Stichwort: Identität

Autor, Quelle: Lonergan, Bernard J.F., The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: Bewegung: actio - passio

Index: Reale Identität: Bewegung und actio - Bewegung und passio

Kurzinhalt: The classic example of this is the real identity that Aristotle affirmed between motion and action and between motion and passion

Text: 283b The classic example of this is the real identity that Aristotle affirmed between motion and action and between motion and passion. He defines action as 'the act of a thing considered as being from this thing,' that is, an act of an agent considered as proceeding from the agent, and passion he defines as 'the act of a thing considered as being in this thing,' that is, the act of a recipient considered as being received in the recipient. And since the act that proceeds from the agent is the same as that which is received in the recipient, namely, the motion produced by the agent and received in the recipient, it follows that both action and passion are really identical with motion. One can see from this example why this theorem is apparently so difficult for so many. For 'action' and 'passion' add to motion the relations 'as from this' and 'as in this'; but this added intelligibility is far different from the intelligibility of the motion of an absolute, and therefore to many it seems extremely difficult to see that such diverse intelligibilities of the absolute and of relatives are present in one and the same reality. (Fs) (notabene)

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285a Still, we must admit that there is no example of this to be found in creation. Action and passion in the Aristotelian sense, which are really identical with motion, are not mutually opposed, since action regards the agent and passion the recipient. In fact, since 'from the agent' and 'in the recipient' pertain to one undivided intelligibility, they stand in a single order and constitute but one order or one real relation. (Fs)

285b If, however, action is understood as a relation of the agent to the recipient and passion as a relation of the recipient to the agent, then indeed we have relations that are real and mutually opposed. Nevertheless, action and passion understood in this way cannot be really identical with the same third, since action supposes act, passion supposes potency, and the same reality in the same respect cannot be both in act and in potency. (Fs) (notabene)

Stichwort: Identität

Autor, Quelle: Lonergan, Bernard J.F., The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: Wissen - Identität, nicht Dualität

Index: Wissen als Identität: das Intelligible als der Intellekt im Akt

Kurzinhalt: No knowledge is rooted in duality, since sense in act is the sensible in act and intellect in act is the intelligible in act.

Text: 303e With regard to the first argument advanced in favor of this intermediate distinction, we must point out that its major premise rests on a false supposition. No knowledge is rooted in duality, since sense in act is the sensible in act and intellect in act is the intelligible in act. Much less does God's knowledge of divinity entail duality, since in what is without matter the one who understands and what is understood are identical, and the very essence of the truth in divine knowledge of God consists not in similarity but in the absence of dissimilarity. (Fs)

Stichwort: Identität

Autor, Quelle: Lonergan, Bernard J.F., The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: Identität - Wort, Ding

Index: Identität - Wort, Ding; esse naturale - esse intelligibile

Kurzinhalt: Every word is in a way the very thing that is expressed by that word; otherwise a word would not be the medium in which either the essence or the existence of a thing is known. And indeed, if a thing is understood by analogy ...

Text: 661b The third difference concerns the natural mode of existence (esse naturale) and the intellective mode of existence (esse intelligibile). (Fs)

Every word is in a way the very thing that is expressed by that word; otherwise a word would not be the medium in which either the essence or the existence of a thing is known. And indeed, if a thing is understood by analogy, the word conceived or uttered by the one who understands is partly similar to that thing and partly different from it. But if a thing is understood by its quiddity and is exactly conceived, the word conceived by the one who understands is in every respect similar to the thing. (Fs) (notabene)

661c Now there is this difference between God and creatures, that in no creature are existence and understanding the same (Summa theologies, i, q. 54, a. 2), whereas in God there is no distinction whatsoever between existence and understanding (ibid. q. 14, aa. 2 and 4; q. 16, a. 5, ad 2m). Hence, it follows that in creatures there is a difference between the natural mode of existence and the intellective mode of existence, while in God these two modes of existence are absolutely identical. (Fs)