Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Göttliche Hervorgänge; Irrtümer allgemein: Mangel, Übermaß (defect, excess); psychologische Analogie: richtiges Verständnis vom Intellekt (Thomas - Scotus)

Kurzinhalt: The erroneous opinions err either through excess or through defect. The semi-rationalists err through excess; ...

Textausschnitt: Opinions

131b Some opinions about the ways in which the divine processions may be understood are erroneous, others are insufficient, still others are poorly propounded; then there is the opinion of St Thomas. (Fs)

131c The erroneous opinions err either through excess or through defect. The semi-rationalists err through excess; they affirm that the mysteries of faith are demonstrable, and they strive to demonstrate them. This opinion was explicitly condemned under an anathema by Vatican I (DB 1816, DS 3041, ND 137). On the other hand, those who say that we cannot in this life have even an imperfect understanding of the mysteries of faith err by defect. This opinion could once have been understood as piety repelling heretical errors or curbing audacious speculation; but since it openly contradicts Vatican I (DB 1796, DS 3016, ND 132), it should be completely abandoned. (Fs)

131d The insufficient opinions express some truth but in such a way as to show that their proponents have only a slight understanding of the problem. Thus, it is entirely true that the good is self-diffusive; more than that, however, is required. What kind of diffusion is this? How does the first self-diffusion differ from the second? Why is there not a third, a fourth, a six-hundredth instance of self-diffusion? Again, it is entirely true that the triune God is the perfect society of love. But this gives rise to further questions; and they are not solved. (Fs)

131e By poorly propounded opinions I mean opinions of those who employ the psychological analogy, but in a way that overlooks to some extent the proper force and efficacy of the analogy. According to this approach, which we admit is closer to the truth than the previous approaches, some likeness exists between the divine processions and the finite emanations that occur in human intelligence. But human intelligence can be conceived in two ways: first, in accordance with the reality of intelligence itself, and second, in accordance with some analogy drawn from human sensibility. In the first way, the human intellect is conceived in terms of the act of understanding itself; thus St Thomas affirms that 'the human soul understands itself by its understanding, which is its proper act, perfectly demonstrating its power and its nature.'1 In the second way, the human intellect is conceived first as proceeding from external words to universal concepts, then as proceeding from the corporeal act of seeing to some simple spiritual apprehension whereby concepts become known to us; this is the approach of Scotus and the Scotists, and of many others who believe they are following St Thomas. Now, if the human intellect is conceived in accordance with the intellect's proper reality and nature, one is able to press forward to an analogical conception of the divine processions; this is the view that argues in favor of the psychological analogy.2 But if the human intellect is conceived in accordance with some remote analogy founded in sensible data and sensations, one is overlooking the real basis for discovering the likeness between the triune God and the human intellect; and if this is overlooked one may labor strenuously and dispute extensively and yet conclude to nothing clear. (Fs) (notabene)

133a Therefore, not only should the psychological analogy be employed, it must also be understood in such a way that the likeness is not sought between the sensitive part of our nature and the triune God. And if we attend even for a few moments to our own internal and properly intellectual experiences, we make three discoveries. (Fs)

133b First, 'whenever we understand, by the mere fact that we do understand, something proceeds within us, which is the conception of the thing understood, issuing from our intellective power and proceeding from its knowledge.'1 (Fs)

135a Second, 'it is of the nature of love not to proceed except from a conception of the intellect.'2 (Fs)

135b Third, 'what proceeds internally by an intellectual process does not have to be different. Indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more it is one with that from which it proceeds.'3 (Fs)

135c Once we understand these three statements, the entire fundamental trinitarian problem is solved, at least virtually. The rest of what has to be said demands not the acquisition of further understanding, but only further applications of the understanding already achieved. (Fs)