Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: Collection: Papers bei B. Lonergan

Titel: Collection: Papers bei B. Lonergan

Stichwort: Lonergan über Coreth (Gilson): Vollzug (performance); Magen - Schachtel (stomache - box)

Kurzinhalt: ... he begins, not from statement, but from a performance, a Vollzug, asking questions; Nihil in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu

Textausschnitt: 199b However, if Fr Coreth grants that statements have a meaning only within a horizon, how can he escape the dogmatism that Prof. Gilson believes inevitable? The answer is that he begins, not from statement, but from a performance, a Vollzug, asking questions. It is a performance that begins early in childhood and is continued even by an Aquinas until a higher form of knowledge supervenes. No doubt, that performance will be interpreted or overlooked in different manners when assumed within different horizons; but it is given to be interpreted or overlooked whether or not it is assumed. Nor can any doubt be entertained about the fact of the performance. To doubt questioning is to ask whether questions occur. The condition of the possibility of doubting is the occurrence of questioning. Fr Coreth, then, begins from a clearly known, universally accessible, indubitable occurrence. (Fs) (notabene)

200b Now the determination of the two poles is the determination of a horizon, and it is easy to see that Fr Coreth's horizon is total and basic. It is total, for beyond being there is nothing. It is basic, for a total horizon is basic; it cannot be transcended, gone beyond, and so it cannot be revised. (Fs)

200c But further, for Fr Coreth being is precisely what St Thomas meant by being. For as intended in questioning, being is unrestricted. In that premise there is already included the conclusion that esse de se est illimitatum, whence it will follow that finite being is a compound of essence and existence and that every ens is an ens by its relations to esse. (Fs)

200d From this it would seem to follow that being for Fr Coreth and being for Prof. Gilson must be exactly the same. For Prof. Gilson also means by being what St Thomas meant. It remains that this identification is not without its difficulties, for if the objective pole in Fr Coreth's horizon is the same as the objective pole in Prof. Gilson's, the subjective poles are manifestly different. (Fs)

200e Thus Fr Coreth would accept the principle, Nihil in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu. But he would have to distinguish, say, between the way there is nothing in a box and the way there is nothing in a stomach. When there is nothing in a box, a box does not feel empty; when there is nothing in a stomach, the stomach does feel empty. Human intelligence is more like a stomach than like a box. Though it has no answers, and so is empty, still it can ask questions. (Fs)

200g Again, for Prof. Gilson, our knowledge of being is a posteriori: abstract concepts of being and existence are had by abstracting from sense; and to reach the concrete there is added to the abstractions his intellectual vision. But for Fr Coreth, being is an a priori, i.e., the intention of being in questioning bears no resemblance to sensitive or empirical knowledge. What is perceived is not unknown, not to be known, but already known. But being as intended in questioning is the exact opposite of the object of perception: it is not already known; it is unknown; it is to be known. In other words, the analysis of questioning forces one to conceive human intelligence, not on the analogy of sense, but properly in terms of intelligence itself. (Fs)
201a Moreover, we have seen that Fr Coreth rejects the idealist's acceptance of idealism as contradictory, that Prof. Gilson regards idealism as non-contradictory, that consequently he is left with a problem of a bridge from a concept of l'etre en general to an existence concrete, actuelle, extra-mentale, and that, inevitably enough, this bridge has to be an intellectual perception of existence. This narrative, it would seem, enables us to pick the exact point at which Prof. Gilson and Fr Coreth part company. Both agree that idealism is noncontradictory. But where Fr Coreth maintains that the idealist's acceptance of idealism is contradictory, and so eliminates the problem of the bridge, Prof. Gilson acknowledges a problem of a bridge and so arrives at his need for an intellectual perception of being. Hence, being can be a priori for Fr Coreth, because for him the idealist is involved in self-contradiction; but being must be a posteriori for Prof. Gilson, because for him idealism is not self-contradictory. (Fs)

201b Finally, there remains the question how Fr Coreth and Prof. Gilson both arrive at the same objective pole, being in the Thomist sense, when their subjective poles are mutually exclusive. The explanation would seem to be that, if Prof. Gilson does not thematize questioning, nonetheless he asks questions and so intends what is intended in questioning; further, while Prof. Gilson asserts an intellectual perception of existence, still he is careful to integrate this perception within the structure of Thomist cognitional theory, and so is able to shift from a theory of being as something seen in data to a theory of being as something affirmed in perceptual judgments of existence. Hence, inasmuch as Prof. Gilson asks questions and gives rational answers, his position coincides with that of Fr Coreth, and as the subjective poles are the same so the objective poles are the same. On the other hand, if Prof. Gilson were to operate simply and solely with a concept of being that can be 'seen' in any sensible datum, not only would his subjective pole differ from Fr Coreth's but also it would be impossible for him to reach being in the Thomist sense as his objective pole; for being as object of perception is being in which essence and existence are only notionally distinct. (Fs)