Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964

Titel: Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964

Stichwort: Geschichte: Substanz -> Subjekt; Hegel, Londergan; Subjekt - Geschichtlichkeit (historicity)

Kurzinhalt: The subject is this substance inasmuch as he is known by consciousness;

Textausschnitt: 71b The first of these is the notion of historicity, of Geschichtlichkeit. It is said of Hegel, or he said it himself, that he transferred philosophy from the substance to the subject, Spinoza wrote about the substance, Hegel wrote about the subject.1 The notion of the subject is a difficult notion to get hold of. One is not a subject, though one is a substance, when one is asleep and not dreaming. If one starts to dream, one becomes a subject, though a subject of an inferior type. But when one wakes up, one is much more of a subject, one is an empirical subject, a subject of acts of sense, seeing, hearing, and so on. If one inquires, understands, a new dimension emerges in consciousness; one is not only an empirical but also an intelligent subject. If one questions one's understanding, proceeds to judge, one becomes, one takes on the further dimension of, the rational subject. When one comes to making a decision or choice, the choice involves not only die chosen but also the chooser, and one is in die final level of the human subject, the self-conscious subject. (Fs) (notabene)

72a What is the subject? Well, the subject is what is known in consciousness. It is a term that, as it were, involves a leap from such metaphysical terms as substance and subsistence, which are defined and are verified independently of whether the subject is conscious or not. The subject is this substance inasmuch as he is known by consciousness; and not only is the subject known by consciousness, but he is also constituted qua subject by consciousness. It is when one moves from the metaphysical level of thinking to another level that there is a discontinuity, and I was talking about the notion of the subject to illustrate that discontinuity. We are always substances, but we are subjects only when we are awake, and we are subjects in different degrees according to what type of activity is going on in us. (Fs) (notabene)

72b Now just as man is a subject known and constituted by consciousness, so also man is known and constituted in his humanity by historicity, by this historical dimension of his reality. That notion of historicity is one that happens to be receiving all sorts of attention this century. From the thought of Martin Heidegger, there has radiated - often with decreasing degrees of dependence - a whole series of illuminations and transformations in previous ways of dunking of tilings. The notion goes back much further than Heidegger, but an illustration of it is the application of Heidegger's existentialism to depth psychology, and I will try to use a paper by Ludwig Binswanger on the dream and existence to elaborate.2 (Fs)

73a He distinguishes two types of dreams: the dream of the night, which is more largely determined by somatic influences, and the dream of the morning, in which the existent is shaping himself and his world. Consciousness is such that there is always a subject conscious of something, and the range of things the subject is conscious of is the horizon. Now the dream of the morning is a symbolic, incipient positing of the subject and his world. That world is not just a world of objects; it is a world in which the subject is acting, and because this human acting is determined, conditioned, by the historical developments of the past and a contribution to what the history of the immediate future is to be, you also have its historicity in the very constitution of the subject. (Fs)

73b To try to get hold of this notion from a slightly different angle, or perhaps to carry the point a step further, note that a person suffering from amnesia does not know who he is. If I were to forget that I was a Jesuit, a priest, a professor of theology, and so on, my possible activities would be entirely out of conformity with what I am. My memory of myself is constitutive, a fundamental determinant, of what I do. And to generalize, if a people were to forget themselves as a people, if all Canadians were to have amnesia insofar as they are Canadians, then Canada would no longer exist, and the same is true of any other people. There is an existential memory that is constitutive of the people qua people just as there is an
existential memory constitutive of a personality qua personality. (Fs)

73c Again, the history of a people is an account, an interpretation, of what the people were; but what the people were was their own self-interpretation. A man is not just a thing; he is what he does. What he says, what he works for, is all a function of his experience, his accumulated experience, understanding, judgment, his mentality, his way of thinking, what he approves of and disapproves of, what he wants and does not want. His mental activities are the main determinants of all his actions, and his mental activities include an interpretation, an idea, of what he himself is and what he is for - his nature and destiny. As this is true of the individual, so also it is true of the group. The historian, in writing the history of the people, in interpreting what the people were, is not the first to step into the field of interpretation. There is an understanding that was constitutive of the history that is written about, not only the understanding of the historian. (Fs) (notabene)

73d So history becomes an objectification of the existential memory of the people, of their self-interpretation. Just as drama is an objectification, a symbolization, of human life in some aspect or some situations, so, on a more fundamental level, you could say that all living is in a sense drama - people dealing with people and things. That more fundamental drama is the more fundamental objectification in civilization of what, more originally, the person is. In that way, one has a comparison between drama and history - as though drama is, as it were, a prehistorical, more simple type of history, of objectification and criticism of the way that people live, while history is a fuller, more ample, more reflective drama. (Fs)

Kommentar (04/28/06): "Just as drama is an objectification, a symbolization, of human life in some aspect or some situations, ..." Von daher verständlich der Begriff "dramatisches Subjekt". (Fs)

74a Now what I have been trying to do is to suggest this notion of historicity, but it is a very difficult notion to get hold of. On the other hand, it is a field of very fruitful reflections on the nature and significance of history. I cannot carry this notion any further here.1 (Fs)