Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964

Titel: Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964

Stichwort: Trinität, Introspektion; falsches Verständnis: Wissen als Sehen

Kurzinhalt: A further consequence of conceiving knowing on the analogy of the popular notion of vision is the exclusion of the conscious subject. Objects are paraded before spectators ...

Textausschnitt: 5 Block to Integration: Notion of Knowledge

130b Now in this new block to integration ocular vision is a perfect symbol for knowing. When do you know? When you perform an act that is like an act of seeing. If you perform such an act, it is self-evident, unquestionable, beyond any possible rational doubt, that the object of that act is really and truly known, that it is valid, that it is objective. On the other hand, if a cog-nitional act is not like seeing, it is equally self-evident, unquestionable, and beyond possible doubt that its object is not really and truly known, that it really is not valid knowledge. That symbol, because it is symbolic, is absolutely convincing. Myths are not mere funny stories; a myth is something you are absolutely certain of. People who hold the earth is flat do not hold that view as a theory or hypothesis or possibility; they hold it as something which simply must be so. Similarly, one can be absolutely convinced that a cognitional act can be cognitional only if it resembles ocular vision. Of course, if it is like ocular vision, it does not need explanation but is self-evident. (Fs) (notabene)

130c Ocular vision here is ocular vision as popularly imagined. As scientifically studied, ocular vision demands distinction between 'real' color and visible color, between 'real' shapes and visible shapes. The 'real' color of the cassocks worn by the seminarians at the German College1 is always the same no matter what the age of the cassock, the lighting of the room, and so forth. The visible color varies with the age of the cassock, the number of times it has been washed, the light in which you see it. This is the visible color, unseen by most people. Again, artists see things in their perspective, but the rest of us see things the way in which they are built, the way in which they are not visible. We see everything in straight lines, in rectangles, and so forth; but that is not the way they are in fact visible.2 (Fs)
131a Now, if human knowing is to be conceived exclusively, by an epistemological necessity, as similar to ocular vision, it follows as a first consequence that human understanding must be excluded from human knowledge. For understanding is not like seeing. Understanding grows with time: you understand one point, then another, and a third, a fourth, a fifth, a sixth, and your understanding changes several times until you have things right. Seeing is not like that, so to say that knowing is like seeing is to disregard understanding as a constitutive element in human knowledge. (Fs) (notabene)

131b A further consequence of conceiving knowing on the analogy of the popular notion of vision is the exclusion of the conscious subject. Objects are paraded before spectators, and if the spectator wants to know himself, he must get out in the parade to be looked at. There are no subjects anywhere, for being a subject is not being something that is being looked at; it is being the one who is looking; it is not what is understood, but the one who is understanding; it is not what is being questioned, but the one asking the questions; and by the very fact that he is asking them, he is aware of himself asking the questions. And if the conscious subject has been excluded, it is not surprising that three conscious subjects are also excluded or at least omitted in the Trinity. (Fs) (notabene)

Kommentar (05/21/06): "Objects are paraded before spectators, and if the spectator wants to know himself, he must get out ..." Diese einfache Feststellung erklrt von einer Tiefe her das Verhalten jener Zeitgenossen, die aus einem elementaren Antrieb her unter Menschen stets damit beschftigt sind, sich mglichst sichtbar in die Parade der Objekte einzureihen.

131c When understanding is excluded from knowledge, not on the grounds that we do not have intellects (for we are not materialists), but on the grounds that we do not have intelligence,3 then we may have spiritual eyes that look at universals, compare universals, see the possible nexus, and see the necessary nexus, and we may bow our heads in assent; but we are not understanding in the ordinary meaning of the word. And if understanding is excluded from conscious knowledge, there is no possibility of one's defining or clarifying because one understands. To speak of judging because one has understood, grasped, the unconditioned, will have no meaning. Without a notion of the conscious subject or of the intelligible emanation, the process from the judgment of value to the act of choice will also be overlooked. (Fs) (notabene)

132a For some twenty-three years now, I have been examining in theology. Jesuit students must take an examination which, besides the hundred theses on theology, includes all of philosophy. When a student is asked for a philosophical proof of human liberty, he is likely to appeal to consciousness. If it is objected that, in consciousness of a free act, we are conscious only of the fact that we chose one part or the other, but not of the possibility of choosing the opposite, most students are stumped. For the appeal to consciousness must be an appeal to the conscious subject who is principle of this act or that act and is aware of the fact that he is principle of either. The appeal must be to the conscious subject and to intelligible emanations. (Fs; ???)

132b The notions of knowledge and of reality which we have outlined, although distinct, still reinforce one another. Reality is what is known by an act much like an act of seeing, and not at all what is known by understanding and judging. A neat, closed-in world is built up in which there is no room for three conscious subjects in the Trinity. (Fs)

132c There is, then, a problem for Catholic thinkers in the field of trinitarian theory. We must use the word 'person' in speaking of God, and in its traditional sense; we are bound to the formula 'three persons in God.' But we can say 'three persons' and mean three conscious subjects, that is, use the word in the sense of three who are somebody although there is one consciousness for the three subjects. There is no major difficulty in integrating the notion of person as 'conscious subject' with the whole tradition of systematic theology on the Trinity; it simply is a matter of understanding what St Thomas said. One may understand what he said or merely repeat his formula, and that is the difference between having three conscious subjects and not having them in the Trinity. The real difficulty lies elsewhere. It lies in philosophic problems and their carry-over into theology. Theology is reason illuminated by faith. And should reason limp, well, limping reason illuminated by faith will not give perfect results. (Fs)