Autor: Voegelin, Eric

Buch: The World of the Polis

Titel: The World of the Polis

Stichwort: Homer, Dialektik: Blindheit - Sehen

Kurzinhalt: Is there really a time interval between blindness and seeing? Is man really at one time a passionate self, blinded, and at a later time ...

Textausschnitt: 174a A second important instance is furnished by Agamemnon's apology to Achilles (II. 19.78-144). The king casts the responsibility for his unjust action on a whole assembly of gods (Zeus, Moira, Erinys, Ate) who blinded him. But when the blindness falls from him, and he becomes seeing again, he assumes responsibility for his action and offers amends. With Homer a man's actions are his own only when he sees what he is doing; as long as he is blinded they are not his own and he is not responsible for them; but when in retrospect he sees again, then what he committed in blindness becomes his own through seeing and he compensates for his misdeeds. The analysis by means of the symbolism of "blindness" and "seeing" is of considerable interest for the later development of a theory of action. For Homer is on the way toward discovering what the philosophers will call the "true self," that is, the area in a man's soul in which he is oriented toward noetic order. When the true self dominates, then the man "sees"; and through the retroactive recognition of "blindness," the misdeed is integrated (as it were by a "conscience") into the acting self. Still, in the case of Agamemnon, the blindness remains the work of the gods; the absorption of the misdeed into the self does not yet go to the point of accepting the guilt for temporary "blindness." And in general there is no tendency toward an understanding of guilt in the Christian sense-either in Homer, or in the philosophers of the classical period who, although they develop the problem further, retain the Homeric position on principle. The continuity with regard to this problem, from Homer to the fourth century, will go far to explain the odd idea of Socrates-Plato of solving the problem of true order in the soul and society through "seeing," that is, through knowledge. (Fs) (notabene)

174a Nevertheless, the self-interpretation of Agamemnon in his apology to Achilles is perhaps not the last word of Homer in this matter. A wary psychologist will ask himself the question how "true" Agamemnon's story about his temporary blindness really is. Does a man, even in anger, not know in some corner of his mind that just now he is doing something which he ought not to do? Is there really a time interval between blindness and seeing? Is man really at one time a passionate self, blinded, and at a later time a true self horrified at the deeds of his passionate self? Homer certainly asked himself such questions. The proof is the scene of Paris in his chamber. There is the case of the elegant rotter who, in excellent self-analysis, informs Helen that his mind is obsessed by eros, and then pleasantly proceeds to act not on the "seeing" of his analysis but on the "blindness" of his passion. The case of Paris shows the simultaneity of blindness and seeing. And what happens in this case is most illuminating for Homeric as well as for Greek theory of action in general. We do not fall into the abysmally desperate situation described by Saint Paul in Romans 7, but into a refined rascality, not lacking in profoundness. (Fs)

175a The case of Paris shows that Homer knew about the mysteries of blindness and seeing. Nevertheless, it should not be taken as an expression of his own opinion in the matter. The apology of Agamemnon certainly does not mean to characterize the king as a hypocrite who tries to cover up the fact that he knew quite well what he was doing at the time and preferred to indulge in the voluptuousness of his anger.1 The case of Agamemnon must be taken at its face value as one of the various types in a psychology of action. Homer's own position should rather be inferred from the manner in which he constructs the story of the epics on principle. In both epics the story rests, as we have seen, on the careful analysis of the legal issues involved in the various actions. The public knowledge of order, of themis, of what is right, is the foundation for the actions of the heroes. Everybody knows, as a matter of public knowledge, exactly what he ought to do-and then he does something else. As an extreme case, to support this point, let us remember the old Priam, who knows quite well what is wrong but cannot wrest from himself the effort to maintain public order; he throws the responsibility on the gods and lets Troy go to destruction. The various figures of the epics, thus, are set by Homer against a background of public knowledge about what is right. They all "see" while they are "blinded"; but there are various degrees of blindness and sight, as well as a variety of relations between them. (Fs) (notabene)