Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: A Third Collection

Titel: A Third Collection

Stichwort: Naturrecht in der Geschichte; Einsicht der Griechen (Tier, Mensch); Aristoteles' Definition v. Natur

Kurzinhalt: From that premise there followed a conclusion. What had been made by human convention ...; ...in the notion of natural right was found its rebuttal; Aristotel: nature as an immanent principle of movement and of rest

Textausschnitt: 9/11 It was the sheer multiplicity and diversity of the practises and beliefs of the peoples of the earth that led the ancient Greeks to contrast animals and men. The habits of each species of animal were uniform and so they could be attributed to nature. But the practises and beliefs of men differed from tribe to tribe, from city to city, from region to region: they had to be simply a matter of convention. (171; Fs)
10/11 From that premise there followed a conclusion. What had been made by human convention, could be unmade by further convention. Underpinning human manners and customs there was no permanent and binding force. (171f; Fs)

11/11 The conclusion was scandalous, and in the notion of natural right was found its rebuttal. Underneath the manifold of human lifestyles, there existed a component or factor that possessed the claims to universality and permanence of nature itself. (172; Fs)
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12/11 However, this component or factor admits two interpretations. It may be placed in universal propositions, self-evident truths, naturally known certitudes. On the other hand, it may be placed in nature itself, in nature not as abstractly conceived, but as concretely operating. It is, I believe, the second alternative that has to be envisaged if we are to determine norms in historicity. (172; Fs) (notabene)
13/11 Now Aristotle defined a nature as an immanent principle of movement and of rest. In man such a principle is the human spirit as raising and answering questions. As raising questions, it is an immanent principle of movement. As answering questions and doing so satisfactorily, it is an immanent principle of rest. (172; Fs) (notabene)
15/11 Still, intellectual satisfaction, however welcome, is not all that the human spirit seeks. Beyond satisfaction it is concerned with content and so the attainment of insight leads to the formulation of its content. We express a surmise, suggest a possibility, propose a project. But our surmise may awaken surprise, our suggested possibility give rise to doubts, our project meet with criticism. In this fashion intelligence gives way to reflection. The second type of question has emerged. As intelligence thrust us beyond the flow of sensitive spontaneity, so now reflection thrusts us beyond the more elementary concerns of both sense and intelligence. The formulated insight is greeted with such further and different questions as, Is that so? Are you sure? There is a demand for sufficient reason or sufficient evidence; and what is sufficient is nothing less than an unconditioned, though a virtually unconditioned (such as a syllogistic conclusion) will do. (172f; Fs) (notabene)
16/11 It remains that the successful negotiation of questions for intelligence and questions for reflection is not enough. They do justice to sensitive presentations and representations. But they are strangely dissociated from the feelings that constitute the mass and momentum of our lives. Knowing a world mediated by meaning is only a prelude to man's dealing with nature, to his interpersonal living and working with others, to his existential becoming what he is to make of himself by his own choices and deeds. So there emerge questions for deliberation. Gradually they reveal their scope in their practical, interpersonal, and existential dimensions. Slowly they mount the ladder of burgeoning morality. Asking what's in it for me gives way to asking what's in it for us. And both of these queries become tempered with the more searching, the wrenching question, Is it really worthwhile? (173; Fs)
17/11 It is a searching question. The mere fact that we ask it points to a distinction between feelings that are self-regarding and feelings that are disinterested. Self-regarding feelings are pleasures and pains, desires and fears. But disinterested feelings recognize excellence: the vital value of health and strength; the communal value of a successfully functioning social order; the cultural value proclaimed as a life to be sustained not by bread alone but also by the word; the personal appropriation of these values by individuals; their historical extension in progress; deviation from them in decline; and their recovery by self-sacrificing love. (173; Fs)


12/11 However, this component or factor admits two interpretations. It may be placed in universal propositions, self-evident truths, naturally known certitudes. On the other hand, it may be placed in nature itself, in nature not as abstractly conceived, but as concretely operating. It is, I believe, the second alternative that has to be envisaged if we are to determine norms in historicity. (172; Fs)