Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964

Titel: Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964

Stichwort: Klärung: intelligibel (intelligibile); in genere intelligibilium ut actus

Kurzinhalt: St Thomas, where he says that sensible things are not in genere intelligibilium, that our intellects are in genere intelligibilium ut potentia tantum, that ...

Textausschnitt: 135b Question: What is the meaning of the term intelligibile as applied to acts of understanding, as distinct from the way it is applied to natural causes?

Response: The difference is clear enough in St Thomas, where he says that sensible things are not in genere intelligibilium, that our intellects are in genere intelligibilium ut potentia tantum, that to be in genere intelligibilium ut actus is to be infinite - that is a use of intelligibile that does not apply to natural objects: human intelligence is at the bottom of the ladder.1 The intelligibile is the sort of thing that for it to be in full act is to be infinite. It is in a category that moves off to infinity. It makes no sense to talk about the infinitely hot, but it does make sense to talk of the infinitely intelligible. That's with regard to usage. (Fs)

136a With regard to meaning, a learned book in Akkadian2 may inspire your admiration for its beautiful printing but you won't know what it means. It's intelligible but I don't understand anything. That is not the sense in which 'intelligible' is used when we speak of an intelligible emanation. When we speak of an intelligible emanation, we refer to the intelligible that can be only in an intelligent subject as intelligence in act. A city plan, a parish church or hall, may be very intelligently worked out but the plan itself is not intelligent at all; it is an effect of intelligence. But what goes on in a man's mind when he thinks of the plan? It is not merely an object that can be studied and admired as neatly contrived; it is not the contrived but the contriver - namely, the intelligent. People judge because of sufficient reason. And you may say that I am here tonight because of a sufficient reason; or that something happens and there is a sufficient reason for it. But the sufficient reason is not rational in itself; it is the grounded: what results from following reason. But what occurs in virtue of reason itself is the sort of thing that is moved because it is rational, by the reason itself. As in the expressions, 'It stands to reason,' 'If you had an ounce of gumption, you'd say yes,' and so on. We become impatient when addressed in that way. But what is being appealed to? The speaker is appealing to our rationality, to our ability to be moved by reason as distinct from any other type of pressure or threat. In that ability to be moved by reason, at its center - in the intellect itself, in the rational appetite that is the will - the place where theory counts and where, if we are rational, it should 'cut some ice' (even if it doesn't in practical affairs) there is to be located the field of intellectual emanations. (A book on logic is logical, but when the Greeks called man a zoon logikon - a logical animal - they were talking about him as rational. The Latins did not make a mistake in translating it animal rationale - a rational animal. The question is, What is rationale?) (Fs)

136b Question: Is it true to say then that intelligible and intelligent mean the same thing? (Fs)

Response: No. In general you can say that everything is intelligible: even prime matter, though not in itself but in its form; and the social surd but only within the dialectic. Everything is intelligible but only intelligent beings are intelligent. They are the only beings that understand. What is understanding? It is like seeing in this sense: that just as, if you are blind, you don't know what seeing is (you may figure out a theory about what it must mean but it is not something immediately evident to you, and can be evident only to someone who can open and close his eyes and see), so too unless you understand, you can't know what understanding means. The function of the earlier chapters of Insight is to stimulate the occurrence and experience of understanding. People object, 'The examples aren't familiar.' That is the point. If they were familiar, the act of understanding would occur so easily that it wouldn't be noticed. You have to work for it, and at long last it comes: 'I've got it!' (Fs)