Autor: Stebbins, J. Michael

Buch: The Divine Initiative

Titel: The Divine Initiative

Stichwort: Gnade - Ripalda; Behauptung der Möglichkeit einer übernatürlichen Substanz: Widerspruch in sich

Kurzinhalt: God is able to create a substance -> that a communication of the divine nature is naturally owed to it; the created communication of the divine nature is a mystery in the strict sense

Textausschnitt: 67/2 In discussing the second thesis of De ente supernaturali, Lonergan devotes considerable space to refuting a pair of objections to his contention that the created communication of the divine nature is absolutely supernatural. By ruling out the possibility that God could create a being possessed of such a high degree of ontological perfection that it would be proportionate to the created communication of the divine nature, Lonergan places himself in the mainstream of scholastic opinion. But not all have shared the majority view. Juan Martinez de Ripalda , in particular, as well as Luis de Molina, Gregory of Valencia, and M. Morlaix have argued that 'there is no contradiction, or no contradiction can be established, in such statements as, "God is able to create a substance so perfect that a communication of the divine nature is naturally owed to it."' According to Heinrich Lennerz, the problem in Ripalda's case can be traced to the peculiar twist he gave to the notion of nature: (59; Fs)
Ripalda did not extend the concept of nature (the natural order) to all creatable substances, but restricted it to existing substances and to those possible substances which are associated [affines] with existing substances. Thus there are, perhaps, possible substances superior to existing substances, to which the vision of God would be connatural; he calls such a creature a 'supernatural substance' [substantiam supernaturalem].

68/2 In other words, the created communication of the divine nature is conceived as exceeding the proportion only of all actually existing finite substances, not of all finite substances whatsoever; thus it is only relatively supernatural. Ripalda, insisting that he found nothing inherently unreasonable in positing the possibility of a supernatural substance, contended that the disapproval levelled at this view by 'more recent' theological authority was not sufficient grounds for condemning it. (59; Fs) (notabene)

71/2 Lonergan considers a counterargument that might be made in defence of Ripalda's position (DES:31). Isn't it just so much double-talk to assert that the communication of the divine nature is, on the one hand, created and finite and, on the other, proportionate to God precisely as infinite? Isn't such a claim obviously absurd? The objection gives Lonergan a chance to clarify further his notion of the created communication of the divine nature. His response hinges on a discussion of the distinction between substance and the other metaphysical components (DES:32). Substance is an essence in the strict sense and as such is defined through itself and without relation to an other (per se ipsa et sine habitudine ad aliud). Everything besides substance, however, is necessarily defined not only through what it is but also through relation to some other: esse is the act of a substance, accidents exist only in substances, and cognoscitive and appetitive operations, excepting God's, not only exist in substances but also receive their specific determination from an object (DES:32). Lonergan remarks that, 'since a substance is that which is defined only through what it is in itself, it follows that a substance defined through God uti in se est is God and infinite' (DES:32). Thus, Ripalda's notion of a created substance proportionate to the beatific vision is a contradiction in terms. The same cannot be said, however, of the created communication of the divine nature. It is not a substance but only a principle by which certain operations are present in creatures: in the case of Christ, the act of existing by which the assumed human nature is made capable of being united with the divine nature in the person of the Word; in us it is sanctifying grace, the entitative habit from which spring the habit of charity in the will and the light of glory in the intellect, which in turn are the proximate principles of acts of charity and of the beatific vision. Consequently, even though it is defined through God uti in se est, the created communication of the divine nature is not a substance and so is not identical to God. And though it is proportionate to God as infinite, it is itself infinite only in a restricted sense, that is, 'insofar as it is ordered to attaining God uti in se est (DES:31; italics added). (60f; Fs)