Autor: Voegelin, Eric

Buch: The World of the Polis

Titel: The World of the Polis

Stichwort: Sokrates, Protagoras über Tugend; Perspektive, das rechte Maß

Kurzinhalt: Just as in spatial perspective one cannot judge true dimensions by appearances but must apply the measuring rod directly, so in the temporal distortions of goods and evils an art of measurement is required

Textausschnitt: 363b By means of such persistent prodding, urbane in form but hard in substance, Protagoras is pressured through the Socratic questions and answers on the issue of the one virtue. The result of the inquiry is the Socratic thesis that no human being errs voluntarily, or will voluntarily commit evil and dishonorable actions (345E). If he commits evil deeds he does so from ignorance of what is truly pleasant and good. The wrong things are preferred because their consequences are misjudged. Imminent evils loom larger than distant consequences, and present pleasures are overrated because of the same distortion of perspective through time. Just as in spatial perspective one cannot judge true dimensions by appearances but must apply the measuring rod directly, so in the temporal distortions of goods and evils an art of measurement is required in order to recognize the true proportions. The art of measurement (metretike techne) would do away with appearances and let the soul find rest in truth, saving our life (356D-E). To be overcome by pleasure, thus, truly means to be overcome by one's ignorance (357E). To be inferior to oneself is ignorance; to be superior to oneself is wisdom (358C). Virtue ultimately is one, the wisdom of measurement. (Fs) (notabene)

363c At this point the argument breaks off. The structure of the dialogue is completed because all the motifs are now gathered together in the Socratic conclusion. Protagoras started with the thesis that virtue can be taught; Socrates doubted the thesis?and he was right because virtues differ from each other and are not reducible to wisdom, which alone can be "taught." Moreover, the sophistic method of teaching by discourse is unfit for teaching virtue, even if it can be taught, because his very oratory prevents Protagoras from ever finding out what the virtue is that supposedly he can teach. Then, in the course of the argument, Socrates shifts to the position that virtue can be taught?and again he is right, under the condition that the different virtues are varieties of knowledge about the good. "Knowledge [episteme] is a noble and ruling thing"; it cannot be overcome by pleasures; wisdom (sophia) founded on knowledge (episteme) is the substance of all virtue (352C-D). If virtue is the art of measurement, then, and only then, is it teachable. The conclusion is hypothetical. Virtue is teachable if it is knowledge,- but is it knowledge? The question remains in suspense. Socrates professes his desire (prothymia) to clear up this further question; and he desires such ultimate clarity because he prefers Prometheus to Epimetheus, in forethinking care (prometheia) about the business of life (361C-D). The Prometheus-symbol of Protagoras is taken over in the end by Socrates. The sophist becomes the slow-witted Epimetheus who creates confusion because he cannot think ahead toward the most important part of his task; and Socrates, through his art of measurement, becomes the Promethean caretaker of man. (Fs)