Autor: Plato

Buch: Gorgias

Titel: Gorgias

Stichwort: eudaimonia; Wechselbeziehung: Rhetorik- Vergnügen; Hedonismus - widersprüchlich

Kurzinhalt: ... that he regards rhetoric and pleasure as essentially connected; He describes rhetoric as a species of flattery, and claims that flattery in all its guises aims for short-term pleasure rather than the good ...

Textausschnitt: XVIIa Another recurrent term in the dialogue is 'happiness', which translates the Greek eudaimonia (literally, 'being in a good state'). Again, this is a very flexible term. All Greeks, however sophisticated or unsophisticated they were, would have accepted eudaimonia as a description of what they wanted to get out of life; they were all 'eudaemonists'. Where they differed, however, was over what constitutes happiness. Is it a life of sensual pleasure which brings happiness, or what?

XVIIb In Greek, as in English, there is a natural connection between pleasure and happiness. We say, casually, 'Gardening makes me happy', meaning 'I enjoy gardening, I find it pleasant.' In Gorgias, however, Plato launches a strong attack against a type of hedonism, while simultaneously agreeing with the use of the term eudaimonia as a description of the aim of life. Moreover, in a dialogue which was certainly written not long before or after Gorgias- namely Protagoras-Socrates is made to espouse hedonism. We need to see what is going on. (Fs)

XVIIc It turns out that the topic of pleasure offers another route towards understanding Plato's dissatisfaction with rhetoric and the kinds of goals it entails. He makes it clear from the outset that he regards rhetoric and pleasure as essentially connected. He describes rhetoric as a species of flattery, and claims that flattery in all its guises aims for short-term pleasure rather than the good (464d). All you need in order to be a successful flatterer is enough experience of your human target to know what will please him or them (this is graphically portrayed at Republic 493a-c). So the problem with rhetoric is that it panders to its audience's short-term desires, and makes it difficult for them actually to think about what may or may not be better for them in the longer term. (Fs) (notabene)

XVIIIa Plato expresses the contrast at times very starkly. All branches of flattery aim only for pleasure, and all true tekhnai aim for the good of their subjects (464d-465a, 500a ff., 503a-b). He makes it sound as though pleasure and goodness are two incompatible things, so that one could only have one and not the other at the same time. However, I take it that the most accurate description of his position is that at 464d, where he says that branches of flattery are characterized by the fact that they aim for 'immediate pleasure'. This leaves open the possibility that long-term pleasure and goodness may still be related. (Fs) (notabene)

XVIIIb This is supported by a proper understanding of the anti-hedonist argument Socrates develops against Callicles (492d ff.). Again, Callicles is made out to be a champion of the immediate satisfaction of one's desires. His type of pleasure-seeker is entirely irrational: he doesn't allow the possibility of a person weighing up future pain against immediate pleasure and deciding to forgo that fifth cocktail. He doesn't allow the possibility of rational planning at all. If there is desire now for that fifth cocktail, then that desire had better be fulfilled if one is to be happy- that is Callicles' view, and that is the kind of hedonism which Plato and Socrates disavow. In fact, it is to Plato's credit that by means of the argument between Callicles and Socrates he allows us to distinguish between what may properly be called 'pleasure', and what should properly be called 'satisfaction of desire'. (Fs)

XVIIIc This type of hedonism was, for Plato, self-contradictory, since it emphasizes the satisfaction of desire, which is a kind of pain or discomfort. The more intense the pleasure, the more intense the desire. Therefore, to seek to maximize this kind of pleasure is to seek to maximize one's physical discomfort. However, he has nothing against a less intense kind of pleasure, which is to be found in philosophical activities, as long as these activities involve no preceding perceived pain, so that the pleasant component easily outweighs the unpleasant component. Throughout the dialogues (especially in Republic and Philebus) he expresses approval of these pleasures, and at Gorgias 499d ff. he expresses guarded approval of pleasures which promote genuine goods, such as health. The main differences between Plato and a Calliclean hedonist are that the latter seeks short-term gratification, whereas Plato looks for a life in which, in the long term, pleasure outweighs pain, and that a Calliclean hedonist makes desire-satisfaction his yardstick for assessing the goodness of an event, whereas for Plato pleasure was an accidental concomitant of events, which should in the first instance be assessed as good or bad by other criteria. (Fs) (notabene)

xixa So it is possible to read Gorgias as maintaining the natural connection between happiness and pleasure, provided that certain qualifications are in place. The good life as recommended by Socrates in Gorgias need not be entirely devoid of pleasure, but it must be genuinely good for the agent. Indeed, it seems that Plato would argue that we can only really be said to want something if it is genuinely good for us (468c). Since by definition we all want happiness, then if this phrase 'want happiness' is not to be a solecism of some kind, happiness must be genuinely good for us; it follows, according to Plato, that we do not really want anything other than virtue. (Again we find the idea that, according to Plato, the position he attributes to Socrates in Gorgias is the one held in fact, whether or not they are initially aware of it, by everyone.) It also follows that the path to virtue must be rational-must be a tekhne-since Plato effectively denies that we can be said to want happiness unless we can find some means towards the successful attainment of it (466b-468e), which involves the ability to distinguish between those pleasures which are good for us and those which are not (499d ff.). Since rhetoric is not a tekhne, it cannot be a means to happiness. (Fs) (notabene)