Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Göttliche Hervorgänge; Reflexion über Erfahrung: intellektuelle Emanation; Wille, Vernunft: Hervorgang, Liebe

Kurzinhalt: Indeed, this emanation is nothing other than the fact that, whenever we grasp sufficient evidence, from that very grasp of sufficient evidence, by an intellectually conscious necessity we bring forth a true judgment.

Textausschnitt: 135d There are three ways of treating intellectual emanation. The first is philosophical; we investigate everything concerning our mind, whether from a psychological or from a metaphysical perspective. The second way is historical; we strive to understand exactly what individual philosophers and theologians thought concerning our mind. The third way is theological and speculative; we seek to acquire such knowledge of our mind as will enable us to have some understanding of the divine processions. Since we have already written something about both the philosophical question1 and the historical question,2 it seems sufficient here to proceed according to the third way. (Fs)

135e We are therefore attempting something very easy. For we are attempting neither to grasp some philosophical synthesis nor to review and pass judgment on a whole series of opinions, but to go through a simple, brief process of reflection. Everyone who has truly reached the age of reason can go through this process. (Fs)

135f Thus, we all know from experience the difference between a rash judgment and a true judgment. A rash judgment is produced without sufficient evidence. A true judgment, on the other hand, is a judgment so based on the evidence one has grasped that a certain intellectual necessity makes that judgment inescapable. Now, what is lacking in a rash judgment and found in a true judgment is said to be an intellectual or intelligible emanation.3 Indeed, this emanation is nothing other than the fact that, whenever we grasp sufficient evidence, from that very grasp of sufficient evidence, by an intellectually conscious necessity we bring forth a true judgment. (Fs) (notabene)

137a Again, we all know from experience the difference between a definition repeated from memory and a definition proposed because we have grasped something through understanding. When we repeat a definition by memory, we certainly make sounds, not because we have understood anything, but rather because we have acquired some sensitive habit. However, when we produce a definition, because we want to express what we have understood, we can illustrate what we intend not only with other words but also with many different examples. As in defining, so also in illustrating with examples, everything we say is directed and, in a way, necessitated by the very act of understanding. Now, what is lacking in someone repeating things by memory but present in someone who understands and displays that understanding in a variety of ways is again what we are calling an intellectual or intelligible emanation. Indeed, this emanation is nothing other than the fact that, whenever we understand, from the very fact that we understand, by an intellectually conscious necessity we bring forth definitions as well as explications and illustrations. (Fs)

137b Finally, we all know from experience the difference between an act of will that is disordered and contrary to reason and one that is well ordered, right, obligatory, holy. For a good that is grasped by the intellect, approved by reason, and imposed upon the will obligates us in such a way that either we choose what is against the dictates of right reason and so are irrational, or we yield to the dictates of intellect and so are rational. Thus, what is lacking in a morally evil act but present in a morally good act is that spiritual and moral procession that effectively obligates the will in such a way that we not only ought to love the good, but actually do love it. This procession too is an intellectual or intelligible emanation, for it consists in the fact that a potentially rational appetite becomes actually rational because of a good grasped by the intellect. Therefore, since by its very nature the will is a rational appetite, and since this appetite cannot be actually rational unless it actually follows upon reason, we must say that 'it is of the nature of love to proceed only from a conception of the intellect.' (Fs)