Autor: Voegelin, Eric

Buch: The World of the Polis

Titel: The World of the Polis

Stichwort: Xenophanes - Elegie (sophie vs. Kraft); Differenzierung der Seele als sozial relevant

Kurzinhalt: The discovery of transcendence ... is not a matter of "subjective opinion; the differentiation of man, the discovery of his nature, is a source of social authori

Textausschnitt: 255a The attack on Homer and Hesiod is broadened in the elegy by the attack on the glory of panhellenic excellence. With regard to its theoretical structure, the new attack closely resembles the earlier one on the poets. The discovery of sophie is accompanied by an insight concerning the rank of the newly differentiated area of the soul; the philosopher knows that "it is not right" to judge strength higher in rank than his wisdom; the formula "it is not right," which appears on this occasion, corresponds to the earlier "it is not seemly." Theoretically the new formula suffers, therefore, from the same fallacy as the first one insofar as those who hold in honor the Olympian excellences do not actually judge them higher in rank than the Xenophanic wisdom, for the good reason that they have no knowledge of the latter. The new wisdom as a "knowledge about" the things of which Xenophanes speaks is accessible only to those who have developed it existentially as an awareness and habituation of the soul. Hence Xenophanes rightly speaks of "our wisdom" possessively, for the others, who supposedly have no proper regard for it, indeed do not possess it at all. (Fs) (notabene)

256a Knowledge and existence depend on one another; the order of being becomes visible only to those whose souls are well ordered. The correlation, which becomes an issue on occasion of the Xenophanic attacks, developed into the fundamental problem of an epistemology of political science, that is, into the problem of the double status of types of cognition as (a) cognitive functions of the mind and (b) as excellences or virtues of the soul. In Plato we shall see the problem unfolding into the insight that the "true" science of man in society is accessible only to the philosophers who have seen the Agathon. And in Aristotle we shall find the types of cognition (wisdom, science, art, prudence, and intellection) as the dianoetic excellences that enable man to lead the bios theoretikos. In Xenophanes the problem appears still in a rudimentary form, embedded in the practical act of a rebellion of "holy wisdom" against a glory that contributes nothing to the right order [eunomia) of the polis. (Fs) (notabene)

256b The practical aspects of the rebellion set a further pattern, which governed Hellenic politics down to Aristotle. The fallacy of berating people for their preferences, while in fact they live innocently in a tradition without knowledge of a preferable alternative, was more than a theoretical problem; as so frequently with fallacies of this type, there was a practical issue behind the facade of a theoretical mistake. Xenophanes was not satisfied with having gained his wisdom; he also wanted public recognition. This desire must not be understood in the cheap meaning of modern parlance. Xenophanes did not want attention for idiosyncrasies. He had discovered new areas of experience; and he knew that the differentiation of such experiences was an actualization of the common essence of man. The traditional culture of the polis had not yet risen to the new level of human civilization; but he sensed the rise as the duty of every human being individually as well as of the community in general. The qualification of the cultural tradition as a "preference" (while indeed no such preference exists) must be understood, therefore, against the background of the implied postulate that knowledge with regard to the essentials of humanity is a duty and, consequently, that ignorance in such matters is preference. (Fs) (notabene)

256c The discovery of transcendence, of intellectual and spiritual order, while occurring in the souls of individual human beings, is not a matter of "subjective opinion"; once the discovery is made, it is endowed with the quality of an authoritative appeal to every man to actualize it in his own soul; the differentiation of man, the discovery of his nature, is a source of social authority. The assertion of such authority, as well as the appeal to the ignorant to actualize the potentialities of their humanity, is a permanent factor in the dynamics of order. It is discernible as the justifying core even in such atrocious distortions as the colonization of "backward" peoples by the more "progressive" ones. While the objective authority of the appeal does not endow the prophet or discoverer from whom it emanates with a subjective right to maltreat his ignorant fellow men, there certainly is on the other side no subjective right to be ignorant. The unity of mankind is the community of the spirit. With the unfolding of the nature of man in history the men who actualize hitherto dormant potentialities in their souls live under the duty of communicating their insights to their fellow men; and on the others is incumbent the duty of living in openness to such communication.1 (Fs) (notabene)

257a This fundamental structure of the progress of mankind in history must be presupposed in the Xenophanic attack on agonal culture. The attack is not a personal affair but a type-creating event. The critique of society with the authority of the spiritual appeal remains from now on a type for the expression of political thought. The awareness of this type created by Xenophanes will help us to understand certain aspects of the Platonic work that otherwise might remain puzzling. The peculiar tension of the Republic, for instance, stems from its character as an appeal, directed to the Athenians with the spiritual authority of the philosopher. It would be an unfortunate misunderstanding to interpret this intense call for spiritual reform as a rational blueprint of an "ideal constitution." (Fs) (notabene)

257b Moreover, even the specific limitation of the Xenophanic appeal has set a type for later Hellenic politics. On principle, the appeal might be directed to mankind at large; it might transcend the limits of the polis and even of Hellas. In fact, however, both rebellion and appeal of Xenophanes accept the polis as its social field. Agonal culture comes under attack because a victory at Olympia contributes nothing to the eunomia of the polis; and inversely, the new excellence of sophia is in search of recognition not by man but by the citizen. The Xenophanic limitation of the appeal has remained typical for the later speculation on the existence of man in society. Even Plato, in spite of his concern about the spiritual reform of Hellas, did not let his institutional imagination range beyond a Hellenic federation under the hegemony of a savior-polis. And Aristotle still considered man a politikon zoon in the strict sense, that is, a being that could actualize the excellence of the bios theoretikos only as the citizen of a polis. The process of spiritual and intellectual differentiation of man was conceived as bound up with the culture of the polis to the