Autor: Voegelin, Eric

Buch: The World of the Polis

Titel: The World of the Polis

Stichwort: Homer; der Mensch als sterbliches Wesen; Definition: Held

Kurzinhalt: Only one thing is really certain even about Homeric man: He must die; the hero in the Homeric sense can be defined as the man in whose actions a more-than-human order of being becomes manifest

Textausschnitt: 172a The Homeric problems of order originate in the uncertainties concerning the nature of man. Only one thing is really certain even about Homeric man: He must die. Hence, "mortal" is the preferred synonym for man, distinguishing his nature without a doubt from that of the immortal gods. For the rest, the transhuman elements of the order of being penetrate so deeply into man or, from the other side, man is yet so imperfectly closed as a self-conscious, reflecting agent, that the status of various phenomena as human or divine must remain in doubt and, in particular, that quite frequently it will not be certain to what extent the actions of man are his actions at all. Homer's difficulties in dealing with these problems, as well as the importance of his partial solutions, can be understood only if we place ourselves in his position. If, on the contrary, we interpret the epics under the assumption that he knew already what gods and men were, his specific achievement in clarifying the nature of man and the meaning of order will be obscured. Hence, we shall approach the problem casuistically by analyzing the two main classes of action as they appear in the epics, that is, first the actions that maintain and restore order, and second the actions that disturb order. (Fs)

172b All through the epics run divine interventions that result in human decisions of public importance. A typical case is the energetic action of Odysseus, in Iliad 2, when he holds back the army that is on the point of boarding ship for home; it is an action at the behest of Athena. The cases of this type are rather frequent. Any human decision, hesitation, or resolution somewhat out of the ordinary is apt to appear as inspired by divine counsel. They are so frequent indeed that sometimes the interventions themselves become a routine; Athena is a ubiquitous lady, especially in the Odyssey, arranging the voyage of Telemachus step by step, from pushing the young man into action, to outfitting the ship and getting him on his way. On the whole, however, the interventions effectively serve the purpose of raising the otherwise irrelevant doings of man to the rank of actions that are transparent toward the order of being. Ordinary men, going about their ordinary business, are not favored in this manner; the divine appearances are bestowed on the heroes when the consequences of their action affect public order. Hence, action in this limited sense acquires the more-than-human meaning of a manifestation of divine order; and the hero in the Homeric sense can be defined as the man in whose actions a more-than-human order of being becomes manifest. The Homeric clarification of the meaning of action was continued by Aeschylus. In his Suppliants especially, Aeschylus characterized heroic action (that is the only action deserving the name, as distinguished from ordinary doings) as the decision for Dike against demonic disorder; the order of the polis, insofar as it was established and maintained by such action, represented the order of Zeus. Action at the heroic height, thus, is as much human as it is the manifestation of a divine force. And the public order of a society, insofar as at critical junctures it depends on the forthcoming of such action, is precariously maintained in being at the borderline of this meeting of human with divine forces. (Fs)

173a The aetiology of order and disorder obviously cannot be reduced to a simple formula. Are the gods who inspire, or the men who obey, responsible for heroic action? And who is responsible for a debacle when a hero did not receive a divine inspiration at the right moment-the god who played truant or the man who embarked on an unfortunate course of action by his own light? And such questions become even more pungent when actions are disruptive. What is the status of ate in Homeric ethics? On the one hand, she is blinding passion that motivates actions in violation of just order; on the other hand, she is a goddess, the oldest daughter of Zeus who, on occasion, plays a trick even on her own father. Who is responsible for misdeeds caused by ate?. A detailed answer to such questions would require a monograph. We can do no more than state the principle of Homer's position, supported by a few cases. (Fs)

173b Throughout the Iliad the poet seems to be engaged in a subtle polemic against the morality of several of his figures-and the polemic quite probably is also aimed at his social environment, which sympathized with the figures. Take the case of Achilles: From Homer's descriptions he emerges as a splendid warrior, useful to have on your side in an emergency, but as a not very appealing figure, almost a pathological case. And the poet leaves no doubt that the trouble stems from toying and tampering with fate, from misusing the divine Thetis for satisfying the hero's childish desires, and from a reluctance to shoulder the burden of humanity. The difficulties fall apart when the burden of fate and responsibility is accepted with humility. (Fs)

174a A second important instance is furnished by Agamemnon's apology to Achilles (II. 19.78-144).