Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Vergleich 2: dogmatische - systematische Methode; 8 Unterschiede; Verwirrung durch fehlende Unterscheidung zw. Dogmatik und Systematik

Kurzinhalt: What is prior in one is subsequent in the other ... The reason for this inversion is completely universal ... it is not always grasped how much confusion results from not keeping the dogmatic and systematic ways sufficiently distinct

Textausschnitt: 69a That said, let us proceed to the comparison. (Fs)

In the first place, it is clear that the dogmatic and the systematic ways are concerned with the same realities. The missions of the Son and of the Spirit narrated in the New Testament are identical with the missions discussed by St Thomas in question 43 of the Prima pars of the Summa. The divine generation that St Athanasius wrote about is the same generation that St Thomas spoke of both in question 27, before he had presented his systematic conception of the persons, and in question 41, after he had completed that presentation. This kind of identity will be found all across the board, since the synthetic movement is simply an orderly exposition of what was discovered and demonstrated in the analytic process. (Fs)

69b Second, although each movement treats the same realities, still each posits realities in a different order. What is prior in one is subsequent in the other. Thus, Aquinas ends with the missions, while the New Testament starts with them. Again, the patristic inquiry ends with the psychological analogy, while Aquinas starts with it. The reason for this inversion is completely universal: anyone who inquires or removes doubts starts from what is most obvious in order to conclude to what is more remote and more obscure; but anyone who is teaching starts with those notions that can be understood without presupposing the understanding of other notions, so that, by gradually increasing the complexity, one might arrive at an understanding of the concrete. (Fs)

69c Third, although the same realities are treated in each movement, they are conceived differently in each. The concept of a divine mission that is put forward in a Summa of theology, namely, the relation of the one sent both to the sender and to the term, is hardly what came explicitly to the mind of the first Christians as they read the letters of St Paul. Again, the Creed Quicumque teaches that mere are three persons, but it does not mention three subsisting relations. There is also a universal reason for this difference: included in the way of synthesis is the entire explanatory element toward which the way of analysis proceeds one step at a time. This is behind the common distinction in the manuals between 'the fact,' which they prove from authorities, and 'the understanding of the fact,' in regard to which more often than not they show theologians arguing with one another. (Fs)

71a Fourth, this formal difference of concepts increases as we compare the elements that are prior in the dogmatic way with the elements that are subsequent in the systematic. The later an element is posited in the systematic movement, the more it presupposes and includes the whole previous cumulative understanding. But the earlier an element is posited in the dogmatic movement, the more it expresses a simple narration of fact and the more it avoids any controversial understanding. (Fs)

71b Fifth, the same formal difference of concepts diminishes as we compare the elements that are subsequent in the dogmatic way with the elements that are prior in the systematic. For the dogmatic way moves toward the attainment of understanding, and once it has attained understanding it holds onto it and adds it to previous achievements; and the systematic way does not immediately express all of this understanding at the very beginning. Thus, there is no great difference between the psychological analogy at which the dogmatic way concludes and the same psychological analogy from which the systematic way begins. (Fs)

71c Sixth, the proofs of the two ways differ, partly because of the formally different concepts, but also because of the different goals intended. The dogmatic way proves that relations certainly exist in God, arguing from the names of 'Father' and 'Son,' from the necessity that any distinctions in God be purely relative, and from the notional acts. But the dogmatic way is not aware of the relations insofar as they are somehow known prior to the persons;1 nor does it begin to think about the basis of the relations until it has established the fact that relations do exist. The systematic way, in contrast, proceeds from the foundation of the processions to posit the relations, and since it has not yet formed a systematic conception of the persons, it is only by an inappropriate anticipation that it would argue from the names, properties, and notional acts of the persons. The difference is completely universal: every argument proceeds from something prior and moves to something subsequent; but what are prior in the systematic way are subsequent in the dogmatic; and what are subsequent in the systematic way are prior in the dogmatic. Thus, anyone who tries to use a blend of the two at the same time will be compelled to run through practically the entire treatise in every individual thesis. (Fs)

[...]

75a We have distinguished two ways, the dogmatic and the systematic. While they investigate the same realities, they proceed in contrary and opposed orders', they use formally distinct concepts, they employ different methods of proof, they have different relations to theological notes and censures, and they consider opponents and errors in different ways. Why all this? Because 'every act should be performed in a way adapted to its end. Now an argument can be directed to either of two ends.'1 Although it is the one same being that has essence and the act of existence, although it is the same proposition by which there is expressed the intelligible (which is true) and the true (which is intelligible), and although we cannot without reduplication distinguish between intelligible truth as true and intelligible truth as intelligible, nevertheless there is one operation of the mind that attains intelligible truth as true, and a really distinct operation that attains intelligible truth as intelligible. But if the operations are different, so are the methods by which one proceeds to the operations. It follows that if you seek certitude, you begin from those items that are most manifest and gradually arrive at a demonstration of those that are more obscure; but if you seek understanding, you start from those items which you can understand without presupposing the understanding of others; if, however, what you prefer is confusion, then you demand understanding where certitude is the issue, and certitude where what matters most is understanding. (Fs)

77a I trust no one really wants confusion. But it is not always grasped how much confusion results from not keeping the dogmatic and systematic ways sufficiently distinct. Where the goals are different, where the formal objects are different, where the operations by which the different goals are attained are different, where the orders by which one moves toward the goals are different, where different formal concepts are employed, and different proofs and different ways of considering errors, it makes little sense to judge theological works as if they all had but one goal, one formal object, one kind of operation, one ordering of questions, one type of formal concept, one way of proving, and one way of considering errors. And if it makes little sense when the issue regards simply the dogmatic and systematic ways, it makes even less sense when the consideration of history is added. To that we now turn. (Fs)