Autor: Stebbins, J. Michael

Buch: The Divine Initiative

Titel: The Divine Initiative

Stichwort: Instrumentale Wirkursache; esse imperfectum -> analog zu Bewegung; 2 Arten von Wirkursachen; Beispiel: Meißel

Kurzinhalt: Instrumental Efficient Causality; 'principal inasmuch as the perfection of its form either equals or exceeds the perfection of the effect'; the other is 'instrumental inasmuch ...

Textausschnitt: 24/7 The reader is already familiar with Lonergan's definition of an efficient cause and with the idea that the proportion of an efficient cause is determined by its form. Lonergan goes on to distinguish two kinds of efficient cause: one kind is 'principal inasmuch as the perfection of its form either equals or exceeds the perfection of the effect'; the other is 'instrumental inasmuch as the perfection of its form is exceeded by the perfection of the effect' (DES:63). How can an effect be more perfect than its cause? According to Aquinas, only if the cause is instrumental to the causal activity of some other efficient cause that itself is proportionate to the effect. Hence, Lonergan can also define an instrument or an instrumental efficient cause as 'a lower cause moved by a higher so as to produce an effect within the category proportionate to the higher' (GF:81; cf. GO:142-44). In other words, instrumentality is defined in terms of the relation between causes with differing degrees of ontological perfection. (220; Fs) (notabene)

25/7 Now the definitions just given imply that the only principal efficient cause, in the strict sense of the term, is God (DES:64). Every effect exists, but God is the only being that exists through the perfection of its form; hence, God alone is proportionate to producing actual existence or occurrence. As a consequence, 'every effect, inasmuch as it exists [inquantum habet esse], exceeds the proper proportion of any finite cause whatsoever' (ibid.). Whenever a finite cause produces an effect - even, let it be emphasized, when the form of the effect is less perfect than that of the cause - the cause is never more than instrumental with respect to the production of the effect's actual existence or occurrence (GF:89-9O; DSAVD:81). (220; Fs) (notabene)

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27/7 Finally, what is it about the instrument that allows it to produce effects more perfect than itself? Since the entire effect does in fact proceed from the instrumental efficient cause, then 'if the instrument is to operate beyond its proper proportion and within the category of the higher cause, it must receive some participation of the latter's special productive capacity' (GF:81; cf. DES:64). This participation pertains not to the instrument's form as such (for by definition, its form is less perfect than that of either the principal cause or the effect) but to its operation. What makes the chisel proportionate to the sculpting of a statue is not the form of the chisel but rather the precise pattern of the chisel's motions - a pattern caused by the artist, without which the shape of the statue would never emerge from the piece of stone. This participation of the instrumental cause in the proportion of the higher cause, this active potency of the instrument as such, is called 'instrumental power' (virtus instrumentalis). (220f; Fs)

28/7 Aquinas defines instrumental power by way of an analogy with motion. Motion is
not 'something' but a process 'towards something.' It is not included in any of the ten genera entis [genera or categories of being], but it is the process towards three of them; it is 'towards being in a place,' 'towards being of a certain kind,' 'towards being of a certain size.' This intermediate between not being and being, the process towards being something, is termed an esse incompletum. (GO: 143)

29/7 Local movement, change in quality, change in size - each represents the coming-to-be of some reality that is the term of the motion, so that motion can be thought of as the 'incomplete being' of the term, the term in its process of becoming (V:101-105; cf. GF:81 note 84). The analogy, then, is that 'just as motion is the esse incompletum of its term, for instance, "becoming white" is an incomplete "being white," so also the proportion of the instrument is an incomplete realisation of the proportion of the principal cause.' The fact that Aquinas proposes this analogy is important because, as I will show later in this chapter, it represents yet another point with respect to which Lonergan takes exception to the Bannezians' overconfident appropriation of the label 'Thomist.' (221; Fs)