Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: Collection: Papers bei B. Lonergan

Titel: Collection: Papers bei B. Lonergan

Stichwort: Sprache, Schlussfolgerung; wenn A, dann B als Grundfrom des Schließens; Kausalsatz, Konzessivsatz, Bedingungssatz

Kurzinhalt: Thus a study of language has given us a working hypothesis: the form of inference is the simple hypothetical argument.

Textausschnitt: 4a Any language has a number of syntactical forms that are peculiarly inferential. Most obvious is the causal sentence, because A, therefore B, where A and B each stand for one or more propositions. Next comes the concessive sentence, although A, still not B, which is the natural instrument of anyone ready to admit the propositions, A, but wishing to deny that A implies B. To meet such denial, to give separate expression to the implication of B in A, there is the host of conditional sentences, if A, then B, which may be past or present, proximate or remote future, particular or general, actually verified or the pure interconnection grammarians call contrary-to-fact. It is not hard to see that these three syntactical forms are peculiarly inferential. Just as 'so that' and 'in order that' express the relations of efficient and final causality, so also 'because,' 'although,' and 'if are the special tools of reasoning man. (Fs) (notabene)

4b Closely related to these linguistic tools is the transition from informal to formal inference. It appears a fact that spontaneous thinking sees at once the conclusion, B, in apprehending the antecedents, A. Most frequently the expression of this inference will be simply the assertion of B. Only when questioned do men add that the 'reason for B' is A; and only when a debate ensues does there emerge a distinction between the two elements in the 'reason for B,' namely, the antecedent fact or facts, A, and the implication of B in A (if A, then B). Thus the transition from informal to formal inference is a process of analysis: it makes explicit, at once in consciousness and in language, the different elements of thought that were present from the first moment. For when B simply is asserted, it is asserted not as an experience but as a conclusion; else a question would not elicit the answer, B because of A. Again, when this answer is given, there would be no meaning to the 'because' if all that was meant was a further assertion, A. On the contrary, the causal sentence (because A, therefore B) compresses into one the three sentences of the formal analysis (if A, then B; A; ? B). (Fs) (notabene)

5a No doubt these considerations throw some light both on the prevalence of enthymeme and on the awkwardness of a logical theory that overlooks the normal syntax of inference to design a Procrustean bed with predication. But at any rate it is from the syntactical forms that the logician derives his simple hypothetical argument. This is of the type (Fs)
If A, then B
But A
() B. (Fs)

5b Its indefinite flexibility is apparent: A and B each stand for one or two or any number of propositions; the propositions may be categorical, disjunctive, or hypothetical; and there is no reason why any of them should be forced into the mold of subject, copula, and predicate. No less apparent is the radical simplicity of this type. Every inference is the implication of a conclusion in a premise or in premises: the conclusion is B; the premise or premises are A; the implication is, if A, then B. Thus a study of language has given us a working hypothesis: the form of inference is the simple hypothetical argument. (Fs) (notabene)