances of human experience with questions about the 'nature' of such experiences. But when the object of investigation is the act of empirical inquiry itself, the curious subject is faced with a difficulty. To marshall evidence from previous experiments is to attend spontaneously to the content or term of such experiments. But rather than helping the investigation such attention inevitably constitutes an obstacle. For what is sought is not knowledge about what came to be known through the performance of the experiments but knowledge about the knowing. The alternative might seem to be to ask questions, from an a priori perspective, about the very possibility, the logical possibility, of any and all acts of knowing. But such questions bring the subject no closer to answering his or her questions about the nature of knowing. For their answers can only pertain to what might possibly be the case and not to what in fact is the case. A question of fact can never be settled a priori by an appeal to logic but only a posteriori in an appeal to evidence. What then constitutes evidence in an empirical investigation into empirical knowing? Lonergan suggests that we turn to instances of our own empirical inquiry as they occur when we encounter any unknown. (61f; Fs)