Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964

Titel: Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964

Stichwort: Trinität, Introspektion, Thomas; falsches Verständnis von Realität (Tertullian)

Kurzinhalt: crisis involved in overcoming the spontaneous estimate of the real, and the fear of idealism involved in this crisis

Textausschnitt: 4 Block to Integration: Notion of Reality

128c On the other hand, there did arise blocks which prevented attention to the results of psychological introspection and acknowledgment of their relevance. The root of those blocks is, in my opinion, twofold: a notion of reality and a notion of knowledge. We all spend approximately seven years before reaching the age of reason, but before reaching it we have some notion, some developed sense, of reality. We all possess a prerational feeling, sense, conviction, about what is real and what is not. That prerational conviction about what is real and what is not is not exactly the same as the distinction between id quod est and id quod non est. Indeed, it is so totally different that, when we first hear about ens, we wonder what on earth people are talking about. (Fs) (notabene)

129a There are two ways of conceiving reality, of judging what is real and what is not. One is an appeal to a sense of reality that is prerational. It is never eliminated; if it were, we would not function properly, we would become a psychological case. The other is in terms of ens cui suo modo competit esse. The two notions do not sound the same and are not the same. (Fs) (notabene)

129b The difference may be illustrated by contrasting Tertullian and the Council of Nicea on the divinity of the Son. Tertullian never denied the divinity of the Son, but he did not attribute the same properties to the Son that he attributed to the Father. The Father is eternal; the Son is temporal. The Father gives orders; the Son carries them out. Perhaps - for the exegetes are uncertain of the meaning of the passage1 - the Father is the whole and the Son is the derivative part. Now the fact that the same predicates are not attributed to the Son as to the Father caused Tertullian no difficulty for, in his opinion, the Son was divine because he was made of the same stuff as the Father. Divinity depends on what sort of stuff you are made of. This is a notion of divinity that fits in perfectly with the first sense of reality. According to the homoousios formula of Nicea, however, the Son is divine because the same predicates are to be attributed to him as to the Father, with one exception, the name 'Father.'2 This notion of divinity fits in with the notion of reality in terms of id quod est and id quod non est. Homoousios is conceived in terms of ens, of id quod est, of identity of predicates. By that standard, Tertullian did not properly acknowledge the divinity of the Son. And the difference between Tertullian and Nicea on this point is the difference between the two notions of reality we outlined. (Fs) (notabene)

130a Unfortunately, some people have the impression that, while Tertullian and others of his time may have made such a mistake, no one repeats it today. Nothing could be further from the truth. For until a person has made the personal discovery that he is making Tertullian's mistake all along the line, until he has gone through the crisis involved in overcoming the spontaneous estimate of the real, and the fear of idealism involved in this crisis, he is still thinking just as Tertullian did. It is not a sign that one is dumb or backward. St Augustine was one of the most intelligent men in the whole Western tradition, and one of the best proofs of his intelligence is the fact that he himself discovered that for years he was unable to distinguish between what is a body and what is real. (Fs) (notabene)

However, the notion of reality is only one part of the problem. The other is the notion of knowledge. (Fs)