Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: Collection: Papers bei B. Lonergan

Titel: Collection: Papers bei B. Lonergan

Stichwort: Seinsvergessenheit -> Umdeutung der Subjektivität u. Objektivität (abwertend); Gemeinschaft

Kurzinhalt: The forgetfulness of being ... has brought about a semantic reversal. Subjectivity once was a pejorative term; praise of subjectivity seems to imply a condemnation of objectivity

Textausschnitt: Knowing and Living

219a The forgetfulness of being, manifested by naive realists and idealists,l has brought about a semantic reversal. Subjectivity once was a pejorative term;111 it denoted a violation of the normative exigences of intelligence and rationality. But it has come to denote a rejection of misconceived objectivity and a reaffirmation of man's right to be himself even though he cannot untie the hard and intricate knots of philosophy. (Fs)

219b This new usage is not without its own myth, in which Jack and Jill are concerned, not with their hands, but with one another. They look, of course, but much more they talk. They are not merely objects, but also subjects: an 'I' and 'thou' that add up to the single personal total of 'us' talking about 'ourselves' and what 'we' have done and shall do. (Fs) (notabene)

219c Objectivity, as misconceived, is transcended. The problem of the bridge from 'in here' to 'out there' tends to vanish when the whole stress falls on the interpersonal situation,n the psychic interchange of mutual presence, the beginnings of what may prove to be a lifelong union. (Fs) (notabene)

219d Objectivity, as correctly conceived, is by no means rejected. For Jack and Jill are not characters out of a social worker's casebook. They are neither unperceptive, nor stupid, nor silly. If they were, acquaintance would not blossom into friendship, nor friendship into intimacy. (Fs)

219e Still, this recognition of objectivity is only implicit, and, above all, it is not objective knowing but human living o that is the main point. To understand the myth, one has to move beyond strictly cognitional levels of empirical, intellectual, and rational consciousness to the more inclusive level of rational self-consciousness.p Though being and the good are coextensive, the subject moves to a further dimension of consciousness as his concern shifts from knowing being to realizing the good. Now there emerge freedom and responsibility, encounter and trust, communication and belief, choice and promise and fidelity. On this level subjects both constitute themselves and make their world. On this level men are responsible, individually, for the lives they lead and, collectively, for the world in which they lead them. It is in this collective responsibility for common or complementary action that resides the principal constituent of the collective subject referred to by 'we,' 'us,' 'ourselves,' 'ours.' (Fs) (notabene)
Kommentar (06/11/05): Wichtige Stelle oben -> Gemeinschaft
219f The condition of possibility of the collective subject is communication, and the principal communication is not saying what we know but showing what we are. To say what one knows presupposes the labor of coming to know. But to show what one is, it is enough to be it; showing will follow; every movement, every word, every deed, reveal what the subject is. They reveal it to others, and the others, in the self-revelation that is their response, obliquely reveal to the intelligent subject what he is. In the main it is not by introspection but by reflecting on our living in common with others that we come to know ourselves. (Fs)

220a What is revealed? It is an original creation. Freely the subject makes himself what he is; never in this life is the making finished; always it is still in process, always it is a precarious achievement that can slip and fall and shatter. Concern with subjectivity, then, is concern with the intimate reality of man. It is concern, not with the universal truths that hold whether a man is asleep or awake, not with the interplay of natural factors and determinants, but with the perpetual novelty of self-constitution, of free choices making the chooser what he is. (Fs)

220b Further aspects of the significance of subjectivity are endless, for the intimate reality of man grounds and penetrates all that is human. But the point to be made here is, not to go on insisting on this significance which, commonly enough, is recognized, but to draw attention to a real danger inherent in the semantic reversal that we have noted. For the danger is that the values of subjectivity in its more recent sense will be squandered by subjectivity in its prior and pejorative sense. Unless the two meanings are sharply distinguished, praise of subjectivity seems to imply a condemnation of objectivity. But condemnation of objectivity induces, not a merely incidental blind spot in one's vision, but a radical undermining of authentic human existence. (Fs) (notabene)

220c It is quite true that objective knowing is not yet authentic human living; but without objective knowing there is no authentic living; for one knows objectively just insofar as one is neither unperceptive, nor stupid, nor silly; and one does not live authentically inasmuch as one is either unperceptive or stupid or silly. (Fs)

220d It is quite true that the subject communicates not by saying what he knows but by showing what he is, and it is no less true that subjects are confronted with themselves more effectively by being confronted with others than by solitary introspection. But such facts by themselves only ground a technique for managing people; and managing people is not treating them as persons. To treat them as persons one must know and one must invite them to know. A real exclusion of objective knowing, so far from promoting, only destroys personalist values. (Fs)

221a It is quite true that concern for subjectivity promotes as much objective knowing as men commonly feel ready to absorb. Authentic living includes objective knowing, and far more eagerly do human beings strive for the whole than for the part. Nonetheless it remains that the authentic living of anyone reading this paper, though it must start at home, cannot remain confined within the horizons of the home, the workshop, the village. We are citizens of our countries, men of the twentieth century, members of a universal church. If any authenticity we achieve is to radiate out into our troubled world, we need much more objective knowing than men commonly feel ready to absorb. (Fs)