Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: Collection: Papers bei B. Lonergan

Titel: Collection: Papers bei B. Lonergan

Stichwort: Intellekt als Potenz; Intellekt als Erfassen von Washeiten; ens per essentiam

Kurzinhalt: What differentiates intellect from sense is precisely its grasp of essence; recognition of the essentially dynamic character of our intellects and, in particular, of our notion of being

Textausschnitt: 2 The Finalistic Notion of Being

145b My second topic has to do with the notion of being, and I shall begin with a problem. You will agree, I believe, that there is one and only one ens per essentiam, that it is not an immediate object of our knowledge in this life, that the only immediate objects of our present knowledge are entia per participationem. It follows that our intellectual knowledge of being cannot result from abstraction of essence. For if from a horse I abstract essence, what I abstract is the essence, not of being, but of horse; if from a man I abstract essence, what I abstract is the essence, not of being, but of man; and the same holds for every other immediate object of our present knowledge. No being by participation can yield us knowledge of the essence of being, because no being by participation has the essence of being; and what is true of essence, equally is true of quiddity, nature, species, and form. A being by participation no more has the quiddity of being, the nature of being, the species of being, the form of being, than it has the essence of being. (Fs) (notabene)

146a Now this fact gives rise to a problem. What differentiates intellect from sense is precisely its grasp of essence or, if you prefer, its grasp of quiddity or nature or species or form. But in this life we do not grasp the essence or quiddity or nature or species or form of being. How then can we have any intellectual notion, any intellectual concept, any intellectual knowledge of being? Indeed, to put the problem with the sharpness that is essential, how is it that we have precisely such an intellectual notion of being that (1) we can conceive the ens per essentiam and (2) we can pronounce the only beings that we do know directly to be merely entia per participationem? (Fs) (notabene)

146b Further, this problem of the notion of being is not unique, isolated, unparalleled. If in this life we cannot know God by his essence, it also is true that we know the essences of material things only rarely, imperfectly, doubtfully. If our knowledge of essence is so rare and imperfect, should we not conclude either that Aristotle and Aquinas were mistaken in characterizing human intellect by knowledge of essence or, perhaps, that we have not intellects in the full sense of that term? (Fs) (notabene)

146c Many of you, I feel, will incline to the latter alternative. Human intellect is in genere rerum intelligibilium ut ens in potentia tantum, it belongs to the realm of spirit merely as potency. Its knowing is process. It is not some simple matter of grasping essence and affirming existence. It is the prolonged business of raising questions, working out tentative answers, and then finding that these answers raise further questions. Dynamism, process, finality are fundamental features of our intellects in this life. Hence, knowledge of things by their essences is for us, not an accomplished fact, but only the goal, the end, the objective of a natural desire. (Fs) (notabene)

147a Moreover, according to Aquinas, the object of the natural desire of our intellects includes the ens per essentiam. When we learn of God's existence, spontaneously we ask what God is; but to ask what something is, releases a process that does not come to rest until knowledge of essence is attained; therefore we have a natural desire to know God by his essence. (Fs)

147b By such reasoning I was led in Insight to affirm that our natural intellectual desire to know was a natural intellectual desire to know being. The desire, precisely because it is intelligent, is a notion.d But the notion is not any innate idea or concept or knowledge. It is a desire for ideas, for concepts, for knowledge but, of itself, it is merely discontented ignorance without ideas, without concepts, without knowledge. Again, it is not a postulate. Postulates are parts of hypothetical answers, but the desire to know grounds questions. Nor is there any need to postulate questions. They are facts. (Fs) (notabene)

147c What is the issue here? I think it both very simple and very fundamental. If intellect is not characterized by its capacity to grasp essence, then I believe that one parts company from Aristotle and Aquinas and, as well, from any adequate account of the nature of human intelligence. If, on the other hand, intellect is characterized by its capacity to grasp essence, then the fact that our knowledge of essences is so slight can be met only by a full recognition of the essentially dynamic character of our intellects and, in particular, of our notion of being. (Fs) (notabene)