Autor: Stebbins, J. Michael

Buch: The Divine Initiative

Titel: The Divine Initiative

Stichwort: Definition: Substanz; Unterschied: Substand- Akzidenz; essentia: simpliciter dicta , secundum quid: erste, zweite Substanz

Kurzinhalt: substance may be defined as 'that to which it belongs to be per se; accidents: also includes an added relation to their subject; first, secon act

Textausschnitt: 8/2 The easiest way to begin, it seems to me, is to recall that an essence is the concept or definition of a thing, the answer to the question, 'What is it?' Essences are of two kinds. There is substance (quod quid est), which Lonergan defines as 'essence in the strict sense' (essentia simpliciter dicta) (DES:5), the ultimate goal of any scientific inquiry. Less accurately, says Lonergan, substance may be defined as 'that to which it belongs to be per se.' In contrast to substance is accident, which is 'essence in a restricted sense' (essentia secundum quid) (DES:5). Respiration, for instance, is an accident; so too is an intellect. These have essences in the sense that one can define what they are; none the less they have essences only imperfectly, because they do not exist per se but only with reference to some substance that serves as their subject. Hence 'substance alone is a quid [a 'what'] without qualification; accidents, too, are instances of quid, but only after a fashion, for their intelligibility is not merely what they are, but also includes an added relation to their subject; and this difference in their intelligibility and essence involves a generically different modus essendi [mode of being].' In this context the term 'accident' should not be taken to suggest the merely incidental. Lonergan is thinking of proper accidents, that is, the properties that a being has because of what it is; these are, after their own fashion, 'essential' aspects of a being. (38; Fs)

9/2 In each 'line' of being, the substantial and the accidental, one can identify two kinds of act and two corresponding kinds of potency. In the line of substance, form actuates matter, and existence actuates essence. In the line of accident, accidental form actuates accidental potency, and accidental act (operation) actuates operative potency (that is, accidental potency that has received a determination from accidental form). Thus form is called 'first act,' and act, in the sense of esse or operation, is called 'second act.' Lonergan points out that second act is a primitive notion that 'is more invoked than defined; with regard to substance it is the act of existence; with regard to accident it is the act of being moved, of shining, of becoming hot, of sensing, of understanding, of willing' (DES:36). First act, in turn, is defined in terms of second act: it is 'the principle by which a specifically determined second act is per se in a subject' (DES:38), where per se means 'intelligibly and uniformly by reason of the subject itself (DES:58), and where 'subject' refers to essence or to operative potency. Hence first act is form, either substantial or accidental, or something similar to form such as a habit (DES59), because form is the reason why a given subject is in fact an appropriate potency for a particular second act: (39; Fs) (notabene)
Thus in Aristotelian physics heaviness or the form of heaviness is a first act, since it is the principle by which a heavy object is per se moved downwards. Similarly, the external sensitive potencies (sight, hearing, etc.) are the principles by which per se sensitive operations (acts of seeing, acts of hearing, etc.) occur in sensitive organs. And in the same way, operative habits in the intellect (science) and in the will (virtue, vice) are the principles by which per se operations (of science, of virtue, of vice) occur in the intellect or will. (DES:38)

12/2 With regard to the distinction between accidental and essential passive potency, Lonergan adds the following explanation: (40; Fs)
A passive potency is called accidental because it is only per accidens [that is, because of some extrinsic circumstance] if a second act is not in it: thus whoever has the potency of sight, per se sees in second act, [but] per accidens does not see in second act, for if the required conditions are met he is able to see whenever he wishes.
A passive potency is called essential because it lacks a form or habit or other similar principle by which per se a second act is in it. (DES:59)
13/2 Thus, the point of referring to these passive potencies as 'accidental' and 'essential' is to indicate the state of the subject relative to the reception of second act. A human embryo is in essential passive potency to seeing, for though it will have eyes, it does not yet have them; a mature human whose eyes are closed is in accidental passive potency to seeing; a mature human whose eyes are open (and properly functioning) actually sees (NTR:12). Similarly, the raw materials that go into the manufacturing of a car are in essential passive potency to being a car that is actually driven; a car sitting in a garage is in accidental passive potency to being actually driven. (40; Fs)
14/2 Lonergan emphasizes that the constitutive ontological components - substantial and accidental potency, form, and act - are really distinct from one another. Two terms, A and B, are really distinct if A is, if B is, and if A is not B. Now potency, form, and act are all verifiable components of proportionate being. Form is neither potency nor act, because form is intelligible in itself but potency and act are not. Furthermore, potency and act have their intelligibility in some other, but each with respect to a different other. Potency is rendered intelligible by form. Act, though specifically determined by form, is not thereby rendered fully intelligible, for all acts are contingent and so also require an efficient cause to account for them - a fact whose implications are considered in the next section. Hence potency and act are really distinct from one another. Finally, substance and accident are really distinct as well. Substance has its being per se; and accident has its being only in relation to substance; consequently, substance can be defined without reference to accident, but not vice versa (V: 156-57). There is, for example, a real distinction between me and my acts of understanding (NTR:25). (40; Fs) (notabene)