Autor: Stebbins, J. Michael

Buch: The Divine Initiative

Titel: The Divine Initiative

Stichwort: Philipp der Kanzler: natürlich - übernatürlich; appetitus pure naturalis, sequens cognitionem

Kurzinhalt: Philip the Chancellor: distinction between the natural and supernatural orders; the core of Philip's achievement lies in what might be called his rediscovery of the natural order:

Textausschnitt: 36/3 It was in opposition to this view that Philip the Chancellor first employed the theoretical distinction between the natural and supernatural orders. In his Summa de bono he distinguishes between a purely natural appetite (appetitus pure naturalis) and an appetite that follows knowledge (appetitus sequens cognitionem). A purely natural appetite - say, the tendency of a stone to fall when released - loves or desires on its own account, but an appetite that follows knowledge conforms to the mode of knowledge. Now the love of God above all things, Philip says, is of the second type, for it is motivated by the knowledge that God is the highest of all goods that are good in themselves. Since the mode of that love corresponds to the mode of the knowledge from which it springs, and since we possess two sources of knowledge about God - faith and reason - there must be a corresponding duality in our love of God. By faith we acquire knowledge of God that lies beyond the grasp of unaided reason (the fact that God is a Trinity of persons, for instance, or that the Word became flesh), and by this means our intellect is raised above itself. The knowledge of faith gives rise to charity, which elevates us per gratiam et per gloriam (through grace and glory). By reason, on the other hand, we acquire knowledge of God through creatures and accordingly are moved to a natural love of God above all things. This latter knowledge and its consequent love do not elevate us above ourselves because they are the result of natural gifts bestowed on us by the Creator. None the less, the natural love of God constitutes a true love of God super omnia that is radically distinct from self-regarding appetite. (78f; Fs)

37/3 In this fashion, says Lonergan, Philip 'presented the theory of two orders, entitatively disproportionate: not only was there the familiar series of grace, faith, charity and merit, but also nature, reason and the natural love of God' (GF:15-16). One might be hard put to find a tidy summary of the theorem in Philip's work; for that matter, the word 'supernatural' does not occur anywhere in what Landgraf considers to be the crucial passages of the Summa de bono. But Philip's argument for the existence of a natural love of God above all things reveals that he grasped the essence of the theorem of the supernatural, namely, the disproportion between the order of nature and the order of grace. By the gift of nature we attain true knowledge and love of God; by the gift of grace we attain a more profound knowledge and love that lie utterly beyond the reach of our unaided natural powers. In this sense, grace 'elevates' nature. (79; Fs) (notabene)